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The Separate Tax Status of Loan-Out
Corporations
Mary LaFrance 48 Vand. L. Rev. 879 (1995)
When professionals and other persons who offer their goods and/or
services to the public conduct their businesses through corporations, the
Treasury has acknowledged that for federal income tax purposes it must treat
those corporations as separate and distinct from their controlling shareholder-
employees, even where there is only a single shareholder-employee, provided
that the corporation has a business purpose and the taxpayer consistently re-
spects the corporate form. However, the Treasury has refused to accord equal
dignity to incorporated workers who offer their services not to the public at
large but to a single recipient or a small number of recipients. The rationale
for denying the separate taxpayer status of these "loan-out" corporations is
that the party "borrowing" the services of the corporation's employee is the true
employer under common law rules designed to distinguish between independ-
ent contractors and employees.
This Article examines the tax benefits of incorporating a service busi-
ness and the principles which have evolved to prevent taxpayer abuse of those
benefits, and evaluates the Treasury's rationale for using worker reclassifica-
tion to deny loan-outs the tax benefits available to other closely-held corpora-
tions. The examination reveals that the common law worker classification
standards are not an appropriate test of whether a corporation or its employee
is the principal in a transaction. Although paternalism and administrative
convenience arguments may favor classifying workers as employees under
some circumstances, these arguments deserve little weight where the worker
makes the affirmative decision to form a loan-out, thus acknowledging em-
ployee status and disputing only the identity of the employer. In effect, the
government's position in the loan-out cases denies the taxpayer the opportunity
to select the employment contract that will provide the greatest after-tax re-
turns.
Taken to its logical consequence, the government's worker reclassifica-
tion approach to disregarding loan-outs would treat any controlled corpora-
tion as the agent of its controlling shareholder, a position inconsistent with
settled principles of tax law. It is also unnecessary, in light of the anti-abuse
rules which are already available to distinguish fraudulent transactions. The
Article concludes that the Treasury's effort to disregard properly formed loan-
outs through worker reclassification lacks a sound basis in policy and that it
increases, rather than decreases, the inequities of the tax system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The professional corporation has long been popular with physi-
cians, lawyers, accountants, and other professionals who offer their
services to the public. Yet incorporation can offer benefits even to
service providers who, because their services are rendered in a capac-
ity historically associated with "employee" status, do not fit the mold
of these "traditional" professionals. The desire to avoid employee
classification, and to obtain the benefits of the corporate form and
independent contractor status, often motivates workers to create an
employee loan-out corporation.
In the typical loan-out, an individual service provider forms a
corporation, in which she is the sole or majority shareholder as well
1. The loan-out may be either a C corporation or an S corporation. In many cases, how-
ever, the C corporation offers greater benefits. A C corporation, for example, offers some
employee-owners greater potential for tax deferral. See notes 38, 45, 50, and accompanying
text. In addition, a controlling shareholder in a C corporation enjoys numerous tax benefits
unavailable to controlling shareholders of S corporations. See notes 16, 25, 32-37, and
accompanying text; see generally Irving M. Grant and William R. Christian, 1 Subchapter S
Taxation §§ 1.12, 5.01-5.02 (Shepard's/McGraw Hill, 3d ed. 1990) (recognizing that C
corporations offer certain employee fringe benefit tax advantages); Lorence C. Bravenec, Federal
Taxation of S Corporations and Shareholders § 3.4.1 (PLI, 2d ed. 1988) (discussing the tax
consequenses of employee fringe benefits in S corporations). On the other hand, S corporations
generally avoid the corporate level tax, and therefore, within reasonable limits, can distribute
some of their earnings as dividends, thereby reducing payroll taxes. But see Spicer Accounting,
Inc. v. United States, 918 F.2d 90, 92 (9th Cir. 1990) (reclassifying certain payments to an S
corporation shareholder as salary where the shareholder did not purport to receive any salary
for his services and characterized all such payments as dividends). Note, however, that if the S
corporation shareholder receives dividends in place of salary, the shareholder must pay
quarterly estimated taxes, I.R.C. § 6654(a), (c)(1), (c)(2) (1994), thereby precluding the tax
deferral that results from delaying a salary payment. See notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
S status can: also be advantageous if the corporation will continue to receive income after the
death of the employee-owner, for example when the employee-owner's services give rise to
deferred income in the form of royalties, residuals, and profit participations. The heir who
inherits the stock of a C corporation cannot necessarily zero out these revenues by taking a
large salary if she is unable to provide sufficiently valuable services to justify such
compensation. Thus, the heir faces potential double taxation. Electing S status after the
service provider's death, however, would solve this problem while preserving the benefits of C
status during the service provider's lifetime. Because a C corporation can offer the benefits of
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as the sole or principal employee.2 The corporation then negotiates
with a third party-the "borrower"-to 'qend" the services of the
controlling shareholder-employee for a price. The "borrower" pays the
contract amount to the loan-out, which in turn pays a salary (and
perhaps a token dividend)3 and may also provide fringe benefits such
as a retirement plan, a medical reimbursement plan, and various
types of insurance to the shareholder-employee. The salary and bene-
fits provided to the shareholder-employee, when combined with the
other deductible expenses of the loan-out (which may include addi-
tional payments to the shareholder-employee as interest, rents, or
royalties), ordinarily reduce the corporation's taxable income for the
year to zero, or almost zero. Thus, even if the loan-out is a C corpora-
tion, it will incur little or no corporate level tax.4
By performing services as an employee of a corporation of
which she is the principal shareholder, the service provider can enjoy
the limited liability and certain additional benefits that state law
typically affords corporations. The worker also obtains a variety of
tax benefits that might otherwise be unavailable. For example, highly
compensated individuals may take fuller advantage of their business
expense deductions by incorporating and having the corporation bear
deferral and greater deductions, and can avoid double taxation during the service provider's
lifetime by paying a high salary to the shareholder-employee, the discussion in this Article
assumes C status unless otherwise specified.
Unless otherwise indicated, all section references herein are to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 (the "Code"), as amended to date.
2. Although the typical loan-out described here involves a single employee-owner so that
one individual can exercise control over the entity, multiple employee-owners can also form a
loan-out. In addition, a loan-out may have employers that are not owners.
3. Because the Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") may attempt to recharacterize
an unreasonably large salary payment or other deductible expenses paid to the shareholder as a
dividend, which is not deductible, a C corporation loan-out may pay a token dividend. In many
cases, however, there is little risk that a loan-out's salary payment to its employee-owner will be
recharacterized as a dividend; ordinarily, the market value of the employee's services will equal
or exceed the amount that the loan-out pays to that employee as salary.
4. In addition to the ordinary corporate income tax, a C corporation that fails to zero out
its income may be subject to a special 39.6% tax on any "personal holding company income" that
is not distributed to the shareholders as dividends. See I.R.C. §§ 541-543 (1994); see Treas. Reg.
§ 1.543-1(b)(8)(iii), Example (1) (1994) (indicating that an actor's loan-out corporation that
retains most of its service income has personal holding company income); see, for example,
Kenyatta Corp. v. Commissioner, 86 Tax Ct. 171, 188-89 (1986) (imposing personal holding
company tax on an athlete's loan-out). Even if personal holding company status can be avoided,
a loan-out that does not zero out its income may be subject to an "accumulated earnings tax" of
39.6% on some or all of its undistributed earnings, in addition to the regular corporate tax.
I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (1994).
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their expenses and deduct them in full, leaving only net profits to be
paid out as highly-taxed salary.5
Furthermore, by virtue of her status as principal share-
holder-and often as president---of the corporation, the shareholder-
employee normally has the power to control all decisions of the corpo-
ration, including the execution of contracts, the amount and timing of
salary payments, the selection of a taxable year, and the nature of any
fringe benefits provided. These benefits make loan-outs especially
valuable to individuals working in fields where there are frequent job
changes, substantial unreimbursed business expenses, and less-than-
optimal employer-provided fringe benefits and retirement plans.
Professional corporations of the more traditional sort have
gained grudging recognition from the government of their status as
"true" corporations that are separate taxpayers rather than mere
conduits for their shareholders.6 Under a variety of legal doctrines,
however, the Internal Revenue Service ('IRS") has challenged the
5. One Service official has reported auditing 30 entertainment industry loan-outs, with
annual income ranging from $90,000 to $18.5 million. Compensation paid to loan-out officers
ranged from nothing to 94% of corporate revenues, and other deductions ranged from 6% to 82%
of revenues. Robert Marich, Music Industry Makes Debut on IRS Hit Parade, Hollywood
Reporter 1, 19 (June 23, 1993).
6. In 1961 Professor Boris Bittker challenged the separate status of corporations formed
by professionals such as lawyers and physicians (commonly known as "professional corpora-
tions"). Boris I. Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation: Some
Questions and Comments, 17 Tax L. Rev. 1 (1961). Bittker argued that such entities were not
"associations taxable as corporations" under the definition set forth in § 7701(a)(3), because they
lacked three of the four corporate characteristics. Id. at 6-21. Under the state laws in effect at
that time, professional corporations lacked limited liability because the professionals who owned
the corporations remained personally liable for malpractice claims. Id. at 8-13. In addition,
because a shareholder could be required to terminate his relationship with the entity under
certain circumstances dictated by the statute (for example, loss of license to practice, retire-
ment, bankruptcy, or death), professional corporations lacked continuity of life. Id. at 15-17.
Finally, since only a qualified practitioner could be a transferee, interests in the entity could not
be freely transferred. Id. at 17-21.
The Treasury embraced Bittker's critique in 1965 by adopting Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h).
This regulation imposed stricter requirements on professional associations than on other
associations seeking corporate status, and would have denied corporate status to virtually any
professional association. Courts, however, uniformly invalidated this regulation as exceeding
the Treasury's rulemaking authority. See, for example, Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97,
110-12 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding the Treasury regulation to be arbitrary and discriminatory);
Holder v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 160, 164-66 (N.D. Ga. 1968), affd per curiam, 412 F.2d
1189 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding the Treasury regulation invalid as inconsistent with the Code);
ONeill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888, 895-99 (6th Cir. 1969) (same); United States v. Empey,
406 F.2d 157, 164-70 (10th Cir. 1969) (same). The Service finally conceded the issue in Rev. Rul.
70-101, 1970-1 Cum. Bull. 278, in which it recognized the corporate status of professional
associations organized pursuant to state statutes governing professional corporations, and the
Treasury finally revoked the controversial regulation in 1977. Treas. Dec. 7515, 1977-2 Cum.
Bull. 482. For a brief history of this regulation, see Richlands Medical Association v.
Commissioner, 60 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1572, 1577-79 (1990), aft'd, 953 F.2d 639 (4th Cir.
1992).
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status of employee loan-out corporations, usually with the goal of
denying the shareholder-employee the tax benefits that otherwise
would flow from doing business in the corporate form. In some cases,
the government has attempted to disregard the loan-out's corporate
existence completely; in others, it has respected the corporation's
existence but has sought to reallocate the entity's tax attributes in
whole or in part to its employee-owner.
Part II of this Article examines the tax and nontax benefits
loan-outs achieve under current law. Part III evaluates the govern-
ment's traditional, as well as more recent, rationales for either chal-
lenging the existence of the loan-out corporation as a separate tax-
payer or reallocating its tax attributes while respecting its separate
status. Part III then attempts to distinguish those challenges that
have a sound basis in law and policy from those that represent un-
principled overreaching in the name of revenue enhancement. In
particular, Part III criticizes the government's efforts to disregard
properly formed loan-out corporations by reclassifying the owner-
employee as an employee of the borrowing party under common law
principles designed to distinguish between employees and independ-
ent contractors. Part IV suggests an alternative approach that re-
spects the corporate form by applying an agency analysis to the rela-
tionship between the loan-out and its shareholder-employee. This
approach preserves the government's ability to make reallocations
when necessary to conform to arm's length pricing standards, and to
"pierce the veil" of those corporations that are essentially shams. The
Article concludes that the apparent formalism of the loan-out struc-
ture is merely a symptom of inequities in the tax treatment of corpo-
rations and individuals which should be systematically addressed by
Congress. Until then, instead of using worker reclassification princi-
ples to disregard a properly formed employee loan-out corporation, the
government should recognize the separate taxpayer status of such an
entity to the same extent as traditional professional corporations and
other corporations providing goods and services to the public at large.
In this way, a loan-out corporation can provide a "safe harbor" for
workers whose independent contractor status would be uncertain if
they remained unincorporated.
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II. BENEFITS OF THE LoAN-OuT STRUCTURE
A. Benefits Unrelated to Income Taxation
The limited liability that corporations enjoy under state law
offers a powerful incentive to incorporate virtually any business en-
terprise. Moreover, by forming more than one corporation, an indi-
vidual may isolate the risks associated with each project undertaken,
protecting the profits generated by one project from the liabilities
arising from another. 7
The need for asset protection may arise also in the context of a
divorce. State law may treat a person's professional goodwill or right
of publicity as a marital asset for purposes of a property settlement.
If the professional incorporates, contributes these intangibles to the
corporation, and shares ownership of the entity with children or other
family members, then only those shares of stock owned by the profes-
sional will be subject to division.
Contributing valuable intangibles to a corporation,8 and
issuing shares to family members, may reduce federal estate tax
liability, because only the decedent's shares of stock will pass through
the estate.
Finally, the party offering compensation for services may wish
to engage an independent contractor rather than an employee in order
to place their arrangement outside the scope of state worker's com-
pensation laws.
B. Benefits Related to Income Taxation
If loan-outs offered only nontax benefits to taxpayers, the gov-
ernment would have little reason to challenge their corporate status.
7. In industries such as advertising and entertainment, suits for defamation, invasion of
privacy, copyright or trademark infringement, infringement of the right of publicity, and misap-
propriation of ideas are common. In addition, a tort or breach of contract suit presents a poten-
tial liability for any service-provider. For example, a jury recently found actress Kim Basinger
liable for over $8 million in compensatory and punitive damages in an action for breach of an
oral contract to appear in a film. Stephen Galloway, Basinger Told to Pay All $8.1 Mil,
Hollywood Reporter 1, 18 (Sept. 29, 1993). The verdict in the Basinger case was reversed on
appeal because the jury instructions failed to distinguish between Basinger as an individual and
Mighty Wind, Inc., her loan-out corporation. Bill Zwecker, Actress Spared $8 Million Penalty,
Chicago Sun-Times (Sept. 23, 1994). Use of a loan-out in such situations can limit the enter-
tainer's liability and protect personal assets.
8. A recent federal estate tax case held that a deceased author's name was an asset
included in her estate for tax purposes. Estate of Andrews v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 1279,
1295 (E.D. Va. 1994).
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In general, the tax benefits available to loan-out corporations compare
favorably with those available to individuals under their two unincor-
porated alternatives-(1) providing services as a direct employee of
the unrelated party consuming the services; and (2) providing services
as a sole proprietor. Not every benefit listed here will be meaningful
to every individual service-provider; rarely, however, will a loan-out
offer a worker no tax advantage at all.9
1. Expense Deductions
For many service providers, the most significant tax benefit of
using a loan-out is the increased deductibility of their business, medi-
cal, and, in some cases, even personal expenses. The loan-out struc-
ture almost always provides more generous deductions than tradi-
tional employee status, and in certain cases proves superior even to
sole proprietor status.
By attributing business expenses to her loan-out rather than to
herself as an employee, a service provider can take advantage of the
ability of corporate taxpayers (like sole proprietors) to deduct their
business expenses without regard to the limitations imposed on tradi-
tional employees. For example, a corporation or sole proprietor is
allowed a one hundred percent deduction for most ordinary and nec-
essary business expenses.10 Individual employees, however, may
deduct their unreimbursed business expenses only to the extent that
their aggregate miscellaneous itemized deductions exceed two percent
of their adjusted gross income," with no carryover of excess deduc-
9. Until the 1980s, loan-outs offered additional tax advantages, including greater flexi-
bility in selecting a taxable year and the potential for deducting larger retirement contributions
than those available to self-employed persons through Keogh plans. As a result, loan-outs were
used even more widely than they are today. See generally Leavell v. Commissioner, 104 Tax Ct.
No. 6, 1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 8, *97 n.11 (Jan. 30, 1995) (Laro, J., dissenting); Richard E.
Halperin, Use of Loan-Outs Has Been Limited, But Advantages Remain, 65 J. Tax. 74 (1986)
(noting that the tax advantages of a loan-out have decreased, but that loan-outs still provide
some benefits). Because of the recent increase in individual tax burdens, some tax specialists
are again urging entertainers to consider incorporation. Gerald Damsky, Impact of New Tax
Law on Entertainers, Ent. L. & Fin. 5 (Sept. 1993).
10. This deduction is subject, of course, to any other generally applicable limits on the de-
ductibility of business related expenses. See, for example, I.R.C. § 274(n) (1994) (limiting the
deduction for meals and entertainment to 50%).
11. I.R.C. § 67(a)-(b) (1994). The 2% floor on unreimbursed employee business expenses
discourages individuals from deducting expenses that are at least partly personal in nature.
See General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, H.R. 3838, Pub. L. No. 99-574, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 79. It also simplifies the government's enforcement task, reduces the frequency
of taxpayer error, and eliminates the requirement that taxpayers undertake extensive record-
keeping. Id. at 78. The Code allows certain "qualified performing artists" to deduct 100% of
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tions.12 Obviously, whether a worker is characterized as an employee
or an independent contractor can make a significant difference in the
tax liability of a worker in an industry such as the entertainment
industry, where employment related expenses can absorb up to forty
percent of a worker's earnings. 13
In addition, a loan-out, like a sole proprietor, can deduct its
business expenses in calculating its adjusted gross income, whereas
an employee may deduct business expenses only after calculating
adjusted gross income. Moving these deductions from "below the line"
their unreimbursed employee expenses, but limits this relief to performing artists with adjusted
gross incomes that do not exceed $16,000 and with unreimbursed employee expenses exceeding
10% of the gross income earned from services in the performing arts as an employee of at least 2
employers during the taxable year. I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(B), (b) (1994). Therefore, this exception
would be of little use to highly paid performers.
12. In addition, employee status makes it more difficult for the taxpayer to qualify for a
home office deduction. I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (1994). The Supreme Court's decision in
Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993), currently makes a home office deduction
unavailable to service providers who render most of their services at a location outside their
dwelling. It appears likely, however, that Congress will eventually overrule Soliman, at least in
part. See Tax Deductions: Sen. Hatch Proposes to Restore Full Deductibility of Home Office
Expenses, 48 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) d4 (March 14, 1994) (reporting on House bill H.R. 3402 and
Senate bill S. 1924).
13. See B. Paul Husband, Tax Issues for Show Business Workers, Ent. L. & Fin. 3, 7 (June
1993) (discussing the importance of the independent contractor/employee distinction).
Entertainers and athletes may retain coaches, secretaries, agents, business managers, and/or
personal managers. See Jessica Seigel, Screen Test: IRS Audits Hollywood; Industry Practices
Being Examined, The Arizona Republic El (Jan. 31, 1993) (reporting that fees paid by individual
entertainers to agents and publicists are subject to the 2% floor). An agent's commission alone
typically absorbs 10% of an entertainer's gross compensation, personal managers may receive
15% to 25%, and business managers may account for another 5%. Donald E. Biederman, et al.,
Law and Business of the Entertainment Industries 9.01 at 471-73 (Auburn House, 1987).
Because entertainers tend to change jobs frequently, their travel, public relations, and enter-
tainment-related expenses can be substantial, as can the other costs associated with seeking
new employment and maintaining a high profile within the industry. An employer such as a
studio often will not reimburse these work-related expenses because the artist will not have
incurred them under its direction or even while in its employ.
Entertainers may also incur medical expenses that do not qualify for a medical expense
deduction because they are primarily cosmetic, or because they do not exceed the 7.5% statutory
floor on medical expense deductions. See text accompanying note 17. If these expenses can be
treated as business expenses, then the loan-out can deduct them without regard to either the
7.5% floor or the 2% floor. Unfortunately for taxpayers, there is significant doubt about the
availability of a business expense deduction for medical or cosmetic procedures, or physical
conditioning incurred to preserve or enhance an entertainer's appearance or abilities. Compare
Reginald Denny, 33 Bd. Tax App. 738, 743 (1935) (allowing film actor to deduct the cost of
dental bridge to replace teeth knocked out in a prizefight picture) with Sparkman v.
Commissioner, 112 F.2d 774, 776-78 (9th Cir. 1940) (afirming Tax Court Memorandum Opinion
denying an actor's deduction for artificial teeth to improve his enunciation), Rev. Rul. 71-45,
1971-1 Cur. Bull. 51 (denying deduction for a singer's throat treatment), and Rev. Rul. 58-382,
1958-2 Cum. Bull. 59 (ruling that an airline employee could deduct the cost of medical exams
required by an employer to establish his fitness to maintain his position, but could not deduct
the cost of treatment to maintain fitness). See generally Robert Marich, Plastic Surgery
Deductions Not Real, IRS Says, Hollywood Reporter 4, 28 (June 22, 1994) (discussing the status
of tax deductions that relate to the entertainment industry).
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to "above the line" will result in a lower figure for adjusted gross
income, thereby giving the loan-out and the sole proprietor an advan-
tage in calculating two deduction ceilings that are based on adjusted
gross income: the Section 68 phase-out of certain itemized deductions
and the Section 151(d) phase-out of personal exemptions. 14 Therefore,
loan-outs and sole proprietors enjoy a decided advantage over conven-
tional employees with respect to their unreimbursed expenses.
Loan-outs, like sole proprietors, also enjoy tax advantages with
respect to medical expenses. A corporation that pays the medical
expenses (including, but not limited to, health insurance premiums) of
its employees (including spouses and dependents) may deduct those
costs as business expenses, 5 and the employees generally may
exclude them from their gross income.1 In contrast, an employee who
pays such expenses out of pocket may deduct them as personal
medical expenses only to the extent they exceed 7.5 percent of her
adjusted gross income. 7 Sole proprietors receive the same treatment.
Although sole proprietors may deduct thirty percent of their health
insurance premiums,18 any additional health care costs are subject to
the 7.5 percent floor. 9 Of course, if an employer provides medical
14. For single taxpayers, the § 68 phase-out commenced at an adjusted gross income of
$111,800 for the 1994 taxable year (subject to increases for inflation in subsequent years). Rev.
Proc. 94-72, 1994-50 Int. Rev. Bull. 14; I.R.C. § 68(b)(2) (1994). This phase-out, which applies
after the 2% floor, reduces certain itemized deductions-including unreimbursed employee
expenses-by 3% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income over the cap, up to a maximum
reduction of 80%. I.R.C. § 68(a), (d) (1994). The phase-out of personal exemptions under §
151(d)(3) commences at the same adjusted gross income level. I.R.C. § 151(d)(3) (1994); Rev.
Proc. 93-49, 1993-2 Cum. Bull. 581.
15. I.R.C. § 162 (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10 (1994); Temp. Treas. Regs. §§ 1.162-10T,
1.167-7 (1994).
16. I.R.C. §§ 105(b), 106 (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.105-1 (1994). Because this exclusion is
unavailable to shareholders who own 2% or more of an S corporation, I.R.C. § 1372 (1994), C
status is more advantageous.
17. I.R.C. § 213(a) (1994). Unless restricted as part of national health reform, the flexible
spending accounts offered by some corporate employers can help workers avoid the 7.5%
threshold even without forming loan-out, but only to the extent that the employee accurately
can predict her deductible medical expenses for the ensuing year. I.R.C. § 125 (1994); Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.125-2, Q & A-7(b)(6), 2 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 1 7322 (1994).
18. I.R.C. §162(1) (1995) as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-7, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995),
109 Stat. 93 (expired Dec. 31, 1993). The 25% deduction was also available to shareholders
owning 2% or more of S corporations. I.R.C. § 162(l)(5) (expired Dec. 31, 1993). H.R. 2497, if
enacted, would have created a 100% deduction for health insurance costs of the self-employed.
Recent political developments have prompted some commentators to question whether the
deduction can be revived or increased.
19. As in the case of retirement benefits, a union may provide a generous enough health
insurance plan to make this feature of the loan-out less significant for union members.
Nonetheless, the coverage limits under a union plan may be such that the member can benefit
from a supplemental plan that the loan-out provides.
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benefits to employees on a discriminatory basis under a self-insured
medical reimbursement plan, some or all of the excess benefits will be
gross income to the recipients.2° However, it is relatively easy for
most loan-outs to provide nondiscriminatory health insurance benefits
because they employ only one or two persons.2 1
A loan-out can also deduct-and the employee can ex-
clude-the cost of disability coverage, 22 certain employee death bene-
fits,23 and up to fifty thousand dollars of employee life insurance.24 No
such deductions are available to employees or sole proprietors. 25
The recent increase in effective tax rates for high income serv-
ice providers makes the deductions and tax-free fringe benefits avail-
able through incorporation even more advantageous. In addition to
the actual increase in statutory rates, the 1993 amendments, which
permanently extended the phase-out of most itemized deductions for
individuals with an adjusted gross income above a specified amount,
imposed a greater effective tax burden.2 6 Thus, to the extent a serv-
ice-provider can shift these itemized deductions to her loan-out, the
deductions will yield greater tax savings.
2. Retirement Benefits
Through a C corporation loan-out, many individuals can obtain
better retirement plans than they would obtain through either a sole
proprietorship or a more traditional employment relationship. The
taxpayer who forms a loan-out can enjoy the "best of both worlds"
because the rules governing corporate plans are somewhat more lib-
eral than those governing self-employed plans, and yet, like a sole
proprietor, an employee-owner has an opportunity to design her own
retirement plan. Indeed, for many workers who, if unincorporated,
would be considered employees rather than sole proprietors for tax
purposes,2 7 forming a loan-out may be the only way to obtain a sub-
stantial retirement plan.
20. I.R.C. § 105(h) (1994); Estate of W. Favre Slater v. Commissioner, 21 Tax Ct. Mem.
Dec. (CCH) 1355, 1370, 1382-83 (1962).
21. I.R.C. § 105(h)(3)(A), (h)(7) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.105-11(e) (1994).
22. I.R.C. §§ 106, 162 (1994).
23. I.R.C. §§ 101(b), 162 (1994).
24. I.R.C. 88 79, 162 (1994); Tress. Reg. § 1.79-1(c)(2)(i) (1994). Again, some unions may
provide comparable benefits.
25. I.R.C. § 101(b)(3) (1994). These benefits are also unavailable to shareholders who own
2% or more of an S corporation, another reason to prefer C status. I.R.C. §§ 105(g), 1372 (1994).
26. See note 14.
27. See Part Ill.B.3 (discussing government's approach to classifying workers as
employees or independent contractors).
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A sole proprietor enjoys some advantages over the typical
employee when it comes to funding a retirement plan. Due to their
relative lack of bargaining power as well as the nondiscrimination
requirements of federal tax laws, most employees cannot design their
own retirement plans. Instead, they must accept the terms of their
employer's plan, if their employer offers one at all. Therefore, em-
ployees may be compelled to accept features that are not to their
liking-the nature of the plan (for example, defined contribution or
defined benefit), the investment options, the vesting schedule, the
amount of the employer's annual contribution, or, of increasing con-
cern in recent years, the financial condition of the employer or fund
sponsor.28 Employees cannot supplement a less than optimal em-
ployer's retirement plan by setting up an additional plan of their
own.29 In addition, some full-time workers may have no access to a
retirement plan at all, either because their employers do not offer
plans or because they are employed under short term contracts with
different employers and do not remain in one job long enough to par-
ticipate in any employer's plan.
In contrast, an individual who works as a sole proprietor or
forms a loan-out enjoys greater latitude in establishing and customiz-
ing a retirement plan. Such a plan generally allows significantly
larger contributions than could be made to an employee's individual
retirement account ('IRA"),03 and may give the worker more freedom
28. See, for example, Georgette Jasen, Scrutinize Plans Offered By Employers, Wall St. J.
C-1 (May 17, 1994) (recommending that employees seek out more information about employee
investment plans); James H. Smalhout, Avoiding the Next Guaranteed Bailout: Reforms for the
Pension Insurance Program, 11 Brookings Review 12, 12 (March 22, 1993) (discussing federal
pension guarantees); U.S. Private Pensions Were Underfunded by $71 Billion in 1993, Wall St.
J. C-18 (Dec. 6, 1994) (discussing need for private pension reforms); John Markoff, A Legal
Thicket Amid the Redwoods, N.Y. Times D-1 (June 4, 1993) (discussing a corporate takeover in
which the target's pension liability was assigned to an insurance company whose parent later
went bankrupt).
29. An individual retirement account ("IRA") contribution may not exceed $2,000 per year
($2,250 for a spousal IRA). I.R.C. §§ 219(b), (c)(2)(A), 408(o)(1)-(2) (1994). Moreover, a worker
covered by an employer's plan cannot deduct any contributions to an IRA unless the worker's
adjusted gross income falls below prescribed limits ($35,000 for single taxpayers, $50,000 for
married filingjointly). I.R.C. § 219(g) (1994).
30. The Code currently allows an employer-maintained defined contribution plan to
shelter the lesser of $30,000 or 25% of an employee's first $150,000 of compensation per year.
I.R.C. §§ 415(c)(1), 401(a)(17) (1994). In the case of a defined benefit plan, the annual contribu-
tion limit is based on the projected benefits, which may not exceed the lesser of $90,000 or the
participant's average compensation for her three highest paid years. I.R.C. §§ 404(a)(1)(A),
415(b)(1) (1994). The limits are similar for Keogh (self-employed) plans. I.R.C. §§ 401(c),
415(b)(1), (c)(1) (1994) (setting limits for defined benefit and defined contribution plans). These
limits often can be increased by combining a defined benefit and a defined contribution plan.
I.R.C. § 415(e) (1994).
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Where a loan-out's owner-employee belongs to a union that provides retirement benefits
through a multi-employer plan (funded by contributions from either the loan-out or the borrow-
ing entity, depending on the terms of the collective bargaining agreement), the opportunity to
create a separate retirement fund through a loan-out may be more limited. Typically, the
mandatory employer contribution to the guild plan is a specified percentage of the member's
compensation for services covered by the collective bargaining agreement, but that percentage
generally falls well below the maximum allowed by the Code. Although guild members cannot
supplement the guild plan with a deductible IRA, those who incorporate can direct their loan-
outs to contribute additional amounts to a separate retirement plan. In the past, the Service
has applied the statutory limitations on benefits and contributions separately to loan-out plans
and guild plans benefiting the same worker. In other words, the individual was not required to
aggregate the two plans, and thus the use of the loan-out enabled the worker to enjoy
retirement benefits substantially in excess of those available to unincorporated workers. See,
for example, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7816007 (Jan. 17, 1978) (ruling that actor's guild plan and loan-out
plan need not be aggregated for § 415 purposes). This determination apparently applies only
where the borrowing entity, rather than the loan-out, makes the guild plan contributions. Id.;
C. Frederick Reish and Ilene H. Ferenczy, The Hollywood Pension Dilemma Intensifies with
Recent IRS Audit Focus, 2 J. Tax. Employee Benefits 99, 100-01 (1994). This "double-dipping"
has become customary in the entertainment industry, because most guild plans require
producers to contribute directly to the guild plans, thus bypassing the loan-outs. See, for
example, Screen Actors Guild Codified Basic Agreement of 1989 for Independent Producers, Sec.
32.K(3); Directors Guild of America Basic Agreement of 1990, Sec. 12-105(c); Writers Guild of
America Agreement, 1988, Art. 17. See Reish and Ferenczy, 2 J. Tax. Employee Benefits at
99, 101. However, the government's tolerance of this double-dipping is inappropriate. Where a
single income stream arising from a single transaction supports both sets of retirement
contributions, only one plan should be found to exist. If entertainers continue to double-dip in
this way, either the loan-out plan or the guild plan should be disqualified for tax purposes.
Not surprisingly, the Service now seems poised to reverse its earlier position. Using one of
two possible approaches, the Service apparently intends to scrutinize closely those individuals
who maintain loan-out retirement plans in addition to guild plans. Under the first approach,
the rules limiting pension benefits would be applied by aggregating the taxpayer's guild and
loan-out plans. In this case, the use of a loan-out would still allow the worker to increase his
benefits beyond those available under the guild plan alone by increasing his total tax-deferred
contribution (aggregating the loan-out plan with the guild plan) to the statutory maximum. See
I.R.C. § 413(b)(7) (1994) (stating that, if anticipated employer contributions exceed the stipu-
lated limitations, the Secretary will determine which portion of the employer's contribution will
be nondeductible); Treas. Reg. § 1.415-8(e) (1994) (allowing multi-employer plans to be aggre-
gated with nonmulti-employer plans to the extent that such plans provide benefits to a common
participant); see also Priv. Ltr. Rnl. 9325055 (March 30, 1993) (aggregating individual
employer's plan with multi-employer plan). Under the second and more stringent approach,
however, the loan-out plan would be disqualified altogether. This second theory is premised on
the notion that the Taft-Hartley Act allows only the "employer" to make contributions to a plan,
and that only the studio (or other outside payor), which is a party to the collective bargaining
agreement, can be an "employer" for this purpose. Reish and Ferenczy, 2 J. Tax. Employee
Benefits at 99, 102. This approach, however, is unduly harsh. Most loan-outs are parties to the
relevant collective bargaining agreements, id. at 101, and when producers contribute directly to
guild plans they, in effect, act as agents for the loan-outs maintained by the workers on whose
behalf they contribute.
Even if the government adopts the more stringent approach, however, a person who earns
some income that falls outside guild jurisdiction (for example, income earned as a producer) can
establish a separate loan-out solely for earning that income. While a Screen Actors Guild
("SAG") member's compensation for acting would be subject to a mandatory contribution to the
SAG retirement plan, the member's compensation as producer would not be. Nor would it be
subject to the requirements of any other guild plan, because producers have no collective
bargaining agreements. See Michael D. Scott, Multimedia: Law and Practice § 29.03-.04
(Prentice Hall, Supp. 1994) (describing the history and guild contract policies of the Producers
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than is available under an employer's plan to determine the size of
contributions and the nature of the investment plan. However, the
Service often reclassifies as employees certain workers who wish to be
treated as sole proprietors for tax purposes, thereby disqualifying
their individual retirement plans, known as "Keogh" plans. In order
to avoid such reclassification and preserve their individualized re-
tirement plans, these workers may form loan-outs.3'
Guild of America). If the loan-out is not a party to any collective bargaining agreement
involving the payee, then the loan-out plan would not be aggregated with any guild plan for
purposes of the benefits and contributions limitations. To prevent such aggregation, the worker
should earn guild-related income as a direct employee of a producer or studio, in which case
there would then be no legal justification for aggregating the two plans. See C. Frederick Reish
and Ilene H. Ferenczy, Retirement Plan Tips for Talent Guild Members; Dealing with IRS
Scrutiny, Ent. L. & Fin. 5 (Aug. 1994).
31. If the user of services and the loan-out belong to an affiliated service group, then the
loan-out's employee will be treated as an employee of the user of services for purposes of several
important restrictions applicable to tax-sheltered retirement plans, including the minimum
participation standards, the nondiscrimination requirements, the minimum vesting standards,
the limitations on benefits and contributions under § 401(a), and the top heavy rules under §
416. See I.R.C. § 414(m)(2) (1994) (defining affiliated service group). The proposed regulations
indicate that the affliated service group rules are directed toward service entities in health,
law, performing arts, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, consulting,
insurance, and other businesses where capital is not a material income producing factor. See
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-1(f)(2), 6 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 19,162 (1995). However,
the rules apply only where the loan-out is partly owned by employees of the borrowing entity.
I.R.C. § 414(m)(2)(B) (1994). Where no such relationship exists, the employees of the loan-out
should not be treated as employees of the borrower for any of the purposes listed above. Thus,
the affiliated service group rules should not defeat the individual's enjoyment of the benefits of a
custom designed retirement plan.
Most loan-outs can also avoid the aggregation rules applicable to leased employees. The
leased employee rules treat certain "loaned" employees as employees of the "borrowing" entity
for purposes of the same retirement plan rules to which the affiliated service group provisions
apply, and for purposes of several other employee benefit provisions as well. See I.R.C. § 414(n)
(1994) (identifying when a leased employee will be treated as an employee of the borrowing
entity). Some loan-out arrangements will be exempt from the leased employee rules because
the borrowing arrangement will last less than one year or will not be "substantially full-time."
However, even if a loan-out arrangement might otherwise trigger the leased-employee rules, the
fact that the leased employee is usually highly compensated will make the rules easy to avoid.
Section 414(n) was designed to prevent an employer from avoiding the nondiscrimination rules
by leasing its relatively low paid workers from another entity in order to exclude them from its
retirement plan. In contrast, the borrower in a loan-out transaction borrows (from an unrelated
corporation) the personnel who otherwise would be considered highly compensated employees.
The loan-out can then provide retirement benefits superior to those provided by the unrelated
borrower without causing the latter to run afoul of the nondiscrimination provisions of §
401(a)(4). Technically, this is because the loan-out can easily qualify for the safe harbor excep-
tion of § 414(n)(5), which applies when leased employees constitute no more than 20% of the
borrower's nonhighly compensated work force (a requirement easily satisfied where the leased
worker is, in fact, highly compensated), and each leased employee participates in a money
purchase pension plan of the leasing entity that provides for immediate participation, full and
immediate vesting, and a contribution rate of at least 10% of compensation. I.R.C. § 414(n)(5)
(1994). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (1994) (defining money purchase pension plans as
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In addition, the tax laws generally allow employees to borrow
as much as fifty thousand dollars from their pension plans without
adverse tax consequences as long as they pay the loan back within
five years.32 While the tax law permits such loans for virtually all
employees,3 3 an employer is not required to permit such borrowing.M
Thus, the controlling shareholder-employee of a loan-out can enjoy
borrowing privileges that might not be available from an outside em-
ployer. Furthermore, these borrowing privileges are unavailable to
both sole proprietors and shareholders who own five percent or more
of an S corporation.35 Thus, the worker who incorporates her service
business has a unique opportunity to maximize the benefits of a tax-
qualified retirement plan. As an employer itself, of course, the loan-
out is subject to the same nondiscrimination rules that apply to any
employer offering a qualified plan.36 This should present no problem
where the loan-out has only one or two employees, and all such
employees are highly compensated. 7
3. Tax Deferral
Certain taxpayers may enjoy a modest tax deferral by using a
loan-out. The loan-out may accomplish this deferral in two ways: (1)
by shifting income recognition to a later taxable year; and/or (2) by
postponing the date on which taxes are actually due.
contribution plans that employ contribution formulas based on a percentage of the employee's
compensation); Rev. Rul. 73-302, 1973-2 Cum. Bull. 220.
Finally, as long as the leased employee does not own 5% or more of the borrowing entity, the
arrangement will also withstand scrutiny under the "leased owner" rules of Proposed Regulation
§ 1.414(o)-i (1994), which are designed to prevent evasion of the nondiscrimination rules in
situations where the borrowing entity leases only its highly compensated personnel and pro-
vides inferior benefits to its own employees, while the lending entity provides superior benefits
to the leased employees.
32. I.R.C. § 7 2 (p) (1994).
33. Even if they are employees, shareholders who own more than 5% of an S corporation
may not borrow from their pension plans without being subject to a tax equal to 5% of the
amount borrowed (100% if the transaction is not corrected within the taxable period). I.R.C. §
4975(a)-(c)(1)(B), (d), (f)(4) (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 1108(d) (1988 & Supp. 1993) (related ERISA
provision).
34. If the employer allows its employees to borrow from their pension plans, it must make
those loans available on a nondiscriminatory basis. I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(B), (d)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
35. A sole proprietor who borrows from her plan would be subject to the same penalty tax
as a shareholder who owns more than 5% of an S corporation. See note 33. See also I.R.C. §
401(c)(1), (3) (1994) (defining "owner-employee").
36. See I.R.C. 99 401(a)(4), 414(q) (1994) (nondiscrimination rules); id. § 416 (rules for top-
heavy plans).
37. Thus, the employee-owner seeking to maximize this benefit without extending it to
other workers should limit the loan-out's hiring as much as possible, and form only independent
contractor or temporary arrangements with other workers.
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If the loan-out uses a fiscal year rather than a calendar year
for tax reporting, then in some cases a calendar year shareholder-
employee may be able to defer both federal and state income tax li-
ability from one calendar year to the next.38 By having the loan-out
adopt a fiscal year that spans two calendar years and by postponing
most or all of the employee-owner's taxable distribution (salary, inter-
est, rents, and/or royalties) until the end of the loan-out's fiscal year,
the shareholder-employee will recognize income during the second
calendar year rather than the first. This deferral mechanism allows
the owner-employee to direct income to the calendar year in which she
may be subject to a lower effective tax rate.
A second, though less significant, deferral benefit arises from
the fact that a taxpayer using a loan-out can postpone the date on
which she pays taxes. Suppose that a television production entity
pays a large part of a writer's compensation in a lump sum in January
of 1995. If the writer is a sole proprietor, no payroll taxes will be
withheld.39 If she reports her income on a calendar year basis, her
federal income tax (and other self-employment taxes) on this compen-
sation will be due in equal quarterly installments during 1995.40
Suppose, instead, that the payor makes the January 1995 payment to
the writer's loan-out, and the loan-out's taxable year ends in
December of 1995. If the loan-out pays the entire amount as salary to
the writer in December of 1995, payroll taxes will be withheld only at
that later time. Thus, the writer pays her tax liability all at once, in
December of 1995,41 rather than in four equal installments during
1995,42 and enjoys the time value of the delayed payment.
The writer will enjoy even greater deferral of tax liability if,
absent the loan-out, she would be classified for tax purposes as an
employee of the production entity. If she were to receive her salary as
an employee, the production entity would be required to withhold her
payroll taxes at the time of payment.43 Thus, she would prepay her
38. The Code prevents United States citizens or residents who form loan-outs
incorporated under foreign law from exercising this option. I.R.C. §§ 898, 7701(a)(5) (1994).
39. An exception applies if she is a nonresident alien. I.R.C. § 1441 (1994).
40. I.R.C. §§ 1402, 6017, 6654 (1994).
41. If the loan-out used a fiscal year, of course, the salary payment could be delayed until
1996, and the writer would pay taxes at the later year's tax rate. The writer would enjoy the
time value of the deferral plus, where applicable, the benefit of any decrease in her effective rate
of tax.
42. The loan-out will not have to pay quarterly estimated taxes either, as long as it zeroes
out its income for the taxable year.
43. I.R.C. § 3402(a) (1994).
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income tax (as well as her social security taxes) on her income from
those services at the time she received her compensation-in this
case, January of 1995. If the payor instead pays the compensation to
the writer's loan-out in January of 1995, this constitutes a payment to
an independent contractor, and requires no withholding taxes; with-
holding is required only when the loan-out pays the writer her salary.
If the loan-out makes this salary payment at the end of the taxable
year-in this case, December of 1995-the taxpayer will enjoy the
time value of the deferred withholding. Thus, by using a loan-out,
this taxpayer enjoys a deferral of up to one year, a benefit unavailable
to a direct employee of the production entity.44
Although all loan-outs can defer tax within the shareholder's
taxable year, not all can defer tax to the next taxable year. Adopting
a fiscal year for tax accounting purposes is generally not an option for
loan-outs that are S corporations or "personal service corporations"
("TSCs") for purposes of Section 441.45 Because PSCs generally are
not permitted to adopt a fiscal year unless they meet certain stringent
statutory requirements, 46 a loan-out that is also a PSC will have more
44. Of course, a writer who is either an employee of the production entity or a sole pro-
prietor can always negotiate for a deferred payment by the service recipient. However, leaving
the money in the payor's hands interest-free deprives the payee of its time value. Even if
interest accrues, the delayed payout increases the risk of nonpayment if the payor should
become financially unsound. With a loan-out, the employee-owner has the security of knowing
that the payment for services has been received, and can choose how the loan-out invests this
income during the period preceding the salary payment.
45. I.R.C. §§ 441, 444, 1378 (1994). A corporation is a PSC under § 441 if. (1) it is a C
corporation, Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.441-4T(d)(1)(i) (1994); (2) its "principal activity" during the
statutory "testing period" consists of providing personal services "substantially performed by
employee-ownlers"; and (3) employees own more than 10% of the corporation's stock, I.R.C. §§
441(i)(2), 269A(b) (1994); Temp. Tress. Reg. 1.441-4T(d)(1)(iv). For this purpose, an "employee-
owner" is any employee who owns, on any day during the testing period, any of the corporation's
outstanding stock, I.R.C. § 441(i)(2) (1994); Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.269A-1(b)(2), 48 Fed. Reg. 13438-
39 (1994). See also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.441-4T(h)(1) (1994) (describing defining
characteristics of PSCs); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.441-4T(f)-(g) (1994) (defining "principal activity"
and "substantially performed'). The testing period is the taxable year preceding the taxable
year for which PSO status is at issue (unless the corporation is newly formed). Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.441-4T(d)(2) (1994).
46. I.R.C. § 441(i)(1) (1994); Temp. Treas. Reg. 1.441-4T(c) (1994). Unless the taxpayer
can establish a sufficient "business purpose" for using a fiscal year, see I.R.C. § 441(i)(1), a PSC
may adopt a fiscal year only if: (1) it effectuates a deferral of no more than three months (that
is, the fiscal year cannot end earlier than September 30), I.R.C. § 444(b) (1994); Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.444-1T(b)(1) (1994); and (2) by the end of each calendar year, it pays the shareholder(s)
compensation that, in the aggregate, satisfies the minimum distribution requirement of § 280H.
I.R.C. § 444(c)(2) (1994).
A distribution that passes either of two tests satisfies the § 280H minimum distribution
requirement. Under the "preceding year test," the PSC must, by the end of the calendar year,
pay to its employee-owners a pro rata portion of the total compensation they received during the
prior taxable year. I.R.C. § 280H(c)(1)(A) (1994); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.280H-1T(c)(1)(i), (c)(2)
(1994). This option would be painless only if the PSO paid no compensation (or relatively little)
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limited tax deferral opportunities than a C corporation. This rule
prevents significant tax deferral through the use of a loan-out when-
ever the entity falls within the Section 441 definition of a PSC.
Fortunately for many service-providers, under the current
Treasury regulations this limit on deferral opportunities does not
apply to all loan-outs. The definition of a PSC under Section 441
excludes many loan-outs because their principal activity is not consid-
ered to be the performance of personal services. Under the temporary
regulations, a PSC's principal activity47 during the testing period48 is
the performance of personal services only if those services are per-
formed in one or more of the following fields: "health, law, engineer-
ing, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, performing arts, or
consulting. 49 A worker whose principal services fall outside of these
areas can still use a fiscal year corporation to defer income recogni-
tion.50
to its shareholder-employees in the previous taxable year-for example, where a high earning
year is preceded by a low earning year. Alternatively, under the "three year average" test, the
PSC must pay the employee-owners, by the end of the calendar year, the same percentage (up to
a maximum of 95%) of its taxable income earned between the start of the fiscal year and
December 31 (before deducting any payments includible in the shareholders' gross income) that
the PSC has been paying (on average) to the employee-owners during the preceding three
taxable years. I.R.C. § 280H(c)(2) (1994); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.280H-1T(c)(1)(i), (3) (1994). For
purposes of the minimum distribution requirement, payments to the employee-owners do not
include dividends and gains from sales and exchanges of property between the PSO and its
employee-owners. I.R.C. § 280H(f)(1) (1994).
47. Personal services will constitute the corporation's "principal activity" if those services
account for more than 50% of the corporation's compensation to its employees. Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.441-4T(f) (1994).
48. Combined with the 50% "principal activity" test, the use of the prior taxable year as
the testing period can cause the PSC status of a corporation to fluctuate yearly. For example,
assume that a performer's loan-out earns most of its Year 1 income from acting services, but
earns most of its Year 2 income from directing, producing, or writing services. Because acting is
a personal service for purposes of § 441, whereas directing, writing, and producing apparently
are not, see text accompanying notes 52-53, this corporation would be a PSC in Year 2 (a year
during which it performed no personal services) but not in Year 3 (a year during which it may
have performed exclusively personal services). Thus, under the temporary regulations, PSC
status in certain fields can be volatile.
49. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.441-4T(e)(1)-(2) (1994) (cross-referencing the list in I.R.C. §
448(d)(2)(A) (1994) and Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.448-1T(d)(4)(i) (1994)). The temporary regulations
vaguely define "consulting" to include "the provision of advice and counsel" and to exclude all
other services. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.448-1T(d)(4)(iv).
50. In contrast, because S corporations are subject to essentially the same limitations in
selecting a taxable year as a C corporation that is a PSC, this deferral opportunity is unavail-
able to most S corporations, regardless of whether the principal activity of the corporation is in
one of the listed fields. I.R.C. §§ 1378, 444 (1994).
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Although the listed fields include the "performing arts," the
regulation's narrow definition of this field excludes many services in
the entertainment industry:
[T]he performance of services in the field of the performing arts means the
provision of services by actors, actresses, singers, musicians, entertainers, and
similar artists in their capacity as such. The performance of services in the
field of the performing arts does not include the provision of services by per-
sons who themselves are not performing artists (e.g., persons who may manage
or promote such artists, and other persons in a trade or business that relates
to the performing arts).51
The emphasized language appears to exclude the services of many
highly compensated "behind-the-scenes" players in the entertainment
industry-writers, directors, agents, producers, promoters, designers,
art directors, composers, choreographers, and technicians. 52 The
definition's application to certain other categories of performers,
including television journalists, is ambiguous. In addition, the defini-
tion expressly excludes the "provision of services by athletes,"
although the temporary regulations fail to define those "services."
Finally, this narrow definition of "personal services" allows some
51. Temp. Tress. Reg. § 1.448-1T(e)(4)(iii) (1994) (emphasis added). See Temp. Tress. Reg.
§ 1.441-4T(e) (1994) (cross-referencing I.R.C. § 448(d)(2)(A) and the regulations thereunder).
The definition of "performing arts" in the temporary § 448 regulations is the same narrow
definition that applies to § 441. I.R.C. § 448(d)(2). See also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.448-IT(e)(4)
(1994); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.441-4T(e) (stating that any activity of the taxpayer described in §
448(d)(2)(A) and the regulations thereunder will be considered personal services).
52. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9416006, 1994 PRL LEXIS 62 (1994) (holding that director's loan-
out is not a "qualified PSC" under § 448(d)(2) because directing services are not in the
"performing arts" field).
53. The temporary regulations state flatly that "the performances of services in the field of
the performing arts does not include the provision of services by athletes." Temp. Treas. Reg. §
1.448-IT(e)(4)(iv) (1994). Surely, however, this would not be the case if the athlete's loan-out
principally performed services not in athletics but in one of the other listed fields, such as
consulting or the performing arts. For example, in a given year an athlete's loan-out might
receive more than 50% of its service income from the athlete's product endorsements or other
nonathletic activities. See, for example, Kevin Goldman, Is There Life After Basketball?
Companies That Use Jordan Are About to Find Out, Wall St. J. B-1 (Oct. 7, 1993) (reporting that
basketball player Michael Jordan earned $36 million from endorsements in 1992, and only $4
million from playing basketball). Endorsements are not athletics; nor do they fit into any of the
other listed fields, with the possible exception of acting. It may be difficult to determine how
much, if any, of an athlete's endorsement income is attributable to "acting" in commercials--if,
indeed, appearing as one's self in a commercial is considered "acting" at all. A professional
athlete may also work as a performing artist in other settings-as a recording artist, for exam-
ple, or as a performer appearing in films, television shows, or music videos, or making personal
appearances in a variety of settings. Many, if not most, of these services properly could be
considered services in the performing arts and could cause the athlete's loan-out to be a PSC.
An athlete receiving much of her income from rendering such nonathletic "personal services"
could take the precaution of using a separate loan-out only for athletic services. This loan-out
would not be a PSG for purposes of § 441 and, thus, could adopt a fiscal year.
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workers providing multiple services to the same payor to use fiscal
year loan-outs, even though some of the services provided are
"personal services" for purposes of Section 441.54
As a matter of policy, it is not at all clear why deferral should
be available to workers in some service industries but not in others.55
Even if it could be demonstrated that abuses have been historically
more prevalent in the listed fields, a prophylactic rule would seem
appropriate to prevent future abuses in other fields that are equally
service oriented.56  This discontinuity could be eliminated either by
repealing the fiscal year restrictions or by broadening the definition of
personal services.57 Under the current definition, it is clear that many
54. For example, a performer's loan-out may agree that its employee will both direct and
act in a film. If the contract with the borrower designates most of the compensation as payment
for directing rather than acting, the performer's loan-out may avoid characterization as a PSC
for § 441 purposes. Even greater flexibility is available if the contract specifies that the per-
former will act and serve in a capacity such as "executive producer," a position less clearly
defined than that of director. Provided that the allocation is not demonstrably unreasonable, it
should be respected for tax purposes.
55. Neither the legislative history of § 441 nor the Treasury's rule-making record explain
this seemingly arbitrary classification scheme for "personal services." See 52 Fed. Reg. 48524-
25 (Dec. 23, 1987) (Temporary Treasury Regulations, Explanation of Provisions) (noting that
before deciding to use the same narrow definition of personal services that applies to § 448, the
drafters of the § 441 regulations considered numerous alternative definitions). However, the
scheme mirrors that used in § 448 and the temporary regulations thereunder to determine
which taxpayers may use the cash method of tax accounting. I.R.C. § 448(d)(2)(A); Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.448-1T(e)(4)(i) (1994).
56. In its public comments on the proposed § 448 regulations, members of the American
Bar Association's Section of Taxation focused on the exclusion of athletes:
Since there is no mention of athletes in the statute or the legislative history surrounding
I.R.C. section 448, we question the regulatory authority to specifically exclude athletes.
While athletes may not be generally regarded as providing services in the field of
"performing arts," the services rendered by many athletes are somewhat difficult to dis-
tinguish from those rendered by many entertainers. In fact, many athletes are enter-
tainers in the traditional sense. Thus, we are not sure there is any policy reason for ex-
cluding athletes from the definition of performing artists.
Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, Comments on Proposed Treasury Regulations
Section 1.448, reprinted in Tax Notes Today (Dec. 24, 1987). One can imagine some lively
debates over whether professional figure skaters, ice dancers, gymnasts, ballet dancers, and
wrestlers are athletes or entertainers.
57. I.R.C. § 1202 (1994), which creates a capital gains exclusion for certain corporate stock
but denies this treatment for stock issued by corporations engaged in specified service
industries as well as those engaged in "any other trade or business where the principal asset of
the trade or business is the reputation or skill of one or more of its employees," suggests one
possible model for such a broadened definition of personal services. The Temporary
Regulations' passive activity loss rules, which define a "personal service activity" as personal
services in "health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science, performing
arts, or consulting, or [any other trade or business in which capital is not a material income-
producing factor" provide another model. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(d) (1994). See also Daniel N.
Shaviro, Passive Loss Rules § I.B.2.f (Tax Management, 1993) (discussing standards for
material participation in a personal service activity); Prop. Reg. 1.414(m)-2(f)(1) (1994) (adopting
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athletes, entertainers, and other service providers can continue to
defer taxation of their service income by incorporating and adopting a
fiscal year. 8
4. International Tax Consequences of Loan-Out Arrangements
Because of the wide variation in foreign income tax laws as
well as the international income tax treaties that govern transna-
tional service income, it is difficult to generalize about the interna-
tional tax consequences of loan-outs for services performed outside an
individual's country of residence. It is fair to say, however, that any
special advantages of a loan-out in the international context must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
In some cases, the use of a loan-out for transnational service
activities is not advantageous at all. For example, if tax credits in the
worker's residence country will fully offset the income tax imposed by
the source country, then a loan-out generally will be unhelpful.5 9
However, if the source country tax exceeds the residence country tax
or is otherwise not fully creditable, the service provider may wish to
explore methods of reducing or eliminating the source country tax so
that she will be taxed only in the country of residence. Depending on
the exact terms of the source country's tax laws and the applicable tax
treaty, the use of a loan-out can facilitate this reduction or elimina-
tion.
In the absence of a treaty, income from performing personal
services in the United States is generally considered "effectively
the material income producing factor test for aggregating retirement plans maintained by
affiliated service groups).
58. Indeed, if the government is unsuccessful in its ongoing efforts to disregard loan-out
corporations formed by athletes as well as those formed by writers, directors, and other workers
who provide services outside of the listed fields (discussed in Part II), the Treasury will have a
stronger incentive either to seek congressional clarification of the standards for disregarding the
corporate form, or to exercise its rulemaking powers by broadening the regulatory definition of
PSCs to apply to services currently excluded. Although this change could reduce or eliminate
the opportunity for tax deferral, it would not address the government's other concerns about the
use of loan-outs.
59. Many United States entertainers use their loan-outs for domestic contracts only be-
cause their individual foreign taxes are creditable against their United States taxes. Some
countries might tax a United States loan-out on gross revenues, or might disallow some of the
loan-out's deductions, thus imposing a tax on the corporation that would not be creditable in the
United States, where the loan-out has no federal tax liability because it zeroes out its income,
and cannot pass its foreign tax credits to its shareholders unless it is an S corporation. See
I.R.C. § 1366(a)-(b) (1994); Schuyler M. Moore, The Filmed Entertainment Industry 1002.03
(CCH Tax Transactions Library); Halperin, 65 J. Tax. at 79 (cited in note 9); Thomas N. Lawson
and Bruce M. Stiglitz, Tax Planning for Entertainers, Artists and Athletes: The Continued
Viability of Loan-Out Corporations after Tax Reform, Ent. L. Rep. 14-16, 36-52 (Aug. 1989).
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connected" with the conduct of a United States trade or business, and
is therefore taxed in the same manner regardless of whether the
earner (an individual or a corporation) is a United States resident.60
The tax consequences, however, may be different where a tax treaty
applies. Many treaties bar the source country from taxing
nonresident individuals on income generated by rendering personal
services in an independent capacity in the source country unless
either: (1) the income is attributable to a "fixed base regularly
available to the individual" in the source country; or (2) the individual
spends more than 183 days of the taxable year in the source country.61
With proper tax planning, many visiting service-providers can avoid
having a fixed base in the source country, and can observe the 183-
day limit, thus avoiding source country tax if they are working in an
independent capacity.62
60. I.R.C. §§ 864(b), 871(b) (1994); Tress. Reg. § 1.864-2(a) (1994). A de minimi exception
applies to nonresident alien individuals who are present in the United States for no more than
90 days and whose compensation for services performed within the United States does not
exceed $3,000 and is borne by a foreign employer. I.R.C. § 864(b)(1) (1994).
61. See, for example, U.S.-United Kingdom Income Tax Treaty, 31 U.S.T. S668, Art. 14.
(1975) (Hereinafter, all United States tax treaties will be identified solely by the name of the
treaty partner-for example, "United Kingdom.") Although this approach is typical, some
treaties are less generous. See generally Joseph Isenbergh, 2 International Taxation 7 39.3-.4
at 379-81 (Little, Brown, 1990) (discussing the 183-day rule). The 1981 U.S. Model Treaty,
which was withdrawn in 1992, did not define "fixed base," but appeared to associate it with an
office or other place of business. See id. at 17 39.2-.3 at 378-80 (discussing "fixed base" in the
U.S. Model Treaty and other treaties); 1981 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, Art. 14, reprinted in
Isenbergh, 2 International Taxation Appendix A at 461. The concept appears to be similar to a
permanent establishment. See note 63. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development's 1992 Model Income Tax Treaty ("1992 OECD Model Treaty") does not define
"fixed base." 1992 OECD Model Treaty, reprinted in 1 Tax Treaties 2001 (Warren, Gorham &
Lamont, 1995). However, the commentary to the 1992 OECD Model Treaty indicates that:
It has not been thought appropriate to try to define ["fixed base",] but it would cover, for
instance, a physician's consulting room or the office of an architect or lawyer. A person
performing independent personal services would probably not as a rule have premises of
this kind in any other State than of his residence. But if there is in another State a
centre of activity of a fixed or a permanent character, then that State should be entitled
to tax the person's activities.
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital,
Commentary on Article 14 4 at C(14)-2 (March 1994) ("1992 OECD Commentary"). See also
Rev. RUl. 75-131, 1975-1 Cum. Bull. 389 (adopting same approach based on similar language in
1963 OECD Commentary). A theater, concert hall, club, or soundstage conceivably could be a
fixed base if the entertainer performed there regularly, although, even in that case, it is
arguable whether such a facility would be sufficiently at the artist's disposal to be considered
"regularly available." Because of this uncertainty, a taxpayer seeking treaty protection from
source country taxation should try to avoid any activities that could lead to a finding of either a
fixed base or a permanent establishment in the source country.
62. The treaty exception for services rendered in an independent capacity applies to
individuals, not entities. See, for example, 1981 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, Art. 14, re-
printed in 1 Tax Treaties 1022 at 1419; Rev. Rul. 54-119, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 156 (finding that
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In contrast, if a nonresident alien worker is an employee,
treaty rules generally subject the worker to source country tax even if
the worker observes the 183-day limit, unless the employer is a non-
resident. 3 Thus, under the general treaty rules governing personal
services income, both a nonresident independent contractor and a
nonresident employee of a foreign corporation typically can spend up
to six months working in the treaty country without paying any
source country tax.64 In the latter case, the foreign corporation also
generally avoids source country taxation as long as it does not have a
permanent establishment in the source country.65
Because of these provisions, a service provider will often seek
to avoid being characterized as an employee of the source country
entity for which she performs services by forming a loan-out corpora-
tion in the residence country, and making sure that all Televant con-
the income of a Canadian corporation attributable to an entertainer's personal appearances was
not personal services income, and was exempt from United States tax in the absence of a
permanent establishment). Services are considered to be rendered in an independent capacity
unless the individual is an employee. See generally, Boris I. Bittker and Lawrence K. Lokken,
Fundamentals of International Taxation 66.3.9 at 66-59 to 66-63 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont,
1991) (discussing treaty modifications).
63. Specifically, employees are exempt from source country tax only if all of the following
conditions are satisfied: (1) the employee is present in the source country for no more than 183
days of the individual's taxable year;, (2) the employer is a nonresident; and (3) the employee's
compensation is not borne by a permanent establishment of the employer in the source country.
See, for example, Canada, Art. 15, 56 Stat. 1399, T.I.S. 11087 (1980). See generally
Isenbergh, 2 International Taxation 39.4 (cited in note 61) (discussing the 183-day rule). The
term "permanent establishment" generally refers to "a fixed place of business through which the
business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on." See, for example, Canada, Art. 5; 1992
OECD Model Income Tax Treaty, Art. 5. The term typically would include, for example, an
office and certain dependent agents or employees who habitually enter binding contracts in the
source country on behalf of the principal, but it would not include independent agents such as
those who normally represent performing artists. See generally Bittker and Lokken,
Fundamentals of International Taxation 66.3.9 at 66-59 to 66-63 (discussing treaty
modifications); Isenbergh, 2 International Taxation 38.13 at 363-65 (discussing permanent
establishments arising by imputation from agents).
64. Numerous private letter rulings have exempted foreign entertainers under treaty
provisions. See, for example, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7736003 (June 8, 1977) (Ireland); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
7751092 (Sept. 27, 1977) (Ireland); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7913077 (Dec. 28, 1978) (Ireland); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 8015068 (Jan. 15, 1980) (Japan); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8336071 (June 9, 1983) (Netherlands); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 8309055 (Nov. 29, 1982) (Netherlands); Priv. Ltr. Rl. 8028024 (April 15, 1980)
(Netherlands); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7832031 (May 10, 1978) (Netherlands); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7802039
(Oct. 14, 1977) (Netherlands); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7829134 (April 24, 1978) (Netherlands); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 7850037 (Sept. 14, 1978) (Netherlands); Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 7744036, 7744037 (Aug. 8, 1977)
(Netherlands); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7802038 (Oct. 14, 1977) (Austria); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7811092 (Dec. 19,
1977) (Austria); Priv. Ltr. RUl. 7917105 (Jan. 26, 1979) (Austria); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7933027 (May
15, 1979) (Austria); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8024067 (March 20, 1980) (Austria); Priv. Ltr. RUl. 8027057
(April 10, 1980) (Austria); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8029070 (April 24, 1980) (Austria); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
8311022 (Dec. 10, 1982) (Austria); Priv. Ltr. RUl. 8337036 (June 13, 1983) (Austria); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 8339079 (June 29, 1983) (Austria); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8439039 (June 26, 1984) (Austria); Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 7821113 (Feb. 27, 1978) (Belgium).
65. But see note 63 (noting the potentially broad definition of permanent establishment).
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tracts with the source country entity name the loan-out as the princi-
pal.6 Under the United States tax treaty rules described above, the
foreign loan-out itself avoids source country tax if it lacks a perma-
nent establishment in the taxing state.67 As long as the shareholder-
employee observes the 183 day limit, she avoids source-country tax if
her salary is paid by a nonresident corporation that has no permanent
establishment in the source country. Thus, as long as the source
country's tax authority respects the foreign loan-out's corporate
status, neither the loan-out nor its employee will be subject to source
country taxation on services income.
Although these treaty provisions benefit many service provid-
ers, certain workers in the entertainment industry face special limita-
tions. Many newer treaties include an "artistes and athletes" clause
that allows the source country to tax athletes and many other enter-
tainers on their source country performing income above a specified
(and usually low) amount. 68 With some exceptions, this clause typi-
cally applies without regard to the entertainer's status as employee or
66. Sometimes a non-United States resident may form a loan-out in a country other than
her residence country to take advantage of a favorable United States tax treaty. However,
"Limitations on Benefits" provisions contained in newer treaties bar a resident of a nontreaty
country from exploiting the provisions of a United States treaty with a second country by
conducting their United States activities through a controlled corporation in that second coun-
try. See, for example, France, Art. 24A, 19 U.S.T. 5280, T.IAS. 6518 (1967).
67. See Treasury Dep't Technical Explanation of the Convention Between the United
States of America and Canada With Respect to Taxes on Income and On Capital, 1986-2 Cum.
Bull. 275, 277-78. See also Rev. Rul. 67-321, 1967-2 Cum. Bull. 470 (ruling that a French
corporation producing a floor show in a United States hotel lacked a permanent establishment
under the French treaty where contracts for terms of 10 weeks were executed outside the
United States).
68. A number of United States tax treaties currently in force contain artistes and athletes
clauses. See, for example, Australia, Art. 17, T.IAS. 10773 (1982); Barbados, Art. 17, T.IA.S.
11090 (1980); Belgium, Art. 14, 23 U.S.T. 2687, T.I-A.S. 7463 (1970); Canada, Art. 16 (cited in
note 63); the People's Republic of China, Art. 16, S. Treaty Doe. No. 30, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984); Cyprus, Art. 19, T.IA.S. 10965 (1984); Egypt, Arts. 17 & 18, 33 U.S.T. 1809, T.I.AS.
10149 (1981); Finland, Art. 17, S. Treaty Deoc. No. 11, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); France, Art.
15A (cited in note 66); Germany, Art. 17, S. Treaty Doc. No. 10, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990);
Iceland, Art. 18, 26 U.S.T. 2004, T.I.S. 8151 (1975); India, Art. 18, S. Treaty Deoc. No. 5, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Indonesia, Art. 17, T.IAS. 11593 (1988); Italy, Art. 17, T.IA.S. 11064
(1984); Jamaica, Art. 18, 33 U.S.T. 2865, T.IA.S. 10206 (1980); Japan, Art. 17, 23 U.S.T. 967,
T.IAS. 7365 (1971); Malta, Art. 18, 34 U.S.T. 3527, T.IA.S. 10567 (1982); Mexico, Art. 18, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 7, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1992); Morocco, Art. 16, 33 U.S.T. 2545, T.IA.S. 10194
(1977); New Zealand, Art. 17, T.IAS. 10772 (1982); Norway, Arts. 13 & 14A, 23 U.S.T. 2832,
T.IAS. 7474 (1971); the Philippines, Art. 17, 34 U.S.T. 1277, T.IA.S. 10417 (1976); Romania,
Arts. 14 & 15, 27 U.S.T. 165, T.IAS. 8228 (1973); Spain, Art. 19, S. Treaty Deoc. No. 16, 101st
Cong., 2d Seas. (1990); Sweden, Art. 11, 54 Stat. 1759, Treaty Ser. No. 958 (1939); United
Kingdom, Art. 17 (cited in note 61).
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independent contractor,6 9 or to the existence of a fixed base in the
source country.70 The clause treats artistes and athletes rather
harshly compared to other service-providers; however, this special
treatment appears to reflect the fact that artistes and athletes may
derive a substantial amount of income from short visits to numerous
countries during the taxable year, and also have more freedom than
many workers to select a tax haven as their country of residence.71
Artistes and athletes clauses typically include a second provi-
sion targeting certain loan-outs. This provision is intended to allow
the source country to tax the full amount of income earned by the
efforts of a foreign entertainer or athlete (rather than just the per-
former's salary) whenever the income accrues to a foreign corporation
in which the performer is a direct or indirect profit participant.72
Thus, zeroing-out the loan-out's income through payments to the
owner-employee would not reduce the source country tax. No perma-
nent establishment or fixed base is required.
However, loan-outs still benefit many service-providers in the
international context. First, the artistes and athletes clause does not
apply to workers who are neither artistes nor athletes. Thus, visiting
69. Most of the artistes and athletes clauses in the treaties listed in note 68 draw no dis-
tinction between employees and independent contractors. A few apply only to independent
contractors. See, for example, Belgium, Art. 14; Japan, Art. 17.
70. See, for example, France, Art. 15A (cited in note 66); see Bittker and Lokken,
Fundamentals of International Taxation 66.3.9 at 66-62 (cited in note 62) (discussing treaty
rules for artistes and athletes).
71. See generally Isenbergh, 2 International Taxation 39.8 at 384 (cited in note 61)
(noting that the frequency with which performers and athletes move around would allow them a
virtual exemption from taxation under standard treaty provisions governing perfomance of
services). For an impassioned, but unsuccessful, plea to end this discrimination against enter-
tainers, see Hearing Transcript, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on
Economic and Social Affairs (April 12, 1951) (statement of Adrian McCalman, President, Artists
Managers Guild), reprinted in Tax Notes International (April 21, 1990).
72. See 1992 OECD Model Treaty, Art. 17 (cited in note 61); 1992 OECD Commentary
(cited in note 61). Most of the treaties listed in note 68 contain such a loan-out clause;
exceptions include Belgium, Romania and Sweden. Article 18 of the Japan treaty, however, has
a look-through provision that reaches loan-outs regardless of the type of services they provide.
See 1980-1 Cum. Bull. 455, 469-70 (containing the Treasury Department's technical explanation
of United Kingdom treaty). See generally Isenbergh, 2 International Taxation 39.10 at 385-
86; Halperin, 65 J. Tax. 74 (cited in note 9); Bittker and Lokken, Fundamentals of International
Taxation 66.3.9 at 66-62 (cited in note 62). The intended scope of the clause is rather unclear.
While its terms are broad enough to encompass any entity that pays out a portion of its income
to the individual service provider, if the clause were applied this broadly it would treat all
foreign employers as "fronts" for their employees. This clause apparently is aimed at loan-out
entities that defer a substantial portion of the shareholder-employee's earnings until those
earnings are subject to reduced rates of tax, or no tax at all, by the source country. See 1980-1
Cuin. Bull. 455, 469. Thus, in combination, these two provisions of the typical artistes and
athletes clause are intended to prevent an individual nonresident from using a loan-out that
lacks a permanent establishment in the source country as a means of avoiding source country
taxation.
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service-providers in other fields may still employ loan-outs to exploit
the treaty exemptions for independent contractors and employees of
nonresident entities.
In addition, even within the entertainment and sports indus-
tries workers can still use loan-outs to avoid taxes under some cir-
cumstances. Some treaties-older ones in particular-either lack an
artistes and athletes clause altogether73 or contain a version that
applies only to services rendered in an independent capacity.74 And
even when the clause applies to dependent services as well, the term
artistes and athletes has been interpreted narrowly. For example, the
United States Treasury Department's technical explanation of the
United Kingdom treaty indicates that while the term artiste includes
"entertainers such as theater, motion picture, radio, or television
artistes, and musicians and athletes, for their personal activities as
such," it excludes "producers, directors, technicians and others who
are not artistes and athletes."75  Similarly, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") has acknowledged
that it is "not possible to give any precise defimition of 'artiste.' "76
Specifically, the OECD has interpreted the term "artiste" in Article 17
of its Model Convention to exclude "producers, film directors, choreog-
raphers, technical staff, etc.," as well as "impresarios" and other
"'support' staff of artistes and athletes.'7 7 While the overall scope of
this exclusion is far from clear, it is beyond question that many enter-
73. See, for example, Austria, 8 U.S.T. 1699, T.I.A.S. 3923 (1956); Denmark, 62 Stat. 1730,
T.I.A.S. 1854 (1948); Greece, 5 U.S.T. 47, T.I.AS. 2902 (1950); Hungary, 30 U.S.T. 6357, T.I.A.S.
9560 (1979); Ireland, 2 U.S.T. 2294, T.I.A.S. 2355 (1949); Korea, 30 U.S.T. 5253, T.IA.S. 9506
(1976); Luxembourg, 15 U.S.T. 2355, T.IA.S. 5726 (1962); the Netherlands, S. Treaty Doc. No.
6, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Pakistan, 10 U.S.T. 984, T.I-A.S. 4232 (1957); Poland, 28 U.S.T.
891, T.IA.S. 8486 (1974); Russia, S. Treaty Doc. No. 39, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993); and
Switzerland, 2 U.S.T. 1751, T.IA.S. 2316 (1951).
74. See, for example, Belgium, Art. 14 (cited in note 68).
75. 1980-1 Cum. Bull. 455, 469. One commentator has suggested that this definition
would also exclude coaches, trainers, and managers. Halperin, 65 J. Tax. at 79 (cited in note 9).
76. OECD, The Taxation of Income Derived from Entertainment, Artistic and Sporting
Activities, in 2 Issues In International Taxation 52-53 (OECD, 1987) ("Issues in International
Taxation"). For example, while "conference lecturers and persons interviewed on television are
clearly not 'artistes' in the meaning of Article 17," there are "a variety of... situations where..
. appearance on television or in public could generally be seen as 'acting' for entertainment
purposes." Id. at 53. See also OECD Commentary at C(17)-1 to C(17)-2 (cited in note 61)
(similar, giving examples).
77. OECD, 2 Issues in International Taxation at 53. Both the Treasury Department's
technical explanation of the United Kingdom treaty and the OECD interpretations of its 1977
and 1992 Model Conventions are silent on whether the clause applies to writers, but the
exclusion of directors, producers and choreographers strongly suggests an intent to exclude all
behind-the-scenes personnel, including writers.
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tainment related services are insulated from the harsh effects of the
typical artistes and athletes clause, and that workers outside the
sports and entertainment fields are completely excluded from its
scope.7 8
III. CHALLENGING THE LoAN-OUT STRUCTURE
The tax and nontax benefits described in Part II make incorpo-
ration attractive to many individuals in service industries. When a
service corporation is controlled by one or even two of its employees,
however, the government has frequently viewed efforts to obtain these
tax benefits as abusive, and has therefore sought to disregard the
structure of the loan-out arrangement, either by denying taxpayer
status to the loan-out or by reallocating the loan-out's gross income to
its employee-owner(s).
To achieve these results, the government has resorted to sev-
eral means of attack: (1) the assignment of income doctrine, 79 includ-
ing the sham incorporation doctrine; (2) Section 482;8o (3) Sections 269
and 269A;81 and (4) the reclassification of the loan-out's employee-
shareholder as an employee of the party receiving the loan-out's
services. This Part examines each of the government's rationales for
disregarding the structure of a loan-out transaction, first addressing
those doctrines that do not involve reclassifying the loan-out's em-
ployees, and then focusing special attention on the worker reclassifi-
cation approach, as typified by Sargent v. Commissioner.82
78. This exclusion creates tax planning opportunities when an entertainer is employed in
two capacities, for example, as actor and director. The entertainer's income from acting in a
film would trigger tax under an artistes and athletes clause, whereas the entertainer's income
as director of that same film would be beyond the reach of that provision. Entertainers or
athletes whose work abroad can be classified under several headings have an incentive to
allocate more of their income to the services that fall outside the scope of the artistes and
athletes clauses. The allocation must be a reasonable one, because the tax authorities are likely
to scrutinize any allocation that is highly favorable to the taxpayer. OECD, 2 Issues in
International Taxation at 53; 1992 OECD Commentary at C(17)-2 (cited in note 61); Victor
Abrams, et al., International Taxation of Entertainers and Athletes: Report by Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development Spotlights the Area, 10 Ent. L. Rep. 3, 6 (1988). It is
interesting to note that the services that fall outside the typical artistes and athletes clause
include many of the same services that the definition of personal services under § 441 appears
to exclude. See notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
79. I.R.C. § 61 (1994).
80. I.I.C. § 482 (1994).
81. I.R.C. §§ 269, 269A (1994).
82. 93 Tax Ct. 572 (1989), rev'd, 929 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1991).
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A Challenges Not Involving Worker Reclassification
1. Assignment of Income and Sham Incorporation
In its efforts to disregard the loan-out's corporate form, the
government has in some cases attempted to reallocate all of the corpo-
ration's income, deductions, and other tax attributes to the controlling
shareholder-employee as the true earner of the income from services.
This approach takes two forms: (1) the assignment of income doctrine
under Section 61 of the Code as developed by courts in Lucas v. Earl83
and its progeny; and (2) the sham incorporation doctrine.8 In theory,
the doctrines are distinct: a corporation need not be a sham in order
for a court to find that a different taxpayer was the true earner of the
income reported by the corporation8 5 However, because a sham
corporation cannot be a taxpayer, any invocation of the sham incorpo-
ration doctrine in the income tax context necessarily invokes the
assignment of income doctrine, although many applications of the
assignment of income doctrine do not invoke the sham incorporation
doctrine.
The published opinions in tax cases involving corporations
controlled by sole shareholder-employees do not always clearly distin-
guish the assignment of income doctrine from either the sham incor-
poration doctrine or Section 482.86 For example, the Tax Court stated
83. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
84. The sham incorporation doctrine has been traced to the Supreme Court's decision in
New Colonial Ice Company v. Helvering, where the Court stated that:
As a general rule a corporation and its stockholders are deemed separate entities and
this is true in respect of tax problems. Of course, the rule is subject to the qualification
that the separate identity may be disregarded in exceptional circumstances where it
otherwise would present an obstacle to the due protection or enforcement of public or
private rights.
292 U.S. 435, 442 (1934) (footnotes omitted).
85. Haag v. Commissioner, 88 Tax Ct. 604, 611 (1987) (noting that a finding that the
corporation in question is not a sham does not preclude application of the assignment of income
doctrine); Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673, 678 (2d Cir. 1968); Jones v. Commissioner, 64
Tax Ct. 1066, 1076 (1975) (applying the assignment of income doctrine to a corporation held not
to be a sham for tax purposes). Compare Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1988)
(holding that a corporate subsidiary need not be a sham in order to act as an agent for iti
parent).
86. See, for example, Keller v. Commissioner, 77 Tax Ct. 1014, 1030-34 & n.21 (1981), aid
723 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1983) (treating assignment of income and sham incorporation arguments
as equivalent, and identifying § 482 as a means of combatting tax avoidance and of facilitating
application of the assignment of income doctrine); Borge, 405 F.2d at 676-77 (applying § 482
even though the corporation did not participate at all in the income-generating transactions);
Laughton v. Commissioner, 40 Bd. Tax App. 101, 105 (1939), remanded, 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir.
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in one case that applying the assignment of income doctrine to reallo-
cate all of the income of a PSC to its controlling shareholder would be
the equivalent of treating the corporation as a sham.81
A corporation will be treated as a sham and therefore disre-
garded for tax purposes when the shareholder-employee disregards
the corporate formalitiess or when the corporation performs no
'meaningful business function."8 9 Failure to identify the corporation
to other parties as the principal in the contracts and transactions that
give rise to the income and deductions at issue has also led courts to
treat the corporation as a sham.90 Although in such a case the as-
1940) (finding that whether a controlled corporation is a principal or merely an agent of an
employee-shareholder depends on whether the corporation is recognized as an entity separate
from the employee-shareholder); Philipp Bros. Chemicals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 435 F.2d 53, 57
(2d Cir. 1970) (quoted in Keller, 77 Tax Ct. at 1034) (stating that § 482 "rests on the well-settled
policy that income is taxable... to the party who earns it and that it is economic reality rather
than legal formality which determines who earns income"); Jones, 64 Tax Ct. at 1073-79
(applying distinctly separate analyses under §§ 61 and 482 but reaching the same holding under
each approach).
87. Fatland v. Commissioner, 48 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1107, 1112 (1984) (adding that
"the assignment of income doctrine has no place in the personal service context as long as even
minimum respect is given to the corporate entity"). Accord Keller, 77 Tax Ct. at 1031 (finding
that a 100% reallocation would render the corporation "a nullity for federal income tax pur-
poses"). This suggestion is overbroad, for income may be reallocated from one taxpayer to
another without denying either taxpayer's existence. See Keller, 77 Tax Ct. at 1042 ("Mere
existene ... does not carry automatic immunity from the assignment of income doctrine")
(dissenting opinion); Wilson v. United States, 530 F.2d 772, 778 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that a
finding that a corporation is not a sham does not preclude applying assignment of income
principles to reallocate the corporation's income to shareholder-employees). Only where the
corporation is deemed to earn no income at all could reallocation have the effect of treating the
corporation as a sham, and even then the corporation may simply be inactive during that
particular taxable year.
88. "Once incorporated, the personal service business must be ran as a corporation. Its
shareholder-employees must recognize, respect, and treat their personal service corporation as a
corporation. The corporation must accept the disadvantages as well as advantages of incor-
poration." Achiro v. Commissioner, 77 Tax Ct. 881, 895-96 (1981). Accord Patterson v.
Commissioner, 25 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1230, 1235-36 (1966) (finding an intermingling of
personal and corporate accounts plus failure to respect corporate formalities); Roubik v.
Commissioner, 53 Tax Ct. 365, 379-81 (1969) (finding that the corporation existed as a "mere set
of bookkeeping entries and bank accounts").
89. See, for example, Patterson, 25 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 1234-36 (finding that the
corporation should not be recognized for tax purposes where it failed to serve any "meaningful
business function"); Foglesong v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 865, 868-69 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding
legitimate business purpose for a corporation sufficient to make commission income taxable to
the corporation).
90. Compare Roubik, 53 Tax Ct. at 379 (noting that physicians supposedly employed by a
radiology services corporation were personally obligated to the hospitals where they worked);
Keller, 77 Tax Ct. at 1027 (holding that when an income source failed to substitute petitioner's
service corporation for petitioner in its records for an entire year, petitioner remained directly
taxable on income received form that source); Hagy v. United States, 778 F. Supp. 897, 898-900
(W.D. Va. 1991) (same); Evatt v. Commissioner, 63 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 3194 (1992)
(same); with Laughton, 40 Bd. Tax App. at 103-04, 107 (finding that an actor's corporation,
which was clearly identified in its contracts, was a separate taxable entity); Haag, 88 Tax Ct. at
906
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signment of income doctrine would offer a sounder rationale if the
corporation has transacted any other business in its own name,91 the
corporation's failure to act as a principal in any business transactions
could demonstrate a complete absence of business purpose.
Under current law, however, an entity that satisfies the tax
definition of a corporation will not be treated as a sham for tax pur-
poses as long as the taxpayer can satisfy either of the two tests set
forth by the Supreme Court in Moline Properties v. Commissioner:92
(1) the corporation is formed for a purpose equivalent to a business
activity;93 or (2) the incorporation is followed by the carrying on of a
business.94 According to the Tax Court, the business purpose under
either test does not need to be one served only by incorporation; any
income-earning purpose will suffice.95
In loan-out cases, the government has often contended that
even where the corporation is not a sham the shareholder-employee
should be taxed as the true earner of the income under the broader
assignment of income doctrine. Generally, it has succeeded only when
608-13 (holding that a professional corporation's income was not allocable to the taxpayer); Fox
v. Commissioner, 37 Bd. Tax App. 271, 276-77 (1938) (holding that a corporation had a separate
identity from the petitioner, who was the corporation's president and owned 98% of its stock);
Pacella v. Commissioner, 78 Tax Ct. 604, 618-19 (1982) (finding that physician's corporation was
clearly identified to patients and contracting parties as the service provider); Hospital Corp. of
America v. Commissioner, 81 Tax Ct. 520, 584 (1983) (recognizing corporation's existence in part
because unrelated parties did so).
91. See, for example, Keller, 77 Tax Ct. at 1027 n.14 (citing Roubik, 53 Tax Ct. 365).
92. 319 U.S. 436 (1943). For further discussion of Moline Properties, see notes 288-92 and
accompanying text.
93. Whether the purpose [of incorporating is] to gain an advantage under the law of the
state of incorporation or to avoid or to comply with the demands of creditors or to serve
the creator's personal or undisclosed convenience, so long as that purpose is the equiva-
lent of business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by the corporation,
the corporation remains a separate taxable entity.
319 U.S. at 438-39. See also Jones, 64 Tax Ct. at 1076 (holding that a court reporting
corporation that had not been organized for a legitimate business purpose but nevertheless
engaged in substantial business activity was not a sham for tax purposes); Keller, 77 Tax Ct. at
1030 (holding that even if a taxpayer's desire to obtain the benefits of a medical reimbursement
and pension plan did not comprise a business purpose, that desire was immaterial when the
taxpayer's corporation engaged in business activity); Pacella, 78 Tax Ct. at 618-19 (similar).
94. Moline Properties, 319 U.S. at 438-39. Numerous cases have held that the quantum of
business activity that satisfies the Moline Properties standard may be minimal. See, for exam-
ple, Sparks Farm, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CC) 464, 472 (1988); Hospital
Corp. of America, 81 Tax Ct. at 579; Strong v. Commissioner, 66 Tax Ct. 12, 24 (1976), affd
without pub. opin., 553 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1977); Harrison Property Management Co., Inc. v. U.S.,
475 F.2d 623, 626-27 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Paymer v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 334, 336-37 (2d Cir.
1945).
95. See, for example, Hospital Corp. of America, 81 Tax Ct. at 582-87, and cases cited in
notes 93-94.
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the conduct of the parties involved in the loan-out arrangement is
inconsistent with the claim that the corporation is the principal.
Notably, however, the Tax Court has rejected the suggestion that the
assignment of income doctrine should apply to a corporation simply
because the corporate form was chosen for its tax advantages.9
As early as 1938, the Board of Tax Appeals recognized a loan-
out corporation as a separate taxable entity in Fox v. Commissioner,97
where a newspaper cartoonist formed a corporation (Reynard) of
which he was the president and ninety-eight percent shareholder.
The cartoonist entered into an employment contract with Reynard
under which he agreed to render his exclusive cartooning services in
exchange for a salary. He also contributed to the corporation his
copyrights in all cartoons he had previously created. Reynard then
entered into contracts with the syndicate that distributed the car-
toons to newspapers. The cartoonist's salary from Reynard was con-
siderably less than the guaranteed minimum Reynard received under
its contract with the syndicate. Both before and after forming
Reynard, the cartoonist personally executed licensing agreements
permitting third parties to use his cartoon characters, and for several
years he received the royalty payments personally.98 On advice of his
attorney, he later assigned his rights under those contracts to
96. See, for example, Davis v. Commissioner, 64 Tax Ct. 1034, 1044 (1975) (holding that
the transfer of valuable property rights with a known potential to produce income was a logical
and legitimate reason for a physician to establish corporations and give stock to his children).
Accord Foglesong, 621 F.2d at 869, 873 (refusing to weigh business purposes against tax
avoidance to determine whether income should be reallocated from a professional corporation to
the taxpayer); Hospital Corp. of America, 81 Tax Ct. at 583 (stating that petitioner's intent to
obtain tax advantages by incorporating did not require a holding that the corporation was a
sham). This is one application of the broader principle that a taxpayer is free to plan and carry
out transactions in a manner that minimizes taxes. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469
(1935); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477 (1940). Compare Aldon Homes, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 33 Tax Ct. 582, 597 (1959) (disregarding construction corporations that lacked
employees) and Shaw Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 35 Tax Ct. 1102, 1114 (1961)
(disregarding corporations with no offices, employees, payroll, furniture, or equipment), afid
323 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1963) with Bush Hog Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 42 Tax Ct.
713, 722-23 (1964) (recognizing business purpose of corporations formed to distribute products
in new areas); Nat Harrison Associates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 Tax Ct. 601, 618 (1964)
(recognizing business purpose of foreign corporation formed by domestic corporation to carry on
its overseas operations). This position has been legislatively rejected in the context of § 269A,
see notes 148-52 and accompanying text, but it appears to have continued vitality with respect
to determining whether a corporation satisfies the Moline Properties tests.
97. 37 Bd. Tax App. 271 (1938).
98. Id. at 274-75. Unlike many loan-outs, Reynard sold property (the completed cartoons)
rather than services. In some cases, a writer's loan-out might do the same.
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Reynard, and Reynard thereafter reported the royalty payments as
corporate income. 99
The Commissioner sought to reallocate all of Reynard's income
from the syndicate and the other licensees to the shareholder under
Lucas v. Earl. The Board of Tax Appeals, however, found no basis for
disregarding the existence of Reynard as a separate taxpayer, since
its corporate identity had been respected by the taxpayer and
"recognized by all who had dealings with it."loo The court also refused
to treat the cartoonist as the true earner of the income, because he
was not a party to the syndicate contracts and had assigned his copy-
rights and licensing agreements to Reynard.1°1
In Laughton v. Commissioner,10 2 British actor Charles
Laughton formed a corporation under the laws of Great Britain, ac-
quired beneficial ownership of one hundred percent of its stock, and
entered into an exclusive employment contract with the corporation,
which in turn contracted to lend the actor's services to various United
States movie studios for specified projects.0 3 A preexisting contract
between Laughton and one studio was canceled by mutual consent,
and on the same day the loan-out entered a contract with that studio
for Laughton's services. In connection with each loan-out contract,
Laughton executed a personal guarantee of his services.' °4 His salary
from the loan-out was considerably less than the sums the loan-out
received from the studios, but he also received substantial sums from
the loan-out in the form of secured loans.15 Although the corporation
was ostensibly engaged in the business of producing motion pictures,
it did not begin doing so until after the taxable years in question,
apparently because of a shortage of capital.1°6
The Commissioner characterized Laughton's loan-out as
"merely the 'agent and alter ego of the petitioner," and asked the
Board of Tax Appeals (the "Board") to treat the corporation's contracts
with the studios as "anticipatory arrangements for the deflection of
99. Id. Because Reynard adopted a March fiscal year, the cartoonist no doubt enjoyed a
significant degree of income deferral. Id. at 275. Since a cartoonist does not render services in
the "performing arts" within the meaning of § 441, see text accompanying notes 51-52, this de-
ferral would still be available under current law.
100. 37 Bd. Tax App. at 277.
101. Id. at 277-78.
102. 40 Bd. Tax App. 101 (1939).
103. Laughton was neither an officer nor a director of the corporation. Id. at 103.
104. Id. at 103-04. For a discussion of personal guarantees, see note 150.
105. Id. at 105.
106. Id.
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income.'107 The Board, however, refused to disregard the corporation's
existence or to apply the assignment of income doctrine, finding that
the corporation was "an entity separate and apart from the
petitioner," that it was "created for business reasons,"108 and that the
loan agreements "were in accordance with the general practice in the
industry, where one studio or producer had a long term contract for
the services of an actor."109 Although the Board seemed to consider it
relevant that independent film production "Was the ultimate aim and
purpose for which the company was organized"11O-a fact that would
distinguish Fox and make Laughton's intended business more capital-
intensive than the typical loan-out--the Board described the case as
"comparable" to Fox, noting that "Laughton's only relationship with
the contracts for the loaning of his services was to consent to the
performance of the services provided for in such loan contracts.""'
This analogy to Fox suggests that the Board did not rest its decision
in Laughton solely on the existence of a business purpose unrelated to
lending the actor's services, for that factor was absent in Fox. It also
suggests that the Board was untroubled by Laughton's status as sole
shareholder."2 Finally, it seems to make Laughton's option to with-
hold consent irrelevant.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit remanded the Laughton case for
consideration of whether the disparity between the actor's corporate
salary and the fees the corporation charged for his services should
cause the transactions to be recharacterized as "a single transaction
by Laughton in which he received indirectly the larger sum paid by
the producers."11 In other words, the court sought a determination of
whether the transfer of Laughton's services to his corporation was a
sham, even if the corporation itself was not a sham.114 Thus, the ap-
pellate court attempted to distinguish between sham incorporation
and broader assignment of income principles." 5
107. Id.
108. Id. at 106-07.
109. Id. at 106.
110. Id. (explaining the corporation's "failure to engage extensively in the production of
motion pictures during the taxable years... as due to a lack of capital').
111. Id.
112. The Board's lack of concern may be attributed to the fact that the shareholder did not
control the corporation's board of directors. Laughton, 113 F.2d at 104-05.
113. Id. The court's concern over arm's length pricing anticipated the next round of chal-
lenges to loan-out arrangements-realocation under the enactment of § 482. See notes 123-41
and accompanying text.
114. Laughton, 113 F.2d at 104.
115. The government generally will prevail when both doctrines point to the same conclu-
sion, as was the case in Patterson, 25 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1230, in which a professional
boxer formed a loan-out corporation of which he and his manager were the sole shareholders
910 [Vol. 48:879
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In Johnson v. Commissioner,116 the Tax Court added a new
gloss to the assignment of income doctrine. In Johnson, basketball
player Charles Johnson contracted with a Panamanian corporation,
PMSA, to render his services in professional sports for six years in
exchange for a salary far smaller than either the compensation PMSA
was to receive from Johnson's team for the years in question or the
compensation he had received under his individual contract with the
team in each of the preceding two years." 7 The team, however, in-
sisted on continuing to contract with Johnson as an individual, al-
though it agreed to pay his compensation to a corporate licensee of
PMSA, provided that Johnson executed a legal assignment. In addi-
tion to his salary from PMSA, Johnson received a series of large
interest-free loans from the corporation.118 The Service treated the
total amounts paid by the team to PMSA's licensee as income to
Johnson.
Acknowledging that "[r]ecognition must be given to corpora-
tions as taxable entities" even when their income derives from the
personal services of an employee, the Tax Court found it impossible to
resolve the issue by applying the "per se actual earner test" of Lucas
v. Earl, and shifted the inquiry to a two-part test of "who controls the
earning of income:" 9
An examination of the case law from Lucas v. Earl hence reveals two necessary
elements before the corporation, rather than its service-performer employee,
may be considered the controller of the income. First, the service-performer
employee must be just that-an employee of the corporation whom the
corporation has the right to direct or control in some meaningful sense....
Second, there must exist between the corporation and the person or entity us-
and arguably the sole employees. Id. at 1231. The boxer sought to treat his income from boxing
matches as income of the corporation. Id. at 1234. The Tax Court, however, found that the
corporation performed no meaningful business function, that frequently it was not named in the
contracts under which it supposedly earned the income in question, and that the shareholders
consistently failed to observe the corporate formalities and to distinguish their personal ac-
counts from the corporate accounts in their recordkeeping. Id. at 1235-36. Patterson is a
blueprint for how not to conduct business in the corporate form.
116. 78 Tax Ct. 882 (1982), afid 734 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1984).
117. The opinion states ambiguously that the smaller salary was payable "for... life" until
Johnson had ceased to perform services for any athletic team for two years. Id. at 886-87.
118. Although the court's opinion does not indicate who owned PMSA, Professor Elliott
Manning has inferred from the generous interest-free loans that Johnson was the beneficial
owner. Elliott Manning, The Service Corporation-Who is Taxable on Its Income: Reconciling
Assignment of Income Principles, Section 482, and Section 351, 37 U. Miami L. Rev. 657, 662
n.17 (1983).
119. 78 Tax Ct. at 890-91.
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ing the services a contract or similar indicium recognizing the corporation's
controlling position.120
The court determined that even though the first element could be
satisfied if the PMSA-Johnson agreement was a valid contract giving
PMSA the right to control Johnson's services, the corporation's role in
the transaction should still be disregarded because the second ele-
ment was lacking. Unlike the entertainers in Fox and Laughton, the
recipient of Johnson's services contracted with Johnson himself rather
than with PMSA. As a result, Johnson's contract with PMSA was
equivalent to a gratuitous assignment of income.12
In sum, the assignment of income doctrine has facilitated the
government's efforts to disregard loan-out arrangements only when
the conduct of the parties fails to comport with their characterization
of the transaction for tax purposes. The mere fact that the employee
is also the controlling shareholder is insufficient to disregard the role
of the corporation in earning the income.122 The limited applicability
of the assignment of income doctrine makes it relatively easy for well-
advised taxpayers to avoid its application in effecting their loan-out
transactions.
2. Section 482
The government has also attempted to discourage the use of
loan-outs by applying Section 482, which allows the Treasury to real-
locate gross income, deductions, credits, and allowances among trades
or businesses that are "owned or controlled directly or indirectly by
the same interests" to the extent necessary to reflect income clearly or
prevent tax evasion.23 As a service provider, the loan-out's control-
120. 78 Tax Ct. at 891 (citations omitted). The court noted that the tension between the
principles of Lucas v. Earl and recognition of corporate status was "most acute when a corpora-
tion operates a personal service business and has as its sole or principal employee its sole or
principal shareholder." Id. at 890 n.13. The court added that in such cases § 482 normally
provides "a smoother route" to identifying the taxpayer.
121. The court expressly did not decide whether Johnson's contract with PMSA was a
sham. Id. at 890 n.12.
122. This is consistent with the broader rule that wholly-owned corporations are not
presumed to be alter egos or common law agents of their controlling shareholders. See Moline
Properties, 319 U.S. at 440; DeVeguar v. Commissioner, 28 Tax Ct. 1055 (1957) (stating that the
activities of wholly-owned United States corporations would not be imputed to the foreign
taxpayer who controlled them, for purposes of determining whether he was engaged in a United
States trade or business).
123. The text of § 482 provides, in relevant part:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incorpo-
rated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated)
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may dis-
912 [Vol. 48:879
1995] LOAN-OUT CORPORATIONS 913
ling shareholder-employee is in the trade or business of providing
services to an employer-the loan-out-and the loan-out is in the
trade or business of providing those same services to a third party.
Thus, although the matter is not free from doubt, and while the court
has not clearly stated its rationale, recent decisions of the Tax Court
have consistently held that a corporation and its shareholder-em-
ployee are engaged in two separate "trades or businesses" for pur-
poses of Section 482.124 Unlike the sham incorporation doctrine, re-
tribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between
or among such organizations, trades or businesses, if he determines that such distribu-
tion, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or
clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or businesses.
I.R.C. § 482 (1994).
124. In early decisions applying § 482 to shareholder-employees, the Tax Court appeared
reluctant to find that rendering services as an employee of a corporation constituted a trade or
business separate from that of a corporation. For example, in Rubin v. Commissioner, the Tax
Court applied § 482 to a controlling shareholder-employee even though it refused to hold that
being an employee constituted a trade or business, finding instead that the individual taxpayer
"operated an independent business and merely assigned to the corporation a portion of the
income therefrom .." 56 Tax Ct. 1155, 1161 (1971), afrd 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972), acq.
1972-2 Cum. Bull. 3. Likewise, in Borge v. Commissioner, the Tax Court and the Second Circuit
applied § 482 where an entertainer performed some of his artistic and professional services
under a contract with his controlled corporation and performed the remainder of those services
"on his own behalf aside from the contract." 26 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 816, 818, 820 (1967)
afrd 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968). And, in Ach v. Commissioner, 42 Tax Ct. 114 (1964), afrd 358
F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1966), the Tax Court found a § 482 reallocation appropriate where an individ-
ual taxpayer purported to sell her profitable dress business to an insolvent corporation owned
by her children, but continued to manage it without compensation and also failed to transfer
ownership of the business's valuable intangibles. Id. at 124-25. The Tax Court concluded that
"sufficient aspects of the business remained with [her] so as not to deprive her of the status of a
separate 'organization,' 'trade,' or 'business,' within the meaning of section 482." Id. at 125.
However, in a later series of cases, the Tax Court expressly recognized that for purposes of § 482
a shareholder-employee was engaged in a trade or business separate from that of the corpora-
tion simply by virtue of being the corporation's employee. It reached this conclusion with
minimal analysis in Keller, 77 Tax Ct. at 1022, a decision that the Tenth Circuit affirmed,
Keller, 723 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1983). The Tax Court continued to apply this rule in Pacela, 78
Tax Ct. at 618, and Fatland, 48 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 1109. The Seventh Circuit reached
the opposite conclusion in Foglesong, 621 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'g and remanding, 35 Tax
Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1309 (1976), on remand, 77 Tax Ct. 1102 (1981), rev'd, 691 F.2d 848 (7th
Cir. 1982).
Both the § 482 regulations and the legislative history of the precursors of that section
support the Tax Court's conclusion in the later-decided cases (Keller, Pacella, and Fatland) that
mere employment can constitute a trade or business for purposes of § 482. House Committee on
Ways and Means, Revenue Act of 1934, H.R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Seas. 24 (1934), 1939-1
Cum. Bull. (Part 2) 554, 572 (directing that the term "organizations, trades, or businesses" be
construed broadly); Tress. Reg. § 1.482-1A(a)(2) (1994) (defining "trade" or "business" as "any
trade or business activity of any kind, regardless of whether or where organized, whether owned
individually or otherwise, and regardless of the place where carried on"). The Treasury agrees
with this interpretation, as indicated by its nonacquiescence in Foglesong. Rev. Rul. 88-38,
1988-1 Cum. Bull. 246. See generally Manning, 37 U. Miami L. Rev. at 659-62 (cited in note
118); Albert Feuer, Section 482, Assignment of Income Principles and Personal Service
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allocation under Section 482 does not require the government to
establish that the loan-out is a sham since it allows for reallocation
even among bona fide business entities.125 With respect to allocations
of loan-out income, Section 482 often is largely indistinguishable from
common law assignment of income principles.126
Generally, Section 482 applies to transactions between com-
monly controlled businesses that do not reflect arm's length pricing.27
For example, if a loan-out were to pay little or no salary to its con-
trolling shareholder-employee, Section 482 would allow the
Commissioner to impute a higher salary and, therefore, impose a
higher tax on the shareholder-employee.28
Corporations, 59 Taxes 564 (1981); John J. McFadden, Section 482 and the Professional
Corporation:- The Foglesong Case, 8 J. Corp. Tax. 35 (1981); James P. Fuller, Section 482
Revisited, 31 Tax L. Rev. 475, 480 (1976); Warren C. Seieroe and Lawrence Gerber, Section 482-
Still Growing at the Age of 50, 46 Taxes 893, 896 (1968); Vincent T. Volpe, Comment, Section
482 and the Personal Service Corporation, 26 S.L.U. L. J. 155 (1981); Robert W. Wood, The
Keller, Foglesong, and Pacella Cases: 482 Allocations, Assignments of Income, and New Section
269A, 10 J. Corp. Tax. 65 (1983).
125. See, for example, Borge, 405 F.2d at 676-77 (recognizing that an actor's poultry busi-
ness was a legitimate corporation but allocating a portion of that corporation's income to its sole
shareholder who alone was responsible for producing that income through his entertainment
services).
126. On some occasions, the government and the courts have used § 482 where the common
law assignment of income doctrine could have produced (or indeed did produce) equivalent
results. For example, in Jones v. Commissioner, 64 Tax Ct. 1066 (1975), the Tax Court first
found an assignment of income under § 61, then went on to allocate (apparently all of) the
corporation's gross income and allowable deductions to the reporter under § 482, finding that a
court reporter's arrangement failed to satisfy the arm's length standard because: (1) federal law
required the services in question to be performed by an individual rather than a corporation; (2)
the reporter failed to enter an employment agreement with the corporation; (3) he remained
under the control of the judge to whom he was assigned; and (4) he personally certified the tran-
scripts. Id. at 1076. However, where the assignment of income doctrine is inapplicable because
the purported earner is clearly the principal in the transaction or the proper formalities were
observed, § 482 can still authorize reallocation where the specific standards of the statute and
the regulations thereunder are needed to sort out complex transactions and interrelationships.
Compare Damm v. Commissioner, 36 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 793, 796 (1977) (distinguishing
Rubin, where the purported earner was in fact a party to the income-generating contract, thus
making an analysis under § 482 more appropriate than an assignment of income analysis, from
the case before it, where the purported earner never entered the contract). See Wood, 10 J.
Corp. Tax. at 76-77 (cited in note 124) (discussing the importance of formalities in avoiding
assignment of income challenges). See generally Joseph W. Burdett, Fogelsong's Sec. 482
Approach May Threaten Closely-Held Personal Service Corporations, 53 J. Tax. 330 (1980). The
Commissioner's discretion under § 482 is broader than under assignment of income principles.
See, for example, Wilson, 530 F.2d at 776 (referring to the Commissioner's "broad discretion"
under § 482). Section 482 also allows reallocation of nonincome items.
127. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1A(b)(1) (1994) dictates the arm's length standard.
128. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(b) (1994) (describing the determination of taxable income
when one member of a controlled group performs services for another). See, for example, Ach,
42 Tax Ct. at 125 (holding that income must be reallocated to an individual taxpayer when the
record showed that she had rendered services to her children's corporation without
compensation for several years); Borge, 405 F.2d at 675-77 (holding that income must be
reallocated to an individual taxpayer who had entered into a five-year employment contract
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However, the arm's length standard can be applied not only to
the amount of taxable compensation paid out to the shareholder-em-
ployee, but also to the various tax benefits the taxpayer derives from
earning service income through a loan-out: tax deferral when share-
holder payments are made at the end of the corporation's taxable year
(which may be a fiscal year if the corporation is not a PSC for Section
441 purposes), greater deductibility of business expenses, and the
various tax-favored insurance, medical, retirement, and other fringe
benefits. Even if the shareholder's taxable compensation satisfies
arm's length standards, these tax advantages alone may be substan-
tial enough to raise a question whether the shareholder-employee's
return position evades taxes and/or fails to reflect clearly her income
within the meaning of Section 482.
No cases have squarely addressed the government's power to
use Section 482 to eliminate the tax benefit of deferral enjoyed by
shareholder-employees who receive year-end salary payments.12 9 In
the case of a controlled fiscal-year corporation, courts determining
whether to reallocate corporate income to shareholder-employees
under Section 482 typically compare the total compensation the
shareholder actually received during the calendar year with the
amount she would have received had she operated as a calendar year
sole proprietor. If the amounts are approximately equal, the court
will not apply Section 482.130 Where no fiscal-year entity is involved,
with his corporation when he was paid in only one year); Rubin, 56 Tax Ct. at 1159 (allowing
reallocation where the shareholder-employee's services were rendered to parties other than the
employing corporation); Haag, 88 Tax Ct. at 617 (describing as "most important" the fact that
the petitioner provided medical services without compensation to his corporation during the
years in issue); Hospital Corp. of America, 81 Tax Ct. at 597-602 (reallocating part of the
corporation's income to controlling shareholder-employee to reflect reasonable compensation);
Jones, 64 Tax Ct. at 1077 (permitting nearly 100% reallocation where federal law did not allow
most of the services in question to be provided by a corporation).
129. In contrast, the Treasury's interpretation of § 269A indicates that "deferral of income"
is the type of tax avoidance motivation that can trigger application of that section. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.269A-1(b)(6), 48 Fed. Reg. 13,438 (1983). See note 160 and accompanying text.
130. See, for example, Keller, 77 Tax Ct. at 1025; Haag, 88 Tax Ct. at 618-22. In Keller, the
Tax Court declined to consider the government's attack on the professional corporation's
adoption of a November fiscal year. The selection of a November year-end benefited the
corporation because it was a partner in a partnership that had a different taxable year.
Although the opinion does not identify the partnership's taxable year, it was probably a calen-
dar year. Keller, 77 Tax Ct. at 1020, 1034; Halperin, 65 J. Tax. at 75 n.12 (cited in note 9). The
Keller court expressed a cryptic "doubt whether... this presents a problem to be analyzed in
the context of this case under section 61(a) and section 482." 77 Tax Ct. at 1034. In comparing
"the net income which petitioner would have received absent incorporation," the court included
the distributive share of partnership income that would have been taxable to the physician if he
were an unincorporated, and, thus, a calendar year, taxpayer. Id. at 1029 and nn.18-19. The
physician's corporation "took the position that as a partner... it was only required to report
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so that a salary payment to a controlling shareholder is merely de-
layed within the taxable year, but not deferred to a later taxable year,
the time value of the deferred payroll taxes will not, in many cases, be
significant enough to warrant scrutiny under Section 482.
In a situation where deferral produced a substantial tax bene-
fit to the shareholder-employee, it would seem that the Section 482
inquiry could focus properly on whether such a delay would have
occurred in an arm's length transaction. No cases have addressed
this question, however, and in most instances the answer would be
hopelessly speculative. It is not unusual for a taxpayer dealing with
an uncontrolled but creditworthy payor to negotiate delayed salary
payments in an effort to delay payment of withholding taxes. On the
other hand, with a less creditworthy payor, a worker agreeing to a
deferred payment would face a risk of nonpayment that does not exist
when the worker controls the payor.131
The question of whether Section 482 should be applied to real-
locate expense deductions is more complex. In Haag v. Commissioner,
the Tax Court's Section 482 inquiry focused in part on identifying
deductions that would have been unavailable to the taxpayer as a sole
proprietor. 132 Disregarding these deductions meant that the tax-
payer's taxable income during two of the years at issue would have
been significantly higher than it would have been absent incorpora-
tion. The court, therefore, concluded that a reallocation was war-
ranted.
Reallocation is certainly justified where the corporation's de-
ductions arise from expenses that lack a business purpose. For ex-
ample, if the controlling shareholder-employee caused the corporation
to undertake activities generating expenses that would be nonde-
ductible under the Section 183 hobby loss rules if undertaken by an
partnership income for the partnership year ending with or within the fiscal year of the
corporate partner...." Id. at 1020. The Tax Court and the Second Circuit adopted a similar
approach in Borge, 405 F.2d at 675 n.6, 676 n.8.
131. The taxpayer's degree of access (as employee, not as shareholder) to the funds held by
the corporation before the year-end disbursement should be relevant to this deferral question.
If the employment contract does not entitle the owner-employee to accelerate the salary pay-
ments, then, as an employee, the shareholder is not in constructive receipt. In most cases, as a
controlling shareholder, of course, she does have the power to compel a distribution, either by
declaring a dividend or by altering the terms of the employment contract. To conclude, how-
ever, that this constitutes constructive receipt ignores the separate existence of any corporation
that has a single controlling shareholder (or a controlling block of related shareholders).
Compare Hyland v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 422, 424 (2d Cir. 1949) (holding that a controlling
shareholder of a close corporation was not in constructive receipt of salary even though he could
have used his control to cause payment, but leaving open the question of the one-man
corporation).
132. Haag, 88 Tax Ct. at 619-20.
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individual, a reallocation of those expenses (and, hence, disallowance
of the loss deductions) would be warranted.13 Due to the lack of a
profit motive, these would not be ordinary and necessary expenses,
and thus-in Section 482 terms-they would not reflect an arm's
length relationship between the employee and the corporation.
However, because they were not ordinary and necessary in the first
place, the deductions could also be disallowed under Section 162
without resort to Section 482.
In contrast, many deductions that are available to corporations
but unavailable to individuals arise from expenditures that have a
business purpose. One example would be ordinary and necessary
business expenses that would have been deductible by an employee
only to the extent that the employee's miscellaneous itemized deduc-
tions exceeded two percent of her adjusted gross income. These de-
ductions should not necessarily trigger reallocation under Section 482
because they do not by themselves violate the arm's length standard;
instead, they could reasonably have been incurred by any corporation
employing the taxpayer.
In Haag, however, the loan-out's reasonable business expenses
were so high that they left the shareholder-employee with a salary far
below what the worker could have commanded in the open market.34
Where an unreasonably low salary is the taxpayer's only compensa-
tion, the arm's length standard is not satisfied because the taxpayer
would not have agreed to such a salary from an uncontrolled payor.
In contrast, Section 482 should not apply where a salary that appears
unreasonably low on its face is accompanied by a retirement plan or
medical reimbursement plan sufficiently generous such that the indi-
vidual worker's total compensation package satisfies the arm's length
standard, even though its tax consequences to the worker are far
more favorable than those of an arm's length salary without the tax-
free fringe benefits. In fact, the government has not succeeded in
using Section 482 to attack loan-outs by neutralizing the effects of
retirement and medical benefits. Provided that the corporation
actually engages in business activity, the Tax Court has repeatedly
133. I.R.C. § 183 (1994). See, for example, Haag, 88 Tax Ct. at 620 n.10 (noting that the
government could have raised a § 183 argument to bolster its effort to reallocate a corporation's
income to a controlling shareholder). Such a corporation might also be deemed a sham due to
lack of a sufficient business purpose under Moline Properties. See notes 92-94, 288-92, and
accompanying text. Section 269 could also be invoked to disallow these deductions. See, for
example, Borge, 405 F.2d at 678.
134. Haag, 88 Tax Ct. at 622.
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rejected the suggestion that Section 482 may be invoked when obtain-
ing the benefits of retirement and medical reimbursement plans moti-
vates incorporation. 135 As a result, the government has not had great
success in reallocating loan-out income under Section 482.
Keller v. Commissioner,16 which sharply divided the Tax Court
sitting en banc, is a particularly notable example of the government's
lack of success in using Section 482 to attack the various tax-advan-
taged fringe benefits enjoyed by incorporated workers137 In that case,
the taxpayer was a physician who joined a partnership of other
physicians and subsequently contributed his partnership interest to a
professional corporation of which he was sole shareholder and
director, and of which he and his wife were the sole employees. The
corporation paid the taxpayer a salary and provided him with various
benefits including a medical reimbursement plan and a defined
benefit pension plan (which the Service conditionally determined was
a qualified plan).138 The taxpayer did not dispute that the primary
reason he adopted the corporate form was to obtain the tax benefits of
the pension and the medical expense reimbursement plans.39
Although the government sought to tax all of the professional
corporation's income to the taxpayer under either Section 482 or the
assignment of income doctrine, the ten-judge majority ruled that the
total compensation paid to the taxpayer (including not only his salary
from the professional corporation, but also any pension contributions
and medical expense reimbursements from that corporation) "was
essentially equivalent to that which he would have received absent
incorporation."40 The court acknowledged that if only taxable income
were considered, the taxpayer received less than he would have
received absent incorporation, but the court found that this reduction
resulted "from the Code provisions which specifically provide for
deferral and nonrecognition of income."'1'
135. Fatland, 48 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 1109; Achiro, 77 Tax Ct. at 899-900; Keller,
77 Tax Ct. at 1030; Pacella, 78 Tax Ct. at 618. Where reallocation is warranted on other
grounds, however, the Tax Court has disregarded a corporation's medical and pension deduc-
tions to approximate the taxable income the shareholder-employee would have received absent
incorporation. See Haag, 88 Tax Ct. at 620-21 (noting, however, that an individual employed by
a noncontrolled corporation would be reasonable to accept a lower taxable salary if these tax-
favored benefits were also provided).
136. 77 Tax Ct. 1014.
137. The resulting congressional outrage spawned § 269. See note 144 and accompanying
text.
138. The taxpayer personally guaranteed all obligations of the corporation arising out of its
relationship with the partnership. Keller, 77 Tax Ct. at 1016-17.
139. Id. at 1021.
140. Id. at 1025.
141. Id. at 1029.
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3. Sections 269 and 269A
Troubled by the outcome in Keller, in 1982 Congress took aim
at professional service corporations by enacting Section 269A. This
section permits the government to reallocate "income, deductions,
credits, exclusions, and other allowances" between a "personal service
corporation" (PSC) and its employee-owners when two conditions are
satisfied: (1) substantially all of the corporation's services are
provided to a single entity; and (2) the corporation was formed for the
principal purpose of avoiding federal income taxes.4 2  Section 269A,
however, appears to be highly ineffective and largely redundant. As
discussed below, its ineffectiveness as a means of challenging loan-
outs in some respects parallels the failure of Section 269 to serve that
same purpose.
Section 269A is, in effect, a specialized version of Section 269,
which has long authorized the Treasury to disallow or reallocate any
"deduction, credit or other allowance" whenever a person acquires
control of a corporation for the "principal purpose" of "evasion or
avoidance of Federal income tax by securing the benefit of a deduc-
tion, credit or other allowance which such person ... would not oth-
erwise enjoy.'' 3 As discussed below, the two provisions are strikingly
142. I.R.C. § 269A(a) (1994).
143. I.R.C. § 269(a), (c) (1994). Numerous decisions have construed § 269 to apply to the
acquisition of a controlling interest in a newly formed corporation, whether or not it is a PSC.
See, for example, Borge, 405 F.2d at 677-78 (holding that a corporation was formed solely to
avoid taxes within the meaning of § 269); James Realty Co. v. United States, 280 F.2d 394, 397-
98 (8th Cir. 1960) (finding that the principal purpose of creating multiple corporations was to
avoid federal income or excess profits tax). Thus, both provisions could apply to the formation of
a PSC for the principal purpose of tax avoidance. However, whereas § 269 authorizes the
Secretary either to reallocate or to disallow deductions, § 269A authorizes only reallocation.
Nothing in § 269A or its legislative history would appear to require the Secretary to apply
the more lenient rule of § 269A to a PSC. However, § 269 authorizes reallocation only "among
the corporations, or properties, or parts thereof." I.R.C. § 269(c)(2) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.269-4
(1994). Absent some guidance as to what constitutes a "part" of a corporation for this purpose, it
is not clear whether § 269 authorizes reallocation to a noncorporate shareholder, as § 269A
clearly does. If it does not, this would seem to be an artificial distinction, since any individual
shareholder who incorporated separately would thereby become subject to § 269 with respect to
the tax benefits of the lower tier corporation, while the unincorporated shareholder enjoying the
same tax benefits would not. Nevertheless, the statutory language of § 269 is narrow, and
would authorize reallocation in the case of loan-outs only if an individual employee-owner could
be considered a "part" of the corporation. Of course, when a particular deduction is available to
corporations but not to individuals, reallocation of that deduction to a corporation's shareholders
under §§ 61, 482, or 269A has the same effect as disallowance under § 269. See, for example,
Borge, 405 F.2d at 678 (using § 269 to disallow corporate deductions which would have been
unavailable to a noncorporate taxpayer). This would be true, for example, of corporate deduc-
tions that, at the individual shareholder level, would constitute medical expenses below the
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similar in that neither appears to apply when the taxpayer can dem-
onstrate that the decision to incorporate either was not motivated
principally by federal income tax considerations, or was motivated by
federal income tax benefits that Congress intended to confer
regardless of the taxpayer's motive for incorporating. In addition, the
narrow range of circumstances in which Section 269A applies makes
it an even less useful tool than Section 269.
PSCs are not defined as narrowly in Section 269A and
Proposed Regulation Section 1.269A-1 as they are in Section 441.
Specifically, neither Section 269A nor the proposed regulation lists
the types of services that qualify as "personal." Thus, Section 269A
apparently applies even to corporations formed by producers, direc-
tors, writers, composers, designers, athletes, coaches, and other indi-
viduals whose "behind-the-scenes" services Section 441 excludes from
the definition of "personal services."
The legislative history indicates that Section 269A was en-
acted, at least in part, to "overturn the results reached in cases like
Keller v. Commissioner... where the corporation served no meaning-
ful business purpose other than to secure tax benefits which would
not otherwise be available."'144 Ironically, because the conjunctive
nature of the statutory test makes it relatively easy for taxpayers to
"plan around" Section 269A, many-if not most-loan-outs can with-
stand scrutiny under this section either because they do not render
services to a single entity or because they are formed for a nontax
avoidance purpose.
Loan-out employees often provide services to more than one
entity, so that Section 269A would not apply. In the film industry, for
example, it is common for a service provider to work for a number of
different producers or studios during a relatively short period of time,
or, in some cases, simultaneously. Likewise, athletes that compete
exclusively or primarily in nonteam sports such as tennis, golf, or
auto racing provide services to multiple organizations. 45
Some loan-outs, of course, face greater difficulty under the
single entity test. In television, for example, an actor, director, or
writer often will provide services exclusively to one party for extended
7.5% floor or unreimbursed employee expenses below the 2% floor, and expenses that would
generate nondeductible hobby losses under I.R.C. § 183 (1994).
144. Conference Committee Report on Pub. L. No. 97-248 (Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982) (citation omitted). Accord 128 Cong. Rec. 22403 (Aug. 19, 1982)
(comments of Senator Dole).
145. The emergence of professional team tennis conceivably could alter the application of §
269A to personal service corporations formed by any professional tennis players who provide
substantially all of their compensated services to a team.
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periods. Because an athlete engaged in a team sport typically plays
for a single team for one or more years, she could also have difficulty
under this test. Yet even television entertainers and team athletes
often provide significant services to parties other than their chief
employers; team athletes, for example, often work as actors, singers,
'"personalities," or product endorsers. This outside activity alone
might be sufficient to insulate an entertainer or athlete's loan-out
from Section 269A. Note, however, that for any worker a period of
extended unemployment could cause the worker to "flunk" the single
entity test, since the worker's last employer might be her only em-
ployer during the measuring period. And workers that fit the tradi-
tional "employee" mold-for example, medical personnel working for a
hospital or a professional partnership-clearly would have a problem
under the single entity test.146
Neither Section 269A nor Proposed Regulation Section 1.269A-
1 explains what constitutes "substantially all" of a corporation's serv-
ices, or what period of time is to be considered in determining
whether the corporation performs substantially all of its services for a
single entity, critical questions for many service-providers. 147 Thus,
depending on the testing period, a loan-out could be subject to Section
269A in one year but not in the subsequent year.
Even if a corporation provides substantially all of its services
to a single entity such as a sports team or a television production
146. As a theoretical matter, of course, it is not entirely clear why the number of service
recipients should be relevant to the question of whether the corporate status of the entity should
be respected for tax purposes. The single entity test has little theoretical justification, and
appears to derive simply from Congress' desire to overrule Keller. Enacting § 269A for this
purpose, however, was largely superfluous once Congress had created near-parity between
corporate and self-employment retirement plans and had enacted the rules governing affiliated
service organizations and leased employees. See notes 27-31, note 161 and accompanying text.
147. With respect to the "testing period," the Treasury could adopt an approach similar to
that used to define a PSC in the temporary regulations promulgated under § 441, which deter-
mine whether a corporation's "principal activity" is the performance of personal services in a
given year by reference to its activities in the preceding taxable year. Temp. Treas. Reg. §
1.441-4T(d)(1), (2) (1994). Alternatively, the Treasury could consider only the services rendered
during the taxable year at issue, using the method advanced in the § 448 temporary regulations.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.448-1T(e)(4)(i) (1994). Either approach could cause the tax treatment of a
loan-out to change significantly from one taxable year to the next. Alternatively, the test could
examine the corporation's principal activity during a period of longer duration-three out of the
preceding five taxable years, for example. This approach, which is similar to that used in the
hobby loss rules, I.R.C. § 183 (1994), would prevent a small one-time shift in revenue allocation
from having a drastic effect on the loan-out's tax treatment and would encourage long-term tax
planning while still effecting the Congress's intent to eliminate the perceived abuse in the Keller
case. For corporations with shorter histories, of course, a different rule would be necessary.
Section 183(e) offers a model for one possible approach, which would allow a retroactive deter-
mination once the corporation has existed for the testing period.
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company during the testing period, Section 269A will still apply only
if the "principal purpose" of forming the corporation is the "avoidance
or evasion of Federal Income tax by reducing the income of, or secur-
ing the benefit of any expense, deduction, credit, exclusion, or other
allowance for, any employee-owner."148 It has never been clear, how-
ever, which taxpayer motives (and what evidence thereof) should be
sufficient to demonstrate a principal purpose of tax avoidance or
evasion, thereby making the second part of the Section 269A test
something of a cipher.
This inherent weakness in Section 269A is the same one that
impeded the government's short-lived efforts to apply Section 269 to
taxpayers who incorporated their sole proprietorships. Courts analyz-
ing challenges under Section 269 were reluctant to disallow a tax
benefit unless the taxpayer's enjoyment of the benefit would clearly
frustrate the intent of Congress. 49 Section 269A, because it clearly
148. I.R.C. § 269A (1994).
149. The government initially believed that § 269 would enable it to disallow retirement
plan deductions taken by PSCs, but the Treasury had virtually abandoned this effort by 1986,
finding that "courts are reluctant to treat incorporation for pension benefits as evasion of tax."
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,553 (Sept. 3, 1986). See Frank V. Battle, Jr., The Use of Corporations by
Persons Who Perform Services to Gain Tax Advantages, 57 Taxes 797, 803 (1979) (noting the
government's failure to assert this claim over many years of litigation involving incorporated
workers). See also Achiro, 77 Tax Ct. at 895 n.18 (criticizing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7939003, which
stated that § 269 applies when the principal purpose of incorporating was to take advantage of
deductions for pension and medical plans). Compare note 135 and accompanying text (noting
judicial reluctance to apply § 482 to retirement plans).
As noted earlier, taxpayers may incorporate to obtain tax benefits other than favorable
retirement plans. Yet the government has made little use of § 269 to challenge the other tax
benefits of incorporation, despite its modest success in Borge (discussed in note 133). An at-
tempt to use § 269 to disallow standard corporate fringe benefits that a professional corporation
provides would probably fail. Courts, and even the Treasury, have refused to find that every
attempt to achieve tax benefits provided by Congress constitutes tax avoidance under § 269.
The authorities generally distinguish tax benefits Congress intended to grant to taxpayers in
return for the simple act of incorporation from those Congress did not intend as an automatic
consequence of undertaking this formality. See, for example, I.T. 3757, 1945 Cum. Bull. 200
(allowing incorporation to gain benefits provided for Western Hemisphere trade corporations);
Rev. Rul. 70-238, 1970-1 Cum. Bull. 61 (same); Rev. Rul. 76-363, 1976-2 Cum. Bull. 90-91
(finding that § 269 does not apply to formation of new corporation to carry on a specific portion
of an existing corporation's business primarily to gain the benefits of subchapter S); Achiro, 77
Tax Ct. at 895 & n.18 (stating that the incorporation to secure the benefits of subchapter S does
not amount to tax avoidance under § 269); Supreme Investment Corp. v. U.S., 468 F.2d 370, 376
(5th Cir. 1972) (stating that § 269 was not intended to deny taxpayers those "tax benefits which
Congress plainly intended that they should enjoy"); Alinco Life Ins. Co. v. U.S., 373 F.2d 336,
340-41 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (allowing incorporation to obtain life insurance companies' tax benefits);
Barber-Greene Americas, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 Tax Ct. 365, 383-85 (1960) (allowing Western
Hemisphere trade corporation benefit); A.P. Green Export Co. v. U.S., 284 F.2d 383, 388-90 (Ct.
Cl. 1960) (same); Bijou Park Properties Inc. v. Commissioner, 47 Tax Ct. 207, 214 (1966) (holding
§ 269 inapplicable to merger in which newly formed corporation received liquidation distribution
of target's installment obligations); Modern Home Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 54
Tax Ct. 839, 853 (1970) (holding that § 269 does not apply to subchapter S election); Rocco, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 72 Tax Ct. 140, 152-53 (1979) (finding that § 269 does not apply to adoption of
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reflects Congress's disapproval of the Keller decision, should have
answered this concern. Surprisingly, it has not.
A taxpayer typically can assert any of a number of nontax mo-
tivations for forming a C corporation. As discussed earlier, the lim-
ited liability enjoyed by corporations offers one substantial (and ex-
tremely common) reason to incorporate. However, if evidence of such
a purpose is sufficient to avoid application of Section 269A, then that
section appears virtually useless because it can be avoided so easily.150
cash method of accounting); Borge, 405 F.2d at 678-79 (using § 269 to disallow certain losses
incurred after incorporation of a poultry business, based on a finding of tax "reduction through
artifice," where the taxpayer incorporated to avoid disallowance of losses); Senate Committee on
Finance, The Revenue Bill of 1943, H.R. 3687, S. Rep. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943),
reprinted in 1944 Cum. Bull. 973, 1017 (noting that the application of the predecessor of § 269
turns on "whether the transaction or a particular factor thereof 'distorts the liability of the
particular taxpayer' when the 'essential nature' of the transaction or factor is examined in the
light of the 'legislative plan' which the deduction or credit is intended to effectuate") (quoting
Higgins, 308 U.S. at 476-77); K. Martin Worthy, IRS Chief Counsel Outlines What Lies Ahead
for Professional Corporations, 32 J. Tax. 88, 90 (1970) (questioning whether tax avoidance exists
where professional corporation is formed to take advantage of tax benefits Congress deliberately
granted); Tress. Reg. § 1.269-2(b) (1962) (following Higgins standard).
Where a loan-out's employee-owner might be considered a common law employee of the
borrower, see Part III.B.3., the government apparently believes it still has a reasonable argu-
ment for disallowing deductions under § 269 if the incorporation was undertaken to secure tax
benefits. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,553 (Sept. 3, 1986). The General Counsel Memorandum con-
cedes, however, that the § 269 argument is weaker than the arguments under §§ 61 and 482,
and notably the government has not pursued a § 269 challenge in any loan-out cases arising
after the effective date of § 269A.
150. There are reasons to question whether limited liability should always be treated as an
adequate nontax motivation under § 269A (or, for that matter, § 269). For example, asserting
limited liability as a nontax reason for incorporation seems less persuasive when the personal
assets of the employee-owner back the corporation's obligations. Parties entering contracts with
individually controlled corporations often require the corporation's owner to execute a personal
guarantee under which the owner becomes liable in the event of any breach by the corporation.
See, for example, Hynes v. Commissioner, 74 Tax Ct. 1266, 1285 (1980) (stating that it is not
uncommon for a sole shareholder to personally guarantee a loan); Richlands Medical Ass'n, 60
Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 1584 (explaining that shareholder guarantees are not uncommon in
the context of closely held corporations); In re Byrd, 41 Bankr. 555, 562-63 (E.D. Tenn. 1984)
(stating that the plaintiffs regional credit manager usually requires a guarantee from a profes-
sional corporation's principal); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8625003 (Technical Advice Memorandum) (Feb.
28, 1986) (involving athlete loan-outs).Arguably, the existence of such a personal guarantee
undermines the parties' characterization of the corporation as the true principal in the trans-
action, since it suggests that both the provider and consumer of the services recognize that the
duty to perform rests ultimately not with the corporation but with its controlling shareholder.
Drawing this inference in Borge, 405 F.2d at 675, the Second Circuit interpreted the employee-
owner's guarantee as an indication that the loan-out "did nothing to aid Borge in his enter-
tainment business." Accord Foglesong, 691 F.2d at 851. Yet parent corporations often guaran-
tee the debts of their subsidiaries, and individual controlling shareholders often guarantee the
debts of their corporations, regardless of whether they are employee-owners. Thus, the Second
Circuit's position in Borge seems extreme. In marked contrast, the Tax Court majority in Keller
concluded that the employee-owner's "guarantee of the corporation's commitments to [the other
contracting party] is an example of the respect shown for [the corporation] as an entity which
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In addition, outside of the Section 269A context, at least one court has
found a legitimate nontax motive where a taxpayer incorporates to
create "a vehicle for subsequent expansion of the business."151 This
premise, too, is dubious, since additional investors can also join a
noncorporate vehicle such as a partnership, or (to a limited extent) an
S corporation. Avoidance of federal estate taxes, foreign taxes, or
even certain state or local taxes, would also appear to be an
acceptable motive, for Section 269A (like Section 269) refers only to
avoidance of federal income taxes. 152  Yet many of the same tax
had its own business obligations." Keller, 77 Tax Ct. at 1032. Accord Richlands Medical Ass'n,
60 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 1584 (observing that the guarantee requirement underscores
corporation's limited liability).
However, the question of whether personal guarantees undermine the status of the corpo-
ration as a separate taxpayer and a principal in a given transaction is quite different from the
question of whether those guarantees undermine a taxpayer's claim that she formed the entity
for a substantial nontax purpose. If the taxpayer routinely executes personal guarantees on
behalf of the corporation, then, as a practical matter, there is no limited liability with respect to
the transactions covered by those guarantees. See Jones, 64 Tax Ct. at 1074 (expressing
"serious doubts" as to whether a court reporter incorporated in order to enjoy limited liability,
where taxpayer personally certified the accuracy of his transcripts and was personally liable for
certain obligations of the business). Nonetheless, such a taxpayer would still enjoy limited
liability with respect to any claims that arose outside of the transactions to which the guaran-
tees applied.
The argument that pursuit of limited liability is an adequate nontax motivation for forming
a personal service corporation might also be unpersuasive where the taxpayer has the option,
under state law, of forming a limited liability company ("LLC"), which could enjoy limited liabil-
ity without being classified as a corporation for federal income tax purposes. However, because
it is uncertain whether an LLC enjoys limited liability with respect to its activities in jurisdic-
tions that do not recognize its LLC status, many taxpayers still have a reason to prefer incorpo-
ration. See Mark A. Sargent and Walter D. Schwidetzky, Limited Liability Company Handbook
§ 3.06[2][c] at 3-24 (Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1994-95). Furthermore, many states would not
recognize an LLC with only one owner. Id. § 1.04 at 1-6. While an LLC can be formed in such a
way that it constitutes a partnership for federal tax purposes, Rev. Rul. 93-30, 1993-16 Int. Rev.
Bull. 4, a one-owner LLC would not be a partnership, see Rev. Proc. 95-10, § 4.01, 1995-3 Int.
Rev. Bull. 20 (Jan. 17, 1995) (indicating that the Service will only consider ruling requests on
classification of LLC as partnership if LLC has at least two members); I.R.C. §§ 761(a),
7701(a)(2) (1994) (defining "partnership"); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (1994) (same); Allison v.
Commissioner, 35 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1069, 1076 (1976) (incorporating requirement of
two or more persons into tax definition of partnership), although it is not clear whether it would
be a sole proprietorship or a corporation. See also William D. Bagley and Philip P. Whynott,
The Limited Liability Company: The Better Alternative § 14.103 (1991).
In contrast, the individual entrepreneur seeking limited liability can almost always form an
S corporation and enjoy limited liability while foregoing some of the tax benefits of a C corpora-
tion-notably, the deferral resulting from use of a fiscal year for tax reporting, and the tax-free
fringe benefits which would be unavailable to major shareholders of S corporations. Thus, the
choice of C status would be primarily or purely tax-motivated. However, the government has
apparently never contended that an incorporated taxpayer who forgoes the S election should be
foreclosed from citing limited liability as a business purpose sufficient to avoid application of §
269A.
151. Foglesong, 621 F.2d at 869 n.9.
152. See generally Moore, The Filmed Entertainment Industry 1 1002.01 at 1652 (cited in
note 59).
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benefits that reduce federal income taxes also tend to reduce other
taxes. Because of this "piggy-backing," in some cases federal income
tax avoidance motives can be recharacterized as nonfederal income
tax avoidance motives.
Unfortunately, little guidance is available to resolve these
ambiguities. Because there have been no reported decisions153 and
only one private letter ruling5 directly applying Section 269A and its
proposed regulations, their scope and validity remain uncertain.155
The proposed regulation under Section 269A cuts a broader swath
than the statutory language, stating that a "principal purpose" of tax
153. Although one appellate opinion mentions § 269A, those comments are dicta. See notes
164-68 and accompanying text.
154. By finding § 269A inapplicable on facts very similar to those of Keller, the letter ruling
itself raises serious questions about the efficacy of § 269A. In that ruling, Priv. Ltr. Rul.
8737001 (April 13, 1987), a physician incorporated his share of a medical partnership, and was
the corporation's sole shareholder and sole physician-employee. The corporation adopted a
retirement plan and a medical reimbursement plan, and used a fiscal year, even though the
physician himself used a calendar year. The Service concluded that the physician did not
incorporate for the principal purpose of tax avoidance, for two reasons: (1) the reduction in the
physician's tax liability resulting from incorporation was "relatively insignificant" once pension
contributions were disregarded (as required by § 269A); and (2) the fact that the corporate form
provided the physician with limited liability under state law was a significant nontax purpose
for incorporation, even though this limited liability did not extend to his own professional
malpractice. The ruling does not indicate whether, or under what circumstances, limited
liability by itself would establish a sufficient nontax purpose.
Strangely, the ruling never even mentions Keller. Yet, the only material differences be-
tween the facts in the letter ruling and the Keller case are that: (1) the physician in Keller
asserted no nontax purpose for incorporation (although almost certainly he, like the physician in
the ruling, could have asserted some degree of limited liability, even though state law might
have prevented limitation of his own medical malpractice liability); and (2) the physician in
Keller may have enjoyed a greater overall reduction in tax liability as a result of incorporation
(although the absence of figures in the ruling makes this conclusion speculative). The Service's
reluctance to apply § 269A in the letter ruling seems inconsistent with the aggressive position
the Treasury's proposed regulation suggests, and is especially odd since the proposed regulation
was promulgated four years before the letter ruling. Based on Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8737001, it is not
at all clear whether, if the Keller facts were presented to the Service today, § 269A would change
the outcome at all. See also Leavell, 1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS at *80 (Swift, J., concurring)
(noting that government, without adequate explanation, conceded that § 269A did not apply to
basketball player's loan-out); id. at *83 n.4 (Laro, J., dissenting) (noting that government
"disavowed" application of § 269A because athlete's primary purpose in incorporating was to
enable him to "claim the benefits of free agency").
155. The proposed regulation has been roundly criticized for its ambiguity on essential
points, and the government's prolonged inaction suggests that the regulation is unlikely to go
into effect, at least without substantial revision. See, for example, Robert Lewis Jackson,
Attorney Calls for Withdrawal of PSC Regs., 92 Tax Notes Today 116-34 (June 4, 1992)
(criticizing the proposed regulations as inadequate); Section 269A-Service Corporations to
Avoid Tax, 19 Tax Notes 186 (April 18, 1983) (discussing a practitioner's reaction); 19 Tax Notes
at 587 (May 16, 1983) (discussing a practitioner's reaction); Lisa Klinger, Proposed 269A
Regulations Criticized As Vague and Expansive, 20 Tax Notes 321 (July 25, 1983) (summarizing
criticisms at Service hearing).
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avoidance is "evidenced when use of the corporation either reduces
the income of any employee-owner, or secures for any employee-owner
one or more tax benefits which would not otherwise be available."1'
'Tax benefits" are defined broadly as "any expense, deduction, credit,
exclusion or other allowance which would not otherwise be avail-
able.'1 57 A particular tax benefit is one that would "not otherwise be
available" to the owner-employee when it would be unavailable to that
person if performing the services "in an individual capacity."'158 The
proposed regulation includes a nonexhaustive list of specific benefits
that meet this definition:159 accumulation of income by the corpora-
tion, use of multiple classes of stock for income splitting, income
deferral through use of a taxable year different from that of the
shareholder(s), 160 life insurance plans, accident and health plans, and
meals and lodging furnished for the employer's benefit. 6'
Although the proposed regulation does not explain whether "in
an individual capacity" means as a sole proprietor, as a partner in a
partnership, or as an employee, the benefits it lists, together with the
legislative history of Section 269A,62 suggest that the focus should be
on benefits that would be unavailable to partners and sole proprie-
156. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.269A-l(a)(2), 48 Fed. Reg. 13,438 (1983). Under a proposed safe
harbor, a PSC will be deemed not to have a principal purpose of tax avoidance if no employee-
owner's federal income tax liability (including the corporation's tax liability) is reduced in any 12
month period by more than the lesser of $2,500 or 10% of the tax liability she would have
incurred "in an individual capacity." Prop. Tress. Reg. § 1.269A-1(c) (1994). The taxpayer who
would reap the greatest benefit from forming a loan-out would typically not satisfy this safe
harbor.
157. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.269A-l(b)(6).
158. Prop. Tress. Reg. § 1.269A-1(b)(4).
159. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.269A-l(b)(6).
160. Deferral is specifically mentioned in the discussion of § 269A contained in the post-
enactment "Blue Book." Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., General
Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,
H.R. 4961, 326 (Comm. Print 1982) ('TEFRA"). This tax avoidance device became less signifi-
cant, however, after enactment of § 441, which forced most PSCs to adopt the same taxable
years as their controlling shareholders. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 806, 100
Stat. 2363 (1986), codified at I.R.C. § 441(i) (1994). As noted earlier, however, many loan-outs
fall outside the scope of these rules. See note 47 and accompanying text. For those entities, a §
269A analysis could still be triggered by the selection of a loan-out's taxable year.
161. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.269A-l(b)(6), 48 Fed. Reg. 13,438 (1983). For taxable years
beginning before January 1, 1984, the list of "tainted" tax benefits also included certain contri-
butions to, and benefits under, a qualified retirement plan, since larger contributions were
permitted to corporate retirement plans than to Keogh plans before 1984. Id. But see 128
Cong. Rec. 22403 (Aug. 19, 1982) (comments of Senator Dole) (suggesting that retirement plans
should not be considered in the § 269A analysis before the effective date of parity under
TEFRA). The TEFRA Conference report indicates that § 269A only applies where a taxpayer
achieves "significant" tax benefits through incorporation, but does not define "significant."
Conference Committee, Report on the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, H.R.
4961, H.R. Rep. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 633 (1982).
162. See note 144 and accompanying text.
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tors. Yet many-if not most-service-providers who could work as
partners or sole proprietors would also have the option of choosing to
work as someone's employee. As employees of another party, they
might have access to at least some of the benefits that a loan-out
could provide, although the benefits would not necessarily be custom-
ized to their needs. Their decision to incorporate could therefore be
characterized as motivated not primarily by tax concerns, but by the
desire to find the employer that provides the best possible benefits
package. If such an "optimal" employer does not already exist in the
marketplace, through incorporation the taxpayer can create such an
employer. Thus, in many cases it would be difficult to say with cer-
tainty that an incorporation was primarily tax motivated rather than
market motivated, even where comparable tax benefits are unavail-
able to sole proprietors and partners. 16 3
For these reasons, it seems likely that Section 269A will dis-
courage the use of loan-outs. The only appellate court that has even
mentioned Section 269A in this context gave it a cold reception. In
Sargent v. Commissioner,'6 a case involving loan-outs formed by
professional hockey players, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
stated in dicta that Section 269A was inapplicable because the 'PSCs
were established for a legitimate purpose, and [the athletes] had bona
fide employment contracts with their respective PSCs."16 5 However,
the only asserted motives for forming the loan-outs in Sargent were:
(1) to gain increased bargaining power; and (2) to place money into a
pension plan. The first of these motives seems utterly irrelevant,
especially since the opinion does not explain how incorporation would
163. If, as the proposed regulation implies, the very existence of tax benefits establishes
that tax avoidance was the principal purpose of incorporation, then § 269A can be applied to
virtually any controlled service corporation formed in a way that maximizes tax benefits to an
individual employee-owner, as long as the corporation provides "substantially all" of its services
to a single party during the relevant testing period (whatever that period is determined to be).
The proposed regulation does not, however, indicate the weight to be afforded this "evidence."
Surely the receipt of some federal tax benefits should not give rise to a conclusive presumption
that the principal purpose of forming the corporation is tax avoidance. Any other interpretation
of the proposed regulations seems inconsistent with both the language and the legislative his-
tory of § 269A.
164. 929 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1991).
165. Id. at 1260 n.17. The Sargent court's comments on § 269A are dicta, because all of the
taxable years at issue in Sargent (1978-82) preceded § 269A's January 1, 1983, effective date.
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 ("TEFRA"), Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 250(a), 96
Stat. 324 (1982), codified at I.R.C. § 269(A) (1994); Sargent v. Commissioner, 93 Tax Ct. 572, 583
n.10 (1989).
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increase the athletes' bargaining power. 166 The pension plan rationale
is also unpersuasive, not only because it reflects the same level of tax
motivation as the benefits enumerated in the proposed regulations,
167
but also because the players would have been covered by the National
Hockey League Players Pension Plan had they not established their
separate corporate plans.168 The appellate court's acceptance of these
motives suggests that it would find virtually any nontax motive
sufficient to avoid Section 269A.
In summary, the purpose and intended scope of Section 269A
are anything but clear. Because of the wide array of nontax purposes
a taxpayer may assert, the proviso that the corporation provide sub-
stantially all services for only one other entity, and the statute's fail-
ure to define "substantially all" or to specify the testing period,
Section 269A has not, in practice, given the government any powers
not already exercisable under Section 269, Section 482, or the
assignment of income doctrine. It appears doubtful that Section 269A
has any "teeth" at all in discouraging loan-outs.
6 9
B. Challenges Invoking the Employee/Independent
Contractor Analysis
In the wake of its numerous failures to persuade courts to
disregard professional corporations under the doctrines discussed
166. See also Leavell, 1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS at *83 n.4 (Laro, J., dissenting) (noting that
government accepted athlete's contention that incorporation was for primary purpose of
enabling him to be a free agent). Leavell is the only other published opinion discussing the
application of § 269A to loan-outs.
167. The proposed § 269A regulation had been promulgated eight years before the court is-
sued this opinion. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 48 Fed. Reg. 13,438 (1983). Under the
proposed regulation, the retirement contributions would not by themselves cause the players'
corporations to be disregarded. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.269A-1(d)(2)(i), 48 Fed. Reg. 13,438-39
(1983) (generally barring application of § 269A to contributions to retirement plans of corpora-
tions formed before September 3, 1982). Yet that does not mean that the drafters of the regula-
tion would have characterized them as nontax motives sufficient to "save' a corporation
from § 269A if that section were otherwise applicable.
168. It is not clear whether the players established their corporate plans instead of, or in
addition to, the league plan, but the loan-outs were not required to contribute to the league
plan. Sargent, 929 F.2d at 1255, 93 Tax Ct. at 576-77. See note 30 (discussing the relationship
between loan-out plans and multi-employer plans).
169. See Moore, The Filmed Entertainment Industry i 1002.01 at 1652 (cited in note 59)
(indicating that § 269A has not substantially deterred the use of loan-outs). As a tool for reallo-
cating income between a loan-out and its shareholder-employee(s), § 482 appears to be superior
to § 269A because, among other things, it is not circumscribed by the requirements that sub-
stantially all of the loan-out's services be provided to only one entity and that the corporate form
be adopted for the principal purpose of avoiding federal income tax. Indeed, in Keller the court
applied § 482 to reallocate a portion of the corporation's income to its employee-owner for the
purpose of satisfying the arm's length standard. Keller, 77 Tax Ct. at 1027.
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earlier, the Service has contended that most of the cases it lost under
these doctrines involved service providers who did not fit the tradi-
tional "employee" mold-self-employed physicians, for example.170
Therefore, it has turned its attention to incorporated service providers
who perform services traditionally associated with employee status,
and has sought to recharacterize loan-out arrangements as direct
employment contracts in which the borrowing entity is the employer.
This approach is especially harsh for taxpayers-and dubious in prin-
ciple-because it allows the government to disregard the separate
existence of a corporation without ever finding that it lacks a business
purpose, that the parties have disregarded the corporate form, or that
the transactions between the corporation and its principal employee
fail to comport with arm's length standards.
1. Background
Even before it began to apply this analysis to loan-out corpora-
tions, the government had a long-standing interest in reclassifying
independent contractors as employees,171 and it has intensified its
efforts since the mid-1980s 7 2 In recent audits of the entertainment
industry, for example, the Service frequently has challenged studios'
characterization of various workers as independent contractors. 73 It
170. Gen. Couns. Mere. 39,553 (Sept. 3, 1986).
171. See, for example, Rev. Rul. 57-155, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 333 (classifying actress and nar-
rator as employees of film company).
172. See James J. Jurinski, Independent Contractors: Tax and Business Planning iii, §§
1.10 to 1-1.30, 1-3.10 to 1-3.30 (Callaghan, 1993) (identifying reclassification as "one of the
critical tax issues of the 1990s"); Ani Hadjian, Hiring Temps Full-Time May Get the IRS on Your
Tail, Fortune 34 (Jan. 24, 1994) (reporting that the Service has been targeting companies that
misclassify contingent workers, especially in temp-intensive industries); IRS Plans to Step Up
Audits of Independent Contractors, Says Neill, Mullenholz and Shaw, 90 Tax Notes Today 164-
67 (Aug. 8, 1990) (stating that consultants and others providing services as independent con-
tractors would be the targets of increased audits in 1991).
173. During 1992, the Service initiated a Market Segment Specialization Program to focus
on auditing the entertainment industry. See Husband, 9 Ent. L. & Fin. at 3 (cited in note 13);
Diane Phelps, A Closer Look at New IRS Policies, 106 Billboard 4, 4 (April 9, 1994); Schuyler M.
Moore, How IRS Audits Affect Industry, 8 Ent. L. & Fin. 1, 1 (1992), Robert Marich, Hollywood
on IRS Hit List: New Entertainment Industry Unit to Focus on Wealthy, Self-Employed,
Hollywood Reporter 1, 37 (Sept. 25, 1992). As part of this effort, the Service recently has issued
new guidelines on worker reclassification in the film industry. See IRS Market Segment
Program Guidelines on Classification of Workers in Television Commercial Production and
Professional Video Communications Industries, reprinted in 92 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) d60 (May
16, 1994) ("Market Segment Program Guidelines") (seeking to make accurate and consistent
determinations of employee status by studying the market segment factors and the factors
demonstrating the requisite control); Bob Geiger, IRS Working Out Tax Deal With Film
Production Industry, Minneapolis Star Tribune 2D (Jan. 24, 1994) (observing that after years of
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has announced its intent to pursue this issue in other industries as
well, with special emphasis on small businesses and on industries in
which workers tend to be employed on a temporary basis, such as
publishing, telecommunications, advertising, software, and construc-
tion.174
The government's preference for characterizing workers as
employees rather than independent contractors has several sources:
(1) the administrative convenience of collecting taxes through with-
holding' (2) the larger tax revenues generated by treating workers as
employees; and (3) the relatively low level of tax compliance by
independent contractors.175 Indeed, in recent years, virtually all of the
Service's efforts to collect employment taxes have focused on
reclassifying workers rather than on discouraging underreporting by
independent contractors, 76 even though the estimated revenue losses
from noncompliance dwarf those from misclassification.'"
controversy regarding classification of entertainment industry workers, new audit guidelines
represent negotiated compromise between government and industry positions). The Service
confirms that worker classification is one of the most difficult issues facing its film industry task
force. Robert Marich, Producer Wins Free-Lance Case, Hollywood Reporter 4 (Feb. 18, 1994).
174. Report by the Committee on Government Operations, H.R. Rep. No. 102-1060 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (Nov. 2, 1992) (noting the emphasis on classification issues in the
Employment Tax Examination Program ("ETEP")); Employee Misclassification Will Get More
Scrutiny in All Audits, IRS Counsel Says, 111 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) d13 (June 11, 1993)
(stating that misclassification will be an issue even when not the main focus of the audit);
Jurinski, Independent Contractors § 1-3.30 (cited in note 172). The Service is currently develop-
ing employee/independent contractor classification guidelines for 50 different industries. See,
for example, Employment Tax Ruling in Final Stages of Development, IRS Official Says, 151
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), dl0 (Aug. 9, 1993) (reporting that the Service is developing guidelines to
determine the employment status of therapists and food service employees); IRS Official Says
Market Segment Guidelines Do Not Constitute Rulings,' 95 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) d23 (May 19,
1994) (stating that the guidelines are intended to give taxpayers a sense of the common law
factors the Service will use to classify a worker).
175. H.R. Rep. No. 102-1060 at 3-4. According to the House Committee on Government
Operations, the trivial $50 penalty imposed on a payor that fails to file a Form 1099 reporting
payments for services provided by an unincorporated independent contractor, and the difficulty
the Service has experienced in matching the payor's reported payments with the recipients'
income tax returns, together account for this low level of compliance. Id. at 4. Note that if an
independent contractor is incorporated, the payor is not required to report the payment at all.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-3 (1994). Wisely, even if belatedly, the Treasury is considering eliminating
this exemption. Joint Committee on Taxation Staff Description of Miscellaneous Revenue
Proposals Scheduled for Hearings Sept. 8, 21 and 23 Before House Ways and Means Select
Revenue Measures Subcommittee, 181 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) d70 (Sept. 21, 1993).
176. H.R. Rep. No. 102-1060 at 1. Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 somewhat abated
the risk of retroactive reclassification. Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978), as
amended by Pub. L. No. 96-541, 94 Stat. 3204 (1980), Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982),
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). Section 530, a provision that was never codified, was
originally enacted as a temporary measure until Congress replaced the old common law test of
employee status with something more practical, Senate Committee on Finance, Report on the
Revenue Act of 1978, H.R. 13511, S. Rep. No. 95-1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 209-10 (1978),
reprinted in 1978-3 Cum. Bull. 315, 507-08, but was extended indefinitely by § 269(c) of TEFRA,
1982-2 Cum. Bull. 462, 536, and is expected to continue in force until Congress replaces the
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Reclassification challenges, when successful, can be costly for
both parties. When the service provider is retroactively
recharacterized as an employee, the party deemed to be the employer
must withhold and pay to the government the worker's wage-based
income tax obligations as well as the employee's portion of social
security taxes, must pay the unemployment tax and the employer's
share of social security taxes, and may also be liable for substantial
common law test. Section 530 relief is available only if the taxpayer had a reasonable basis for
treating its workers as independent contractors. Revenue Act of 1978, § 530(a)(1), 92 Stat. at
2885. See also Rev. Proc. 85-18, 1985-1 Cum. Bull. 518 (setting forth guidelines for
implementing § 530). A reasonable basis will be difficult to show when an examination of the 20
common law factors on which the Service relies indicates employee status. See Rev. Rul. 87-41,
1987-1 Cum. Bull. 296. See also note 190 (discussing the 20 factor test). Under the safe harbor
provisions of § 530, however, a taxpayer can prevail by showing reasonable reliance on case law,
rulings, a prior audit, or "long-standing recognized practice of a significant segment of the
industry in which such individual was engaged." Revenue Act of 1978, § 530(a)(2)(c), 92 Stat. at
2886. In addition, although § 530 does not define "reasonable basis", the legislative history
indicates that Congress intended that the standard be "liberally construed in favor of
taxpayers." House Committee on Ways and Means, Controversies Involving the Employment
Status of Certain Individuals for Purposes of the Employment Taxes, U.R. 14159, H.R. Rep. No.
95-1748, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 631-32 (1978); Rev. Proc. 85-18, 1985-1 Cum. Bull. 518, § 3.01[c].
In Critical Care Register Nursing, Inc. v. U.S., 776 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Pa. 1991), the district
court held that a taxpayer may use the government's 20-factor test to establish a reasonable
basis for treating a worker as an independent contractor. Id. at 1028.
Section 530 relief, however, is unavailable if the taxpayer has treated that worker-or
another worker in a "substantially similar... position"-as an employee in the past. Revenue
Act of 1978, § 530 (a)(2)(B), 92 Stat. at 2885; Rev. Proc. 85-18, 1985-1 Cum. Bull. 518. In addi-
tion, because of perceived abuses, Congress amended § 530 in 1986, making the relief provision
inapplicable to certain technical workers such as engineers, designers, draftsmen, computer
programmers, and systems analysts. Revenue Act of 1978, § 530(d), as amended by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, § 1706, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2781 (1986).
When § 530 applies, the Service may not retroactively reclassify workers as employees.
However, § 530 applies only for purposes of implementing social security tax ("FICA"), unem-
ployment tax ("FUTA"), and income tax withholding. Thus, it does not prevent reclassification
for other purposes, such as reduction of the worker's business expense deductions, disqualifica-
tion of the worker's or the employer's retirement plan, and certain other tax-favored employee
benefits. H.R. Rep. No. 102-1060 at 14; Rev. Proc. 85-18, 1985-1 Cum. Bull. 518, § 3.08; Joint
Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, H.R. Doc. No.
3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1343 (Jt. Comm. Print 1987).
Section 530 not only limits the Service's authority to recharacterize on an audit, but also
prevents the Service from issuing regulations and revenue rulings giving interpretive guidance
on the characterization issue. Revenue Act of 1978, § 530(b), 92 Stat. at 2886 (as amended by §
269(c) of TEFRA, 96 Stat. at 552). This prohibition has been criticized, and its repeal may be
imminent. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-1060 at 14. The Service will issue private rulings on the prior
status of workers, as employees or independent contractors, for purposes of §§ 3121, 3306, and
3401, but it will not issue rulings as to prospective status. Rev. Proc. 95-3, 1995-1 Int. Rev. Bull.
85, § 3.01 (43).
177. H.R. Rep. No. 102-1060 at 19 (reporting revenue losses of $2 billion from misclassifi-
cation, versus $20 billion from underreporting by self-employed individuals alone-not including
partnerships, corporations, or persons who fail to file Schedule C).
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interest and penalties.178 Retroactive reclassification of workers can
also cause an employer's fringe benefit and retirement plans to violate
the nondiscrimination rules imposed on such plans, thereby resulting
in the loss of their tax-favored status.1 9
Reclassification can also be costly to the person recharacter-
ized as an employee. As discussed earlier, employee status per se
(apart from any tax-favored fringe benefits provided by the employer)
is generally not advantageous from a tax perspective. Without inde-
pendent contractor status, the worker will no longer be able to deduct
one hundred percent of her ordinary and necessary business expenses
or customize a retirement plan, and cannot deduct twenty-five percent
any portion of her health insurance premiums. 10 If the worker has
more than one employer during the year, excessive social security
taxes may be withheld. Although the worker must pay a self-
employment tax if classified as an independent contractor,181 that cost
often can be shifted to the service recipient through higher fees to the
same extent that an employer shifts payroll costs to customers. The
situation is even worse if the reclassified worker was incorporated. In
178. See generally I.R.C. §§ 6601, 6621, 6651(a)(1)-(2), 6651(f), 6656(b)(1), 6663, 6672,
6721(d) (1994). Section 3509 of the Code mitigates the retroactive assessment of income with-
holding taxes and the employee's share of FICA taxes where the failure to withhold is uninten-
tional. I.R.C. § 3509 (1994). However, it offers no relief with respect to FUTA taxes, the em-
ployer's share of FICA taxes, or underpayment interest and penalties. Id.; Prop. Treas. Reg, §
31.3509-1(d)(6), 51 Fed. Reg. 619, 626 (1986).
179. I.R.C. § 401(a)(3)(A) (1954); H.R. Rep. No. 102-1060 at 14 (cited in note 174). See, for
example, Burnetta v. Commissioner, 68 Tax Ct. 387 (1977) (disqualifying corporations'
retirement plans for failure to include workers provided by payroll service corporation). In the
entertainment industry, where many workers belong to guilds that provide multi-employer
pension plans, some guild agreements specify that the party who is the "borrower" in a loan-out
transaction must contribute a specified percentage of the loan-out's compensation to the guild's
pension fund. See, for example, Directors Guild of America Basic Agreement of 1990, Sec. 12-
105; Screen Actors Guild Codified Basic Agreement of 1989 for Independent Producers, Sec.
32K; Writers Guild of America Theatrical and Television Basic Agreement-1992 Extension,
Arts. 3-.(3) and 17.B(1). This arrangement will insulate the pension fund from losing tax-
favored status if the worker's loan-out is disregarded and the worker is reclassified as the
borrower's common law employee.
There are, however, other potential consequences of reclassification. If proposals to provide
universal health care coverage result in employer mandates and if the tax classification of a
worker also dictates the worker's classification for health insurance purposes, misclassification
will cause additional problems. See Treasury Defends S Corporation Tax Change in Clinton
Health Reform Plan, 84 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) d5 (May 4, 1994) (reporting intent of the Clinton
admini tration to use one set of worker classification guidelines for both health care and em-
ployment tax purposes). Reclassification of a worker may also trigger an employer's obligation
to pay worker's compensation insurance premiums under state law, though the federal tax
classification of a worker would not necessarily dictate this characterization under state law.
180. Employee status could also jeopardize the home office deduction for some workers.
See note 12.
181. An independent contractor pays a self-employment tax equivalent to both halves of
FICA, I.R.C. §§ 1401-02 (1994), but does not pay any FUTA.
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that case, the reclassification effectively disregards the worker's loan-
out corporation so that the worker can no longer use the corporation
to defer taxes or to generate deductions for one hundred percent of the
cost of health insurance and medical care. Disregard of the
corporation also adversely affects other tax-favored insurance
benefits, business expense deductions, and the availability of a
customized retirement plan.12
The government's aggressive posture on worker recharacteri-
zation may actually have triggered an increase in the use of loan-outs.
Consumers of services may actively encourage workers to operate
through loan-outs, believing that the loan-out will make reclassifica-
tion less likely.183 As a result, the government is likely to respond by
stepping up its scrutiny of loan-outs.'84
2. The Common Law Test of Employee Status
The uncertainty surrounding employee status arises from the
absence of a clear definition of "employee" in the relevant portions of
the Code. For purposes of FICA and FUTA, workers generally are
classified as employees if they would be so classified "Under the usual
common law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee
relationship."'18 5 The government and the courts also have applied the
182. See text accompanying notes 10-50. See also H.R. Rep. No. 102-1060 at 4 (cited in
note 174).
183. See, for example, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9350002 (Sept. 2, 1993) (involving the owner of vet-
erinary clinic who asked staff veterinarians to incorporate in order to avoid employee classi-
fication). The House Committee on Government Operations has predicted that its proposal to
increase enforcement against independent contractors will lead to greater use of the corporate
form by independent contractors because payments to corporations are generally exempt from
Form 1099 reporting requirements. It recommends repealing this exemption with respect to
payments for services, expressing concern that "the pressure on the 20 factor classification rules
cannot be relieved unless this major loophole is closed." H.R. Rep. No. 102-1060 at 15-16. To
improve the matching of payments with payee tax returns, the Committee also recommends
that service consumers be required to contact the Service to verify the taxpayer identification
number of each independent contractor they utilize, and that independent contractors who
supply faulty taxpayer identification numbers to payors be subject to backup withholding. Id. at
17-18.
184. The entertainment industry has reported increased Service scrutiny of loan-outs. See,
for example, Seigel, Arizona Republic at El (cited in note 13); Moore, 8 Ent. L. & Fin. at 1 (cited
in note 173). The Service itself actively publicizes its efforts. See, for example, Reish and
Ferenczy, Retirement Plan Tips for Talent Guild Members, 10 Ent. L. & Fin. 5 (cited in note 30);
Marich, Hollywood Reporter at 19 (cited in note 5); Robert Marich, IRS Cracks Whip on H'wood
as Audits Soar, Hollywood Reporter 1, 32 (Dec. 17, 1992).
185. I.R.C. §§ 3121(d)(2), 3306(i) (1994). The FUTA and withholding provisions of the Code
define the term "employer." I.R.C. § 3306(a) (1994) (FUTA); I.R.C. § 3401(d) (1994) (prescribing
income tax withholding rules). Although the FICA provisions do not define "employer," the
934 VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW [Vol. 48:879
common law test to classify workers for purposes of Code provisions
that do not define "employee."1 6
By far the most important factor in the government's version of
the common law analysis is the degree of control exercised by the
party receiving the worker's services. 187 The Treasury Regulations
focus on whether "the person for whom services are performed has the
right to control and direct the individual who performs the services,
not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to
the details and means by which that result is accomplished." 188
The regulations indicate that individuals who market their
services to the public at large generally will be viewed as independent
contractors: "Generally, physicians, lawyers, dentists, veterinarians,
contractors, subcontractors, public stenographers, auctioneers and
Supreme Court has held that the definition for FICA purposes should not be narrower than that
for withholding purposes. Otte v. U.S., 419 U.S. 43, 51 (1974). Both the FUTA and withholding
definitions of "employer" are essentially circular;, a FUTA employer is one who employs others
or pays "wages," I.R.C. § 3306(a) (1994), and an employer for withholding purposes is the person
for whom another performs services as an "employee," unless the recipient of services does not
control the payment of wages, in which case the wage payor is the employer, I.R.C. § 3401(d)
(1994). "Wages" are defined unhelpfully as "remuneration for employment." I.R.C. §§ 3121(a)
(FICA), 3306(b) (FUTA) (1994). See also I.R.C. § 3401(a) (withholding) (similar language). Until
§ 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 is amended or repealed, the Treasury is prohibited from
clarifying these rules through Revenue Rulings or regulations. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-600, § 530(c), 92 Stat. 2763, 2885, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3401 (1988) (as amended by §
269(c) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324,
552, codified at I.R.C. § 3401 (1994)).
186. Those Code provisions that use the term "employee" without defining it include: (1)
the income tax withholding rules, I.R.C. § 3401 (1994), see, for example, Lanigan Storage & Van
Co. v. United States, 389 F.2d 337, 338 (6th Cir. 1968); (2) the 2% floor on miscellaneous item-
ized deductions (including unreimbursed employee expenses under I.R.C. § 67), see, for exam-
ple, Lewis v. Commissioner, 66 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1830, 1832 (1993); Johnson v.
Commissioner, 66 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1323, 1325 (1993); and (3) the rules regarding
whether a particular worker must be counted as an employee in determining whether the
employer's retirement plan satisfies the requirements of the Code, see, for example, Monroe v.
Commissioner, 38 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 466, 469 (1979); Pugh v. Commissioner, 49 Tax Ct.
Mem. Dec. (CCH) 748, 750-51 (1985); Herman v. Commissioner, 52 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH)
1194, 1196 (1986); Reece v. Commissioner, 63 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 3129, 3131 (1992);
Bilenas v. Commissioner, 47 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 217, 219 (1983); Pulver v. Commissioner,
44 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 644, 648 (1982); Neely v. Commissioner, 37 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec.
(CCH) 128, 130 (1978); Professional & Executive Leasing, Inc. v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 751,
754 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the taxpayer's control over the workers was not sufficient to
establish an employment relationship even under the lower standards applicable to
professionals).
187. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 Cum. Bull. 296; Rev. Rul. 75-41, 1975-1 Cur. Bull. 352.
188. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2) (1994) (FICA), Treas. Reg. § 31.3306(i)-1(b) (1994)
(FUTA), 31.3401(c)-i (income tax withholding) (1994). See, for example, Rev. Rul. 57-145, 1957-
1 Cur. Bull. 332 (concluding that a corporation exercised the control necessary to establish an
employment relationship); Rev. Rul. 68-396, 1968-2 Cur. Bull. 436 (focusing on the right to
control and actual control in establishing the employment relationship).
1995] LOAN-OUT CORPORATIONS 935
others who follow an independent trade, business, or profession, in
which they offer their services to the public, are not employees.189
Although control is the most important factor, the Service nor-
mally considers twenty indicia derived from common law in determin-
ing a worker's status.190 Courts occasionally consider other factors as
well. 191 Both the Department of the Treasury and the General
Accounting Office have conceded, however, that this multi-factor test
is "too vague to be administered on a consistent basis.' ' 92
189. Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-i(c) (1994) (income tax withholding). See also Treas. Rags. §§
31.3121(d)-l(c)(2) (1994) (FICA), 31.3306(i)-i (1994) (FUTA) (using virtually identical language).
Accord, Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 Cum. Bull. 296, 298 (noting that individuals who follow an
independent trade are generally not considered employees). In addition, corporate officers,
except for those who perform minimal services and receive no compensation, generally are
considered employees of their corporations for FICA purposes. I.R.C. § 3121(d)(1) (1994); Tress.
Reg. § 31.3121(d)-l(b) (1994).
190. Specifically, the following factors indicate employee status: (1) the payor provides
detailed instructions on how the work is to be done; (2) the payor provides training;, (3) workers
and the work materials are integrated with the payor rather than functioning independently; (4)
the services are rendered personally; (5) the payor (rather than the worker) hires, supervises,
and pays the worker's assistants; (6) the relationship between payor and worker is relatively
permanent; (7) the payor sets the workers' hours; (8) the payor requires the workers to work a
minimum number of hours per day or week, or to work "full-time"; (9) the payor requires the
workers to work on the payor's premises and the workers may have access to the payor's
support facilities and personnel; (10) the payor requires the workers to perform services in a
given sequence; (11) the payor requires the workers to furnish progress or similar reports; (12)
workers are paid hourly, monthly, or weekly; (13) the payor pays the workers' business and/or
travel expenses; (14) the payor furnishes equipment and materials; (15) the workers do not
make a significant investment in equipment and materials; (16) the payor bears the risk of
economic loss and carries any necessary insurance; (17) the workers work exclusively for the
payor, (18) the workers do not offer services to the public through advertising or other means;
(19) the payor has the right to discharge or discipline the workers at any time; and (20) the
workers have the right to terminate the relationship without incurring liability. Rev. Rul. 87-
41, 1987-1 Cum. Bull. 296, 298-99. The list is not exhaustive, Breaux and Daigle, Inc. v. U.S.,
900 F.2d 49, 51 (5th Cir. 1990), and the weight given to each factor depends in part on the
nature of the work and the context in which it is performed. For additional commentary on
each factor, see Daniel L. Morgan and Yale F. Goldberg, Employees and Independent
Contractors, Tax Transactions Library (CCH) 455-59 (June 1990).
191. The judicially adopted factors include: (1) the skill required for the work, Bartels v.
Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947); Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S.
1, 3-4; (2) the intent of the parties, McCormick v. U.S., 531 F.2d 554, 560-61 (Ct. Cl. 1976); (3)
the custom of the industry, Bonney Motor Express, Inc. v. U.S., 206 F. Supp. 22, 26 (E.D. Vs.
1962); (4) the labels used by the parties, Rayhill v. U.S., 364 F.2d 347, 355-57 (Ct. Cl. 1966); and
(5) the provision of employee benefits, Lewis, 66 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 1834. The
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958), lists other factors that a court or the Service
might consider. See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 112 S. Ct. 1344, 1348 (1992)
(applying multi-factor test to determine whether someone is an employee under ERISA).
192. H.R. Rap. No. 102-1060 at 2, 4 (cited in note 174). Not surprisingly, the subjective
nature of this analysis has produced a 40% appeals rate for worker classification determinations
made by examining agents. Id. at 20. Because payors are not required to notify workers of the
significance of being classified as an independent contractor, some workers may assume mistak-
enly that social security or unemployment taxes are being paid on their behalf. See id. at 7, 18
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The Service has begun to address the vagueness problem by
issuing nonbinding industry-specific guidelines. With respect to
certain segments of the fim industry, for example, the Service re-
cently has attempted to clarify its approach to worker classification.
The newly issued guidelines, 193 which lack the force of law,19 adhere
to the "control' test and the twenty factor analysis, and do not purport
to treat incorporated workers differently from other workers. The
film industry guidelines do not reflect any softening of the govern-
ment's position on worker classification. Rather, they illustrate spe-
cific applications of the control-oriented common law analysis, and
they indicate the weight to be given to each of the twenty indicia in
specific factual contexts. In a rather confusing passage that suggests
a tightening of the classification standards, the guidelines indicate
that while guild members will conclusively be deemed to be employees
if they do not use loan-outs, the consequences of using a loan-out are
beyond the scope of the guidelines. 195
For tax purposes it is not clear why the existence of control
sufficient to create a common law employment relationship should
dictate tax consequences different from those that would exist in an
independent contractor relationship. 96 The common law test used by
(recommending that service consumers be required to supply each worker with a standardized
explanation of their classification and its ramifications).
193. Market Segment Program Guidelines, 92 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at d60 (cited in note
173).
194. Therefore, according to Service officials, these guidelines do not constitute "rulings,"
and thus do not violate the prohibition of § 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978. See Employment
Taxes, IRS Official Says Market Segment Guidelines Do Not Constitute Rulings', 95 Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA), d23 (May 19, 1994); Internal Revenue Service Market Segment Program Guidelines
on Classification of Workers in Television Commercial Production and Professional Video
Communications Industries, 92 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), d2 (May 16, 1994).
195. Market Segment Program Guidelines at § IV.A.3 (cited in note 173).
196. Stover Bedding Co. v. Industrial Commission, 99 Utah 423, 107 P.2d 1027, 1029 (1940)
and Breaux and Daigle, Inc. v. United States, 89-2 U.S.T.C. 9536, 89601-03 (E.D. La. 1989),
aff'd 900 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1990), discuss the development of the control test in the FICA and
FUTA contexts.
In the context of social legislation the Supreme Court has on occasion strayed from strict
adherence to the common law definition of the employment relationship in favor of a test that
focuses on "economic reality" in light of the purpose of the legislation at issue. The Supreme
Court broadly interpreted the common law test in the FICA context in United States v. Silk, 331
U.S. 704, 713 (1947), when it ruled that employee status for FICA purposes should be deter-
mined under the same rules applied to the National Labor Relations Act in NLRB v. Hearst
Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944), which held that the definition of "employee" "was a federal
problem to be construed in the light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained."
Silk, 331 U.S. at 713 (quoting Hearst, 322 U.S. at 124). In the context of federal labor laws,
where the goal was to remedy inequality of bargaining power, Hearst had held that "employee"
"included workers who were such as a matter of economic reality." Silk, 322 U.S. at 713.
Accordingly, Hearst rejected a test employing the "technical concepts pertinent to an employer's
legal responsibility to third persons for acts of his servants"--that is, the power to control the
worker's service-related activities. Id. (quoting Hearst, 322 U.S. at 129). The Silk Court identi-
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the courts and the Service was developed in tort law as a means of de-
termining when the doctrine of respondeat superior should apply.197
In that context, it makes sense to apply a test that focuses on control,
since it places liability on the party who was in the best position to
prevent the injury. The common law test also has been applied in
copyright law to determine whether a copyright belongs to the party
who contracted to pay for a creative effort or to the party who per-
formed the creative activity under that contract.18 In that context as
well, the emphasis on control appears to bear a reasonable relation-
ship to the public policy being served, since the greater the control
exercised by the supervisor, the less likely it is that the supervised
party made a substantial creative contribution.
In the tax context, the control test arguably serves two
legitimate purposes: (1) making enforcement of the tax laws easier
for the government by allowing collection of taxes through payroll
fled the purpose of collecting FICA and FUTA taxes on the wages of employees as "the protec-
tion of [the] beneficiaries from some of the hardships of existence," notably "the insecurities of
modern life, particularly old age and unemployment." Id. at 710-11.
Only one week after its Silk decision, the Supreme Court in Bartels v. Birmingham, 332
U.S. 126, held that for FICA purposes the members of a band were employees of their band
leader rather than of the dance hall that engaged the band. 322 U.S. at 132. The bands in
question were "name" bands built around their band leaders rather than groups formed by the
dance hall operator. As such, the bands performed limited engagements for numerous dance
halls under a separate contract for each engagement. The standard contract adopted by the
American Federation of Musicians, however, purported to give the dance hall operator
"complete control" over the band members, apparently in order to make the band members
common law employees of the dance hall operator and, thus, shift the social security tax obliga-
tion from the band leader to the dance hall operator. Id. at 128-29. Bartels established that
taxpayers could not contractually create a "control" relationship that would conclusively estab-
lish an employment arrangement. Id. at 130-32 (citing Silk, 331 U.S. at 704 (discussing the
importance of factors other than control)).
After Silk and Bartels, however, Congress expressed concern that the "economic reality" test
would overwhelm the common law standards and broaden the reach of FICA beyond Congress's
intent, see H.R.J. Res. 296, Pub. L. No. 642, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948), in 62 Stat. 438
(resolving to maintain the status quo with respect to certain employment taxes and social
security benefits); Veto of Social Security Benefits, 2 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 2501, 2502 (1948)
(statement of President Truman on vetoing the joint resolution); United States v. Thorson, 282
F.2d 157, 159-60 (1st Cir. 1960) (explaining the congressional action); and the Court has since
returned to the principle that when a statute is silent on the definition of "employee" the com-
mon law standards should prevail. Darden, 112 S. Ct. at 1348-49 (construing § 3(6) of ERISA);
Community for Creative Nonviolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 738-51 (1989) (construing § 101 of
the Copyright Act).
197. See, for example, Lifetime Siding, Inc. v. United States, 359 F.2d 657, 660 (2d Cir.
1966) (upholding a jury instruction providing that "the test to be used in determining the status
... is the common law one applicable in tort actions").
198. If there is an employment relationship, the copyright belongs to the employer unless
the parties agree to the contrary in writing. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (1988 & Supp. 1993). See
Community for Creative Nonviolence, 490 U.S. at 737 (applying statute where payor commis-
sioned a sculpture).
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withholding rather than by relying on self-reporting by independent
contractors; and (2) protecting workers who may be unaware that
their employers are treating them as independent contractors and
thus depriving them of future government benefits such as Social
Security and unemployment compensation (and possibly, in the
future, health care benefits).199 Although the first rationale-ease of
enforcement-merits some consideration, the inequities it imposes on
the affected taxpayers and the availability of alternative remedies
such as improving enforcement of the payor's reporting requirements
render it unpersuasive.200 As for the paternalistic rationale, it is
inappropriate in the case of workers who make an informed choice to
operate as independent contractors.20 1 One way to demonstrate such
an informed choice, of course, is to incorporate.20 2
3. Applying the Common Law Test to Loan-Outs
As discussed in Part III.A, the government litigated the
earliest of the employee loan-out cases without resorting to the em-
ployee/independent contractor analysis at all. Instead, it employed
the various doctrines described earlier-assignment of income, sham
incorporation, and, in later years, Section 482-which allow recharac-
terization of a loan-out arrangement whenever the conduct of the
parties is inconsistent with their treatment of the transaction for tax
purposes. Under appropriate circumstances, these same doctrines
allow the government to disregard corporations formed by individuals
who predominantly provide their services not to one recipient but
199. See American Tax Policy Institute, Independent Contractors at 1-6 to 1-7 (cited in note
172); H.R. Rep. No. 102-1060 at 21 (cited in note 174) (noting that workers who are not inde-
pendent need the protection that employment status provides); House Subcommittee on Public
Assistance and Unemployment Compensation of the Committee on Ways and Means, U.S.
House of Representatives, Federal-State Unemployment Compensation System, WMCP 100-39,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 33-34 (Comm. Print, 1988) (study of the federal-state unemployment
system prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress).
200. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-1060 at 22-26 (urging enforcing payor reporting requirements
as a remedy preferable to worker reclassification in most cases). See also note 183 (discussing
inadequate reporting rules).
201. The Committee on Government Operations voiced similar policy arguments in its re-
port recommending that the Service be permitted to publish guidance on the distinction be-
tween employees and independent contractors. H.R. Rep. 102-1060 at 21-22.
202. The Service will not issue prospective rulings on whether, under common law rules, a
loan-out corporation or the borrowing entity is the "employer" of a loaned worker where the
period of the "loan" is more than temporary (equal to or greater than one year), or the loan-out
corporation hires employees of the borrower and assigns them back to the borrower. Rev. Proc.
95-3, 1995-1 Cum. Bull 447, 452-53, § 3.02(8). Even when a ruling is available, this route will be
impractical for many taxpayers entering into short-term services contracts, and will only
remove the uncertainty rather than address the merits of the government's approach.
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instead to the public at large. Thus, until the mid-1980s, the govern-
ment treated loan-outs no differently from so-called "professional
corporations."
In none of these early cases did the government attempt to use
the worker reclassification approach. Such an approach probably
would have failed in Fox,203 since the syndicate probably lacked suffi-
cient control over the cartoonist to be considered his employer.20 In
Laughton,25 however, the actor could have been recharacterized as an
employee of the studio that "borrowed" his services if the studio
exercised the degree of control that typifies the studio-actor relation-
ship. And in Johnson206 the control analysis would have reclassified
Johnson as an employee of his basketball team.
The Fox, Laughton, and Johnson cases predated the
government's intense interest in worker classification. As the
following cases illustrate, since the mid-1980s the government has
embraced worker reclassification as its preferred response to the
proliferation of loan-outs. This approach allows it to disregard loan-
out corporations even when all appropriate formalities have been
observed, the shareholder-employee's relationship with the
corporation satisfies arm's length standards, and all relevant
contracts clearly reflect the role of the corporation as principal rather
than agent.20 7
203. 37 Bd. Tax App. 271 (1938); see notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
204. The "control" test probably also would have failed in Patterson, 25 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec.
(CCH) 1230, since an individual competitor such as a boxer traditionally would not be con-
sidered an employee. Arguably, a boxer whose professional activities were dictated almost
entirely by a single promoter or manager might be considered an employee.
205. 40 Bd. Tax App. 101 (1939), remanded, 113 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1940). See notes 102-15
and accompanying text.
206. 78 Tax Ct. 882 (1982), afl'd, 698 F.2d 372 (9th Cir. 1982). See notes 116-21 and accom-
panying text.
207. Jones v. Commissioner, 64 Tax Ct. 1066 (1975), was a precursor of this line of cases.
Despite the judge's degree of control over the reporter, the government did not contend that the
reporter was an employee of the court. Under the common law analysis, a sufficient number of
factors other than "control" might have pointed to independent contractor status. For example,
the court might have found that the reporter supplied his own materials, set his own hours for
review and transcription, worked in an office space not supplied by the court, performed
reporting services for other parties, or received neither training nor detailed instructions from
the court.
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a. Professional & Executive Leasing, Inc. v. Commissioner
Professional & Executive Leasing, Inc. v. Commissioner0 8
opened the door to applying worker classification analysis to loan-outs
by finding that doctrine applicable to determining not only whether a
particular worker is someone's employee, but also the identity of the
employer where the worker's status is conceded. A corporation
(TEL") had been formed for the purpose of leasing the services of
various physicians, dentists, veterinarians, accountants, and business
and legal professionals. 2 9 Notably, almost all of the workers held an
ownership interest in the entity to which they were leased, and no
worker was ever leased to an entity in which another worker held an
ownership interest.210
The Commissioner contended that PEL's pension and profit
sharing plans did not qualify under Section 401(a) of the Code,211 be-
cause numerous individuals covered by the plans were not
"employees" of the corporation for tax purposes. Applying the com-
mon law concepts outlined in the income tax regulations,22 the Tax
Court agreed.213 Although it conceded that no single factor was con-
trolling, the court nonetheless described as "fundamental" the ques-
tion of" 'whether the person for whom the work is performed has the
right to control the activities of the individuals whose status is in
issue, not only as to results but also as to the means and method to be
used for accomplishing the result.' "214 Although it recognized that the
case law developing these principles addressed the question of
whether a particular individual was an employee or an independent
contractor, the Tax Court found it to be equally applicable in identify-
ing the employer of an acknowledged employee.215
The Tax Court found that several of the common law indicia
suggested that PEL's workers were employees of the service recipi-
208. 89 Tax Ct. 225 (1987), affd, 862 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1988).
209. Id. at 227. It thus differed from the more typical loan-out, which has a single em-
ployee-owner.
210. Id. at 233-34.
211. To qualify under § 401(a), an employer's retirement plan must be maintained exclu-
sively for the benefit of employees. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1994).
212. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-l(c)(2) (1980).
213. Specifically, the Tax Court considered the following factors:
(1) The degree of control exercised over the details of the work; (2) investment in the
work facilities; (3) opportunity for profit or loss; (4) whether the type of work is part of
the principal's regular business; (5) right to discharge; (6) permanency of the relation-
ship; and (7) the relationship the parties think they are creating.
Professional & Executive Leasing, 89 Tax Ct. at 232 (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 232-33 (quotingPackard v. Commissioner, 63 Tax Ct. 621, 629 (1975)).
215. Id. at 232 (citingBartels, 332 U.S. at 132).
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ents, and that the existence of these factors outweighed the existence
of an employment contract between the personnel and PEL.216 The
Tax Court found that the transactions in question 'qack[ed] objective
economic substance and [were] not controlling for tax purposes,"21
and concluded that PEL's role was really that of bookkeeper and
payroll agent rather than employer.218 The court found that PEL
exercised "minimal, if any, control over the workers"--it had never
reassigned a worker, and "it strain[ed] credulity to believe that a
worker would comply with an assignment to a recipient [entity] in
which he had no [ownership] interest."219 In determining that the
personnel in question were not employed by PEL, the Tax Court
acknowledged that it was heavily influenced by the fact that the
workers had an ownership interest in the recipient for which they
provided services. 220 PEL's purported employees, therefore, were
either self-employed or employed by the entity to which they were
assigned; the Tax Court, however, did not resolve this uncertainty.21
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court and
the income tax regulations that the "right to control... not only as to
the result.., but also as to the details and means by which that re-
sult is accomplished" was the most fundamental test.2 2 The appellate
court observed that, in the case of professionals such as physicians, a
lesser degree of control need be found to establish an employment
relationship,223 but it agreed with the Tax Court's conclusion that the
216. The court found that: (1) PEL did not control the details of the professionals' work
performance, and, in fact was unqualified to do so; (2) the service recipients, and not PEL,
owned PEL's work facilities; (3) all profit or loss from the leased person's efforts remained with
that person, with PEL receiving only a fixed fee from the service recipient; and (4) PEL's right
to discharge workers, like its right to reassign them, was illusory in light of their equity
interests in the recipients to which they were assigned. Professional & Executive Leasing, 89
Tax Ct. at 233-34.
217. Id. at 235.
218. Id. at 234. In that respect, PEL resembled the foreign corporations in the Lend-A-Star
rulings. See Part III.C.
219. Id. at 233-34.
220. Id. at 233. Although the record indicated that some of the leased personnel may not
have had ownership interests in the entities to which they were assigned, the Tax Court did not
find that fact dispositive.
221. See id. at 235 (holding that the workers in question were not employees).
222. Professional & Executive Leasing, 862 F.2d at 753 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-
1(c)(2) (1980)). See also Professional & Executive Leasing, 862 F.2d at 753 (citing Silk, 331 U.S.
at 714-16) (discussing common law factors).
223. Professional & Executive Leasing, 862 F.2d at 753 (citing James v. Commissioner, 25
Tax Ct. 1296, 1301 (1956) (physicians); Rev. Rul. 57-21, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 317 (physicians). See
also Professional & Executive Leasing, 89 Tax Ct. at 232 n.11 (noting that under Treas. Reg. §
31.3401(c)-1(c), professionals who incorporate "may be regarded as employees of such entities").
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taxpayer in this case had failed to establish even this lesser degree of
control.224
Because of the leased workers' ownership of the lessee entities,
Professional & Executive Leasing did not test the Tax Court's will-
ingness to respect "plain vanilla" loan-out arrangements such as those
commonly used in the entertainment industry. The "control" analysis
undertaken by both the Tax Court and the appellate court was influ-
enced so heavily by the ownership factor that it is impossible to de-
termine how the case would have been decided absent that fact.225
It is instructive to contrast Professional & Executive Leasing
with the garden variety "temporary" personnel agency, which the
Service routinely treats as the employer of its workers even though
the borrowing entity closely supervises and controls the workers' daily
tasks, and even though the workers are usually free to accept or reject
an assignment.226 In this context, the government's application of the
"control" test has been somewhat capricious. Although the Service
usually takes the position that temporary agencies, rather than their
clients, are the employers of the temporary workers they provide to
clients, many of these rulings conflict with the notion that detailed,
daily "contror' is the critical factor in worker classification. Indeed, in
defense of its position on temporary agencies the government occa-
sionally has found itself arguing against its own "control" analysis. In
Critical Care Register Nursing v. United States,227 for example, the
government tried without success to persuade a jury (and subse-
quently a judge) to overlook the control factor; the jury found that
because the temporary agency had no right to control the temporary
nurses it provided, the nurses were employees of the client hospitals
rather than the agency. Similarly, in a private ruling involving tem-
porary clerical workers, the Service dismissed the high degree of
224. Professional & Executive Leasing, 862 F.2d at 754.
225. If the proposed "leased owner" regulations had been in effect during the tax years at
issue in Professional & Executive Leasing, the court might have reached the same result
without undertaking the control analysis. See note 31.
226. See, for example, Rev. Rul. 75-41, 1975-1 Cur. Bull. 323 (ruling that a corporation
supplying medical support staff to outside parties was the workers' employer for tax purposes);
Rev. Rul. 70-630, 1970-2 Cum. Bull. 229 (conceding that temporary sales clerks were employees
of the temporary agency rather than of the retail stores to which they were assigned); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 8945021 (Aug. 14, 1989) (advising that temporary pharmacists were employees of lending
entity); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9311001 (Oct. 8, 1992) (ruling that temporary clerical workers were
employees of lending entity). In contrast, in Burnetta, 68 Tax Ct. 387, the Service successfully
argued that medical support staff were employees of the physicians' corporations rather than of
the staffing corporation that issued their paychecks. Id. at 398. However, the staffing entity
was not a typical temporary agency because, among other things, it had no employment
contracts with its workers granting it the right to terminate them. Id.
227. 776 F. Supp. 1025 (E.D. Pa. 1991), nonacq. 94 T.N.T. 154-20 (Aug. 8, 1994).
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control exercised by the borrower by finding it "reasonable to infer
that any direction or control exercised over the worker by the client
had flown from the firm's contractual relationship with the client and
was, in effect, exercised with the firm's consent."2 28 Specifically,
"[a]lthough the right to fix the working hours or to terminate the
worker's services were ostensibly the right of the client, they resulted
from the firm's relationship with the client."2 29 Other rulings have
readily found this kind of "implied consent" by conventional tempo-
rary agencies. 230
Thus, in most of the temporary agency cases, the Service has
used the "implied consent" rationale to argue that the agency retains
the right to control the workers' daily job performances even though it
may not actually exercise that control except by retaining the right to
terminate. The income tax regulations, which emphasize the "right to
control" rather than the actual exercise of that control, support this
"implied consent" interpretation.2 31 The government also acknowl-
edges that the entity's right to control the worker is sufficiently "real"
when the corporation's owner-employee is a physician, dentist, or
other professional providing services to the public at large. In con-
trast, the government apparently does not view a loan-out corpora-
tion's power to terminate or replace its owner-employee as sufficiently
"real" to be respected for tax purposes. Yet a physician's loan-out is
no more likely to "fire" the physician than an actor's loan-out is to
"fire" the actor. In spite of this apparent inconsistency, the govern-
ment has made it clear that it still views a loan-out's control over a
worker as questionable whenever the worker's services are subject
primarily to the detailed direction of the service recipient. 232
228. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8745043 (Aug. 12, 1987).
229. Id.
230. See, for example, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8052112 (Oct. 3, 1980) (advising agency that its lack
of supervision over nurses "does not negate [its] right to control [them]").
231. Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3121(d)-l(c)(2) (1980), 31.3306(i)-i, 31.3401(c)-1(b) (1994).
232. The Chief Counsel's office has endorsed the view of one commentator that:
[T]he benchmark should be whether, prior to incorporation, the service person is recog-
nized as already being in an existing trade or business under common-law principles, or
whether he is merely an employee. An employee should not be permitted to incorporate;
such would be an attempt to create a business enterprise where none has existed his-
torically, and, moreover, where it has no commercial significance. Moreover, the em-
ployee might then be obtaining for himself corporate benefits that Congress arguably in-
tended to be available only to corporate enterprises. On the other hand, where one has
been in a free standing trade or business individually, then he is merely changing his
form of operations, and he should be permitted to utilize the benefits of his change in
business enterprise by obtaining the benefits (and disadvantages) of operation in the
corporate form.
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b. Pflug v. Commissioner
In Pflug v. Commissioner,233 the government unsuccessfully
challenged actress JoAnn Pflug's contention that she received her
performing income as an employee of her husband's wholly-owned
loan-out corporation rather than as a self-employed independent
contractor doing business with the loan-out.2 Pflug has
subsequently been cited as authority for respecting the separate tax
identity of loan-outs. 235 A close examination of that decision, however,
suggests that its precedential value is weak, at best.
Pflug and her husband, game show host Charles Woolery,
formed a loan-out (Charwool Productions, Inc.), with Woolery as sole
shareholder and president, and Pflug as vice president. Any party
seeking to obtain the services of Pflug or Woolery was required to
enter a contract for those services with Charwool. Charwool then
"loaned" the employee named in the contract, collected the agreed
upon compensation, and reported this amount, net of the corporation's
expenses (including salaries), as corporate income. The parties con-
tracting with Charwool did not withhold any employment taxes on the
amounts they paid to Charwool.2 6
In exchange for providing her services to Charwool on an ex-
clusive basis, Pflug received both direct and indirect compensation
from Charwool.2 7 In each of the taxable years preceding 1982,
Charwool treated these disbursements as Pflug's salary, and withheld
employment taxes on these amounts.m For 1982, however, Charwool
calculated Pflug's compensation as a percentage of the corporation's
net income based on the proportion of gross revenues attributable to
the lending of Pflug's services, and Charwool did not withhold any
employment taxes on Pflug's compensation, treating Pflug, in effect,
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,553 (Sept. 3, 1986) (quoting Sheldon I. Banoff, Reducing the Income Tax
Burden of Professional Persons by Use of Corporations, Joint Ventures, Subpartnerships and
Trusts, 58 Taxes 968, 984 (1980)).
233. 58 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 685 (1989).
234. As an independent contractor, Pflug would have been obligated to pay the self-em-
ployment tax under I.R.C. §§ 1401 et seq. (1994). Pflug, 58 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) at 687. In
contrast, because Pflug was Charwool's employee, Charwool was required to withhold employ-
ment taxes on her behalf. Id. at 688.
235. Sargent, 929 F.2d at 1257.
236. Id.
237. Id. Pflug and Charwool never executed a written employment contract; the only
evidence of their contract was Pflug's oral testimony and the conduct of the parties during the
years at issue. Id. at 688.
238. Id.
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as an unincorporated independent contractor under contract to
Charwool.2 9
The Tax Court focused on whether Pflug was liable for self-
employment taxes-that is, whether her relationship with Charwool
was that of employee or unincorporated independent contractor.
Relying on the common law rules, the court concluded that Pflug's
relationship to Charwool was that of employee rather than independ-
ent contractor, chiefly because "Charwool had the right to exercise
dominion and control over [her] activities... ."240 Yet the court's con-
clusion (indeed, the very way it framed the issue) simply begs the
question of whether Charwool was the real party in interest in its
contracts with third parties for the lending of Pflug's services. In
other words, the court simply assumed that Pflug received her com-
pensation from Charwool. The court never addressed the possibility
that Charwool was simply acting as Pflug's booking and collection
agent, or even as a mere assignee of her income. The Tax Court may
have been correct in concluding that Pflug was acting as someone's
employee rather than as a sole proprietor, but that did not answer the
question of whose employee she was.21
c. Sargent v. Commissioner
The logical gap left by Pflug was obscured two years later,
when the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit cited Pflug as
authority for recognizing an entertainer's loan-out as a separate tax-
able entity in the context of reversing the Tax Court's decision in
Sargent v. Commissioner.242
i. The Tax Court Decision
Each hockey player in Sargent formed a loan-out corporation
after initially playing for his team as an individual employee. As
noted earlier, the ostensible purpose of each incorporation was to
enjoy "increased bargaining power and the possibility of placing
239. Id. at 686-87.
240. Id. at 688.
241. See Herman v. Commissioner, 52 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 1194, 1196 (1986) (finding
it unnecessary to decide whether worker was employed by "lending" entity or "borrowing"
entity, in concluding that worker was not an independent contractor and, therefore, not entitled
to establish a Keogh plan).
242. 93 Tax Ct. 572 (1989), rev'd, 929 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1991). The Tax Court issued its
decision in Sargent one day before it issued its decision in Pflug.
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money into a pension plan.'24 Each loan-out agreed to provide the
services of its employee to the hockey club in exchange for specified
compensation payable to the loan-out. Each player entered a contract
with his loan-out agreeing to provide athletic and consulting services
exclusively to the loan-out, and agreeing to abide by its instructions.4
Each petitioner was the sole shareholder, sole director, and president
of his loan-out, and each entered into a separate agreement with the
hockey club personally guaranteeing the loan-out's obligations.45
Each loan-out set up a pension fund for its athlete-employee,
and in each case the Service issued a letter declaring the fund to be a
qualified pension plan.26 During the years in question, the hockey
club paid to the loan-outs the amounts that it otherwise would have
placed in the National Hockey League Players' Pension Plan on the
petitioners' behalf. Although the club did not require either of the
loan-outs to contribute these same amounts to the pension plan of its
employee-owner, each loan-out not only paid a salary to its employee,
but also contributed a substantial sum to the employee's pension
plan.247 The Service argued that the amount paid to each loan-out by
the hockey club was taxable directly to the loan-out's employee-
owner,248 because under the common law control test the players were
employees of the club rather than of their loan-outs.249
The Tax Court agreed with the government. The court distin-
guished Fox and Laughton-as well as several cases in which physi-
cians' professional corporations were respected for tax purposes250-- on
the grounds that in each of those cases the court had either made a
factual finding, or simply assumed, that "the taxpayers were em-
ployees of their personal service corporations."'5 In Sargent, by con-
trast, the court determined that the requisite employment relation-
ship between the players and their corporations was lacking, and the
case presented "a classic situation for the application of the
243. Id. at 574-75. See notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
244. Sargent, 93 Tax Ct. at 574-75. One loan-out withheld all required payroll taxes from
the petitioners' salaries. The record, however, was unclear with respect to the other loan-out.
Id. at 574, 575 n.3.
245. Id. at 574-76.
246. Id. at 574, 576.
247. In each case, the total of the employee's salary plus the pension contribution was
slightly less than the amounts paid by the hockey club to the loan-out. Id. at 575-76.
248. Id. at 573.
249. Id. at 578-79.
250. Keller, 77 Tax Ct. at 1024; Pacella, 78 Tax Ct. at 618, 622; Haag, 88 Tax Ct. at 611,
615.
251. Sargent, 93 Tax Ct. at 582. The court also noted that the Johnson court had assumed,
without deciding, that an employment relationship existed between the athlete and the corpo-
ration. Id. See notes 119-21 and accompanying text.
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assignment of income doctrine articulated in Lucas v. Earl."252
Therefore, it treated all sums paid to the loan-outs as sums paid
directly to the athlete-employees.
The Tax Court acknowledged that it was relying on cases that
addressed "whether an individual is an employee or an independent
contractor rather than, as is the case herein, who is the employer of a
conceded employee." Nonetheless, the court cited Professional &
Executive Leasing for the proposition that these cases could also pro-
vide "guidance in determining who is the employer. ' 23 The most
fundamental aspect of this analysis, in the court's view, was the
"control" test.2
Applying this standard, the court concluded that the hockey
club, rather than the corporation, exercised the requisite control
through its coaches and managers. In reaching that conclusion, the
court observed that "the nature of team sports is a critical element
which must be taken into account" in applying the common law con-
trol test. In team sports, unlike individual sports, the court observed,
"[c]oaches scrutinize and direct a player in even the smallest de-
tails,'2 5 so that "the nature of the team sport of hockey involves a
high level of control over player activity by coaches and managers."
Therefore, because they performed their services as part of a "team,"
the individual hockey players could not be employees of their loan-
outs.257
The entire Tax Court reviewed Judge Tannenwald's majority
opinion in Sargent, with twelve judges agreeing and six dissenting.m
The dissenting judges argued that the corporate form and the desig-
nation of the loan-out as the principal in the contract with the hockey
club could be disregarded only if the corporation were a sham.29
Rejecting the majority's application of the "contror' test, Judge Wells
suggested that the tax law should respect the authority of a corpora-
tion to enter into a contract that grants a third party the right to
control the work related activities of the "loaned" employee. In other
words, as in the case of a garden-variety temporary personnel agency,
252. Sargent, 93 Tax Ct. at 583.
253. Id. at 578.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 580.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 579-80.
258. Id. at 584, 589.
259. Id. at 586-87 (Wells, J., dissenting). Judge Wells considered the majority's opinion to
be inconsistent with the decisions in Haag, Johnson, and Keller. Id. at 586.
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such a contract should not divest the corporation of its status as em-
ployer:260
The logical outgrowth of the majority's unique analysis is that only
'traditional" independent contractors (i.e., those over whom service-recipients
do not exercise control) can avail themselves of PSCs while traditional em-
ployees cannot. Such a rule, while perhaps appealing from the standpoint of
predictability, finds no meaningful support in our precedent.
261
The dissent asserted that treating the players as common law em-
ployees of their team was the same as "disregarding the existence of
the PSC's entirely."62
ii. The Eighth Circuit Reversal
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit's majority opinion accepted the
analysis of Judge Wells' dissent and rejected Judge Tannenwald's
version of the control test. The Eighth Circuit relied on the concept of
"implied consent" as applied in the temporary agency rulings and
expressed in the income tax regulations: "[I]t is not necessary that the
employer actually direct or control the manner in which the services
are performed; it is sufficient if he has the right to do so."2 3
Concluding that it would be "arbitrary" to apply different standards
depending on whether the worker "is or is not a member of a superfi-
cially defined 'team,"' the court found it irrelevant that the party
consuming the services (the hockey club) expected its service-provid-
ers to function as a "team.264 The appellate court applied the two-
part analysis used by the Tax Court in Johnson and concluded that
both parts of the test were satisfied: (1) the athletes were employees
of their loan-outs because the latter had the right of control (whether
or not exercised); and (2) each loan-out had validly contracted with
the owner of the hockey club to provide the personal services of the
loan-out's employee.65 In Johnson, the Eighth Circuit noted, the Tax
Court was apparently untroubled by the fact that the taxpayer was a
member of a "team."266
260. Id. at 588.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2) (1980) (FICA), quoted in Sargent, 929 F.2d at 1256.
See also Treas. Reg. §§ 31.3401(c)-1(b) (FUTA), 31.3306(i)-1(b) (1994) (income tax withholding).
264. Sargent, 929 F.2d at 1256.
265. Id. at 1256-58.
266. Id. at 1257.
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The Eighth Circuit majority also found inconsistencies between
the Tax Court's almost simultaneous decisions in Sargent and Pflug.
In the appellate court's view, Pflug held "that Ms. Pflug was an em-
ployee of Charwool, and not an employee of 20th Century Fox
Studios."267 As discussed earlier, however,28 the Tax Court's opinion
in Pflug includes no such holding, because the question before the
court had nothing to do with Pflug's relationship to the studio; it
concerned only her relationship to Charwool.
Having interpreted Pflug as the Tax Court's validation of loan-
outs, however, the court of appeals in Sargent declared itself
"perplexed to find that [the] same contractual arrangements which
were dispositive of the issue of 'control' in Pflug were summarily
discarded" by the Tax Court in Sargent.2 9 The majority also sug-
gested that Pflug's activities as a cast member working with a techni-
cal and production staff in a television series made her as much a
"team" member as the hockey players in Sargent, since ultimate crea-
tive control over her work product rested with the studio.270 Finding
"ample Tax Court precedent which upholds the sanctity of contractual
relations between taxpayers and their respective personal service
corporations," the Sargent majority found that the assignment of
income concerns articulated in Lucas v. Earl are not implicated,
where the taxpayer conducts her income-earning activity through a
bona fide corporation.271
The government responded to the Sargent reversal with a
prompt nonacquiescence, and has continued to litigate the loan-out
267. Id.
268. See notes 233-41 and accompanying text.
269. Sargent, 929 F.2d at 1257.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1257-59 (citing Moline Properties, 319 U.S. at 438-39). Dissenting, Judge
Arnold agreed with the Tax Court majority, finding that "[t]he idea that the coach issued orders
to [the hockey players] in their capacity as corporate officers, which orders they then relayed to
themselves as corporate employees, is fanciful." Id. at 1261 (Arnold, C.J., dissenting). This
idea, of course, is no more "fanciful" than the idea that a corporation has a separate existence as
a legal and taxpaying entity. As Justice Holmes observed:
[It leads nowhere to call a corporation a fiction. If it is a fiction it is a fiction created by
law with intent that it should be acted on as if true. The corporation is a person and its
ownership is a nonconductor that makes it impossible to attribute an interest in its
property to its members.
Klein v. Bd. of Supervisors, 282 U.S. 19, 24 (1930), quoted in Foglesong, 621 F.2d at 868 and
Keller, 77 Tax Ct. at 1031 n.20. If the property of a bona fide corporation cannot be attributed to
its members, the services provided by that corporation should not be so attributed either.
Indeed, the logical consequence of Judge Arnold's position would be that, for tax purposes, a
corporation could never act as the employer of its controlling shareholder.
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question outside the Eighth Circuit22 and to enforce its position in
administrative proceedings. In two recent private letter rulings, for
example, the Service reclassified a physician and several
veterinarians as employees of the clinics where they practiced, not-
withstanding the fact that each of these workers had incorporated,
and the corporations had executed all appropriate contracts.2 13 The
Service's latest reclassification efforts suggest that the analysis of
loan-outs has reached a critical juncture. If taxpayers expect other
circuits to adopt the Eighth Circuit's analysis, the use of loan-outs
may increase, especially in light of the government's intensified
scrutiny of taxpayers asserting independent contractor status.274
As noted earlier, the Treasury can assert two policy reasons in
support of its worker reclassification efforts: ease of enforcement and
272. The nonacquiescence states:
We disagree with both the manner in which the Eighth Circuit employed the
regulation provision as well as its conclusion that the PSC's controlled the taxpayers.
Further, it is our view that the Eighth Circuit improperly employed a form over sub-
stance analysis to the set of facts at issue herein by relying on the mere existence of the
taxpayers' contracts with their respective PSC's, rather than the control imposed di-
rectly upon the taxpayers by the team's coaching staff and management.
... The manner in which the taxpayers rendered their services to the team, sub-
ject to the coach's and club's control is, in our opinion, the determinative factor in resolv-
ing the question of by whom the taxpayers were actually employed.
... [T~he Service will continue to litigate this issue based upon the rationale es-
poused in this case by the Tax Court and will continue to defend the issue in all circuits
except the Eighth Circuit.
1991 AOD LEXIS 42, Action on Decision CC-1991-022 (Oct. 22, 1991). The Service noted that it
would not seek Supreme Court review in Sargent because no other circuit had addressed the
issue yet. Id. It reiterated its nonacquiescence in the recently promulgated Market Segment
Program Guidelines, 92 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) at d60 (cited in note 173).
The Service prevailed in its most recent effort to disregard an athlete's loan-out, in Leavell
v. Commissioner, 1995 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 8, 104 T.C. No. 6 (Jan. 30, 1995), in which the Tax
Court declined to follow the Eighth Circuit's Sargent decision. If it continues to litigate these
issues, the government will also have to address additional questions Sargent left unresolved.
First, assuming the corporate entity is disregarded, what will happen to the corporate pension
plan if, as in Sargent, the Service has declared it to be a qualified plan and the corporation has
already made substantial contributions, because a plan can only be tax qualified if it is main-
tained for the sole benefit of employees? I.R.C. § 401(a)(2) (1994). Second, how can the govern-
ment's position in Sargent be reconciled with I.R.C. § 3401(d)(1), which provides that the party
controlling wage payments (on Sargent's facts, the loan-out) is the employer for withholding tax
purposes, a rule that the courts have extended to FICA and FUTA? Third, can the govern-
ment's position be squared with the rule that, for FICA purposes, corporate officers (such as the
hockey player in Sargent) are employees of their corporations without regard to the common law
standards? I.R.C. § 3121 (d)(l) (1994). See generally Morgan and Goldberg, Employees and
Independent Contractors at 105.02, 108, 114, 614 (cited in note 190) (raising these questions).
273. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9219020 (Feb. 6, 1992) (physician); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9350002 (Sept. 3,
1993) (veterinarians).
274. See, for example, Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9350002 (Sept. 2, 1993) (involving an owner of an
animal health clinic who cited reliance on Sargent as a "reasonable basis" for treating incorpo-
rated workers as independent contractors).
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protection of workers.275 Whatever the merits of these arguments
with respect to unincorporated workers, they are not persuasive in
the case of workers who have incorporated in order to achieve inde-
pendent contractor status. Paternalistic concerns seem particularly
inappropriate with respect to workers sophisticated enough to incor-
porate, respect the corporate formalities, and file a corporate tax
return. The compliance rationale is only marginally more persuasive.
Withholding provides greater assurance that FICA, and income taxes
will be paid, and if withholding is to take place at all, someone must
be identified as the withholding agent. Reclassifying workers as
employees thus makes enforcement somewhat easier. However, the
worker who incorporates creates her own withholding agent. The
very existence of a loan-out corporation requires the filing of various
documents under state law, as well as a federal income tax return.
Thus, when a worker incorporates, withholding will take place with
respect to the worker's salary from the loan-out. The government's
enforcement burden is therefore only somewhat greater than when
that worker is treated as an employee of the service recipient, because
the number of potential withholding agents is greater. Against this
enforcement burden must be weighed the adverse consequences to the
taxpayer who, in effect, is not "allowed" to incorporate-that is, the
loss of some deductions, inability to use a fiscal year, and diminished
(or lost) access to tax-qualified retirement, insurance, medical, or
other fringe benefit plans designed to meet her needs. Congress has
made clear that the tax advantages of such benefits should be
available to corporations and those persons they employ. Any
exceptions to the favorable treatment Congress has provided should
have a sound basis in policy, and should be identified by Congress and
clearly delineated in the Code. By focusing on the extent to which a
corporation chooses to grant its clients the power to direct the work-
related activities of the corporation's employees, a business judgment
that is not relevant to whether that corporation and the employment
relationship exist in fact, the government's reliance on the "control"
test improperly attempts to circumvent the Code provisions.
C. Foreign Loan-Outs: The Lend-A-Star Rulings
The government's position in Sargent roughly parallels its
position with respect to foreign loan-outs formed by nonresidents,
275. See notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
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although the standards it has articulated for foreign loan-outs appear
to be even more stringent. Because foreign loan-outs present special
tax avoidance problems unique to the international context, the
government's position in these cases may rest on a stronger
foundation than in the domestic context.
Johansson v. United States276 illustrates the special problems
presented by foreign loan-outs. In that case, a Swedish boxer who
fought several matches in the United States formed a loan-out in
Switzerland and claimed Swiss residence for himself in order to in-
voke a tax treaty exemption applicable to Swiss residents employed
by Swiss entities.2 7 The taxpayer had entered an employment con-
tract with a newly formed Swiss corporationV8 of which he was the
"sole employee and sole source of revenue. 1279 Although the Fifth
Circuit conceded that the taxpayer's arrangement fit within the literal
terms of the treaty exemption, it employed a "substance over form"
analysis to conclude that disregarding such a formalistic employment
relationship would not "seriously encumber[]" the policy behind the
treaty exemption-assuring foreign enterprises "that they may freely
send their agents and employees into the other contracting state
without thereby subjecting those employees to the latter's taxes.' 8
After its victory in Johansson, the Service published a series of
Revenue Rulings, popularly known as the Lend-A-Star rulings, indi-
cating that, in most circumstances, it would disregard foreign loan-
outs utilized by treaty country residents who perform entertainment
services in the United States, regardless of whether the applicable
treaty contained an artistes and athletes clause. 1 The loan-out
would, in effect, be treated as an agent of the entertainer, rather than
vice versa. The examples provided in these rulings indicate that the
Service will treat a loan-out as the principal (that is, the employer) if
all of the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the artist does not own
276. 336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964).
277. Id. at 812.
278. Id. at 813. The employment contract preceded the formation of the corporation by two
weeks. Id. at 813 n.4.
279. Id. at 813. Although the taxliayer was not a director, and the court's opinion did not
indicate whether he was a shareholder, evidently his employment contract entitled him to
receive 70% of the corporation's gross income, plus expenses and a pension. Id. The opinion
also notes that he "conducted his affairs largely independent of [the corporation's] sole director
or its stockholders." Id.
280. Id. at 814. The court also held that the boxer was not a Swiss resident, id. at 812-13,
but advanced its loan-out analysis as an independent rationale. Id. at 813.
281. See, for example, Rev. Rul. 74-330, 1974-2 Cur. Bull. 278; Rev. Rul. 74-331, 1974-2
Cur. Bull. 282. These Revenue Rulings have been incorporated in the Treasury Regulations.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-4(a)(1) (1960). See also Rev. Rul. 75-503, 1975-2 Cum. Bull. 352
(applying Rev. Rul. 74-330 to a foreign boxer's arrangement with his manager).
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stock in, or otherwise exercise control over, the loan-out; (2) the artist
receives only a fixed salary not measured by profits; (3) the artist has
a continuing work relationship with the loan-out; (4) the artist cannot
veto the terms of any contract the loan-out negotiates, and does not
restrict the loan-out's use of his services; (5) the loan-out furnishes
the tools and "place of performance," and has the right to control the
details of the artist's performance; (6) the loan-out assumes the fman-
cial risk of the artist's performance; and (7) the artist's services are
part of the "regular business" of the corporation. 2s2 The rulings imply
that all of these conditions must be satisfied. The typical loan-out
clearly would not satisfy all of these tests.23
The Lend-A-Star rulings, while directed at foreign loan-outs
used by nonresident entertainers, are based on familiar principles
often applied to domestic loan-outs: the sham incorporation and
assignment of income doctrines, the arm's length standard of Section
482, and the common law indicia of an employment relationship. In
the domestic context, however, the government has never required a
taxpayer to establish that all of the common law factors indicate in-
dependent contractor status. Thus, the Lend-A-Star rulings appear to
demand a higher level of scrutiny than has been applied to domestic
loan-outs.284 Still, nothing in the rulings themselves would appear to
preclude such a broader application. 285
Considerations unique to international taxation may justify
the Lend-A-Star rulings. As discussed in Part II.B.4,286 some foreign
individuals employed by foreign loan-outs can escape United States
taxation altogether under treaty provisions that exempt nonresident
282. 1974-2 Cum. Bull. at 280-82, 285. These requirements track some of the key indicia of
independent contractor status under the common law test. See, for example, Rev. Rul. 87-41,
1987-1 Cum. Bull. 296; Rev. Rul. 75-41, 1975-1 Cum. Bull. 323. See also note 190 and
accompanying text.
283. See generally Stiglitz and Lawson, Tax Planning for Entertainers, Artists and Athletes
at 71-72 (cited in note 59). These authors also suggest that Treas. Regs. § 31.3401(a)(6)-(1)(e),
1.1441-6(c) and 1.1441-4(b) are inconsistent with the Lend-A-Star rulings. Id. at 72.
284. To the extent that the standard imposed on foreign loan-outs is more demanding than
that imposed on domestic loan-outs, the Lend-a-Star rulings may violate treaty nondiscrimina-
tion requirements. See, for example, 1992 OECD Model Income Tax Treaty, Art. 24 (cited in
note 61). However, because the higher level of scrutiny is designed to prevent the foreign
worker from completely avoiding a tax liability to which a domestic corporation or individual
ordinarily would be subject, the difference in treatment may be sufficiently justified to be
compatible with United States treaty obligations. See generally Michael J. McIntyre, The
International Income Tax Rules of the United States § 2/El (Butterworth Legal, 1991).
285. See Stiglitz and Lawson, Tax Planning for Entertainers, Artists and Athletes at 36-37
(cited in note 59).
286. See notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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alien employees of foreign employers. In addition, nonresident aliens
such as the taxpayer in Johansson have often incorporated in a coun-
try other than their country of residence or citizenship solely to take
advantage of a favorable tax treaty between the United States and the
country of incorporation. Both of these scenarios arise because of
provisions contained in tax treaties rather than in the Code. Thus,
disregarding loan-outs designed to capitalize on favorable treaties can
preserve the intent of Congress when broadly drafted treaty provi-
sions threaten to undermine that intent.27
These special considerations have no bearing on domestic loan-
out corporations. Yet even after the Sargent reversal the government
continues to apply substance over form arguments similar to those of
the Lend-A-Star rulings whenever it believes that a properly formed
domestic corporation should be treated as an agent of its controlling
shareholder. As discussed in Part IV, in most cases, a thorough
agency analysis dictates the opposite conclusion.
IV. THE BOLLINGER APPROACH
A sounder approach to the loan-out problem is to recognize the
separate taxpayer status of a properly formed loan-out, and apply
agency principles to determine whether the individual or the corpora-
tion is the principal in any given transaction. A substantial line of
authority addresses whether purported agency relationships between
related taxpayers should be respected for tax purposes. Under the
agency approach, loan-out transactions can be scrutinized, and recast
where necessary, without disregarding the existence of a properly
formed corporation.
The seminal tax case addressing corporate agency is Moline
Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,2s8 in which the Commissioner, con-
tending that the corporation was a mere agent for the shareholder,
sought to tax a corporation's capital gains to its sole shareholder. The
287. By ignoring the separate existence of an artist's or athlete's loan-out, and/or denying
treaty benefits to certain treaty-country corporations that: (1) are beneficially owned by third-
country residents; (2) zero out their taxable income by making deductible payments to third-
country residents; or (3) are formed principally to obtain treaty benefits, the specific anti-treaty-
shopping provisions in newer treaties address these abuses more directly. See, for example,
U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, Art. 16 (restricting treaty benefits available to an entity resident
in a contracting state but owned by residents of another state); United Kingdom, Art. 16
(similar) (cited in note 61). See generally H. David Rosenbloom, Tax Treaty Abuse: Policies and
Issues, 15 L. & Pol. Intl. Bus. 763 (1983). See also note 66 (discussing anti-treaty shopping
rules).
288. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
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Supreme Court rejected the agency characterization: 'There was no
actual contract of agency, nor the usual incidents of an agency
relationship. Surely the mere fact of the existence of a corporation
with one or several stockholders, regardless of the corporation's
business activities, does not make the corporation the agent of its
stockholders."2 89 The Court added that "the question of agency or not
depends on the same legal issues as does the question of identity"
between shareholder and corporation.290 On that question, as noted
earlier,291 the Court held that "so long as th[e] purpose [of
incorporating] is the equivalent of business activity or is followed by
the carrying on of business by the corporation, the corporation
remains a separate taxable entity.292
One fact that distinguished Moline from the typical loan-out
arrangement was the Moline shareholder's "negligible" exercise of
control over the corporation.293 Control, however, was clearly present
several years later in National Carbide Corporation v.
Commissioner,294 in which three wholly owned subsidiaries of a corpo-
ration agreed to operate their plants as "agents" for their parent and
to pay virtually all of their profits, except nominal sums that each
subsidiary reported as income, to the parent. The Supreme Court
refused to hold that the mere existence of a control relationship
proved that the controlled entities were agents of the shareholder.
Instead, the Court held that the subsidiaries were taxable on their
profits, and treated the agreement to pay their profits to the parent as
an anticipatory assignment of income.295 The Court acknowledged
that it was possible for a controlled subsidiary to be a "true" agent of
its parent, and set forth four indicia and two requirements for finding
an agency relationship under such circumstances:
[1] Whether the corporation operates in the name and for the account of
the principal, [2] binds the principal by its actions, [3] transmits money re-
ceived to the principal, and [4] whether receipt of income is attributable to the
services of employees of the principal and to assets belonging to the principal
289. Id. at 440.
290. Id. at 440-41.
291. See notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
292. Moline Properties, 319 U.S. at 439.
293. Id. at 440.
294. 336 U.S. 422 (1949).
295. Id. at 434-36. The Court concluded that no agency relationship existed where the
subsidiaries represented themselves to their customers as the principals in the transaction,
attempted to shield the parent from service of process, and used thousands of their own employ-
ees and millions of dollars of their own assets in their operations. Id. at 425, 434, 438, 438 n.21.
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are some of the relevant considerations in determining whether a true agency
exists. [51 If the corporation is a true agent, its relations with its principal
must not be dependent upon the fact that it is owned by the principal, if such
is the case. [6] Its business purpose must be the carrying on of the normal du-
ties of an agent. 9
6
With its 1988 decision in Commissioner v. Bollinger,297 the
Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the fifth National Carbide
factor, thereby making it possible for taxpayers to predict with
greater accuracy when a corporation would be treated as an agent of
its controlling shareholders. In Bollinger, each of several real estate
partnerships formed a corporation to hold title to the partnership's
real property for the sole purpose of borrowing funds at rates higher
than the state's usury law permitted for noncorporate buyers. When
the partnership reported the income and losses from the property on
its tax return, the Commissioner reallocated these amounts to the
nominee corporation, treating it not as the partnership's agent but as
the true owner of the property. The Commissioner contended that the
corporation lacked agency status because it did not satisfy the fifth
and sixth National Carbide factors.
The Supreme Court rejected the Commissioner's characteriza-
tion.295 With regard to the sixth factor, the Court concluded that the
nominee's business purpose was "the carrying on of the normal duties
of an agent," because the partnership represented itself as the princi-
pal to all parties involved with the loans:299 ' The lenders, contractors,
managers, employees, and tenants-all who had contact with the
development-knew that the corporation was merely the agent of the
partnership, if they knew of the existence of the corporation at all."3°0
296. Id. at 437 (citations omitted). Subsequent cases have indicated that only the fifth and
sixth of these factors are mandatory. Bollinger, 485 U.S. at 340, 346-47 (referring to National
Carbide as establishing four "indicia" and two "requirements'; Roccaforte v. Commissioner, 708
F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the first four conditions in National Carbide are only
"relevant considerations" and that only the last two are mandatory and absolute); Ourisman v.
Commissioner, 760 F.2d 541, 547-48 (4th Cir. 1985) (same); First Chicago Corp. v.
Commissioner, 96 Tax Ct. 421, 447 n.17 (1991) (same).
297. 485 U.S. 340 (1988).
298. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to resolve a circuit split over the tax
status of corporate nominees. Id. at 341. Compare George v. Commissioner, 803 F.2d 144, 148
(5th Cir. 1986) (stating that the existence of agency is not based on ownership) with Frink v.
Commissioner, 798 F.2d 106, 109-10 (4th Cir. 1986) (considering ownership as a factor in finding
that an agency relationship existed).
299. 485 U.S. at 347. This finding of fact is somewhat difficult to accept, because, under
state law, the partnership would not have been able to borrow funds at the high interest rate
the lender charged the corporation. The implication is that the lender knew that the true
borrower was the partnership, and was willing to cooperate with the partnership in misleading
the state authorities.
300. Id. at 345.
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As to the fifth National Carbide factor-the requirement that the
nominee's "relations with its principal not be dependent upon the fact
that it is owned by the principal"--the Court found that the meaning
of this test was "at the risk of understatement, not entirely clear."301
In an observation that seems particularly pertinent to the "control"
question in the loan-out context, the Court noted that: 'Ultimately,
the relations between a corporate agent and its owner-principal are
always dependent upon the fact of ownership, in that the owner can
cause the relations to be altered or terminated at any time.''302
Rather than conclude that "all subsidiary-parent agencies [are]
invalid for tax purposes, a position which the National Carbide opin-
ion specifically disavowed,"303 the Bollinger Court interpreted the fifth
factor as simply a restatement of the concern that "the separate-entity
doctrine of Moline not be subverted."304 In effect, the Bollinger Court
interpreted the fifth factor as an expression of concern that the
Commissioner not be whipsawed by a standard that would give
shareholders free rein to wait until after the occurrence of taxable
events to assert agent or principal status retroactively, depending on
which status would lower their tax liability.305
The Bollinger Court agreed that it was reasonable to require,
as a condition of recognizing the corporation as a genuine agent,
"unequivocal evidence of genuineness in the corporation-shareholder
context, in order to prevent evasion of Moline," but it refused to hold
that a taxpayer could meet this requirement only by showing an arm's
length relationship between the corporation and its shareholders,
including the payment of an agency fee.306 Instead, the Court held:
It seems to us that the genuineness of the agency relationship is ade-
quately assured, and tax-avoiding manipulation adequately avoided, when the
fact that the corporation is acting as agent for its shareholders with respect to
a particular asset is set forth in a written- agreement at the time that asset is
301. Id. at 348-49.
302. Id. at 349.
303. Id.
304. Id.. See also First Chicago Corp., 96 Tax Ct. at 447-48 (stating that the "decision and
rationale in Bollinger is an attempt at balancing a concern for the viability of the concept in
Moline with situations where tax consequences should flow through a corporation which is
acting as a 'genuine agent' i).
305. Bollinger, 485 U.S. at 345-46. See also Greenberg v. Commissioner, 56 Tax Ct. Mem.
Dec. (CCH) 1030, 1032 (1989) (stating that Moline Properties would be undermined if
shareholders could wait until the end of the year and choose whether to claim agent or owner
status).
306. Bollinger, 485 U.S. at 349.
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acquired, the corporation functions as agent and not principal with respect to
the asset for all purposes, and the corporation is held out as the agent and not
principal in all dealings with third parties relating to the asset.30 7
The Supreme Court did not indicate whether the three tests
were mandatory or merely illustrative of the kind of "unequivocal
evidence" required to show that a corporation is acting as an agent of
its controlling shareholder(s). Although treating the three tests as
mandatory would provide certainty and eliminate some evidentiary
problems, the requirement of a written agency agreement could also
prevent the government from finding that a corporation acted as a
shareholder's agent even when the overall facts and circumstances
clearly indicate an agency relationship. It seems unlikely that the
Supreme Court would allow taxpayers to avoid agency status by such
formalistic inaction-that is, by declining to put their agency agree-
ment in writing.3°8
Thus, if a written agency agreement were a prerequisite to
agency status for a controlled corporation, taxpayers would have no
difficulty ensuring that their loan-outs would be treated as principals.
In contrast, if other forms of "unequivocal evidence" of the agency
relationship are acceptable, then there surely will be instances in
which a loan-out should be treated as an agent of its shareholder-
employee because the overall conduct of the parties supports that
characterization. Where the loan-out is not a sham entity and evi-
dence of its agency role is lacking, however, the loan-out's status as
the principal in a transaction should be respected (assuming, of
course, that the shareholder-employee has respected all corporate
formalities).309 The fact that both the loan-out and the employee-
shareholder consistently respect the employment contract, and that
the corporation is identified as the principal in contracts with third
parties, as required by the Johnson court, should indicate that the
employee-shareholder is acting as an agent of the corporation.
307. Id. at 349-50.
308. See Advance Homes v. Commissioner, 59 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 906, 909 (1990)
(holding that the tests are only illustrative and that written agency agreement is not required);
Charfoos v. Commissioner, 62 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCH) 32, 39 n.4 (1991) (finding the three
"tests" merely factors, not dispositive).
309. Compare Charfoos, 62 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (CCI-) at 40 (rejecting taxpayer's claim of
agency relationship where corporation incurred debt on its own behalf, entered contracts with
third parties on its own behalf, and sold property in its own name, where the corporation's
actions were not binding on the shareholder, where it was unclear whether the corporation
remitted its gross receipts to the shareholder, where money the shareholder received was not
attributable to shareholder's own assets, where the corporation did not carry out the normal
duties of an agent, and where the corporation held itself out to third parties as the principal).
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To be a principal under National Carbide and Bollinger, a cor-
poration should not receive income from the use of assets that it lacks
the legal authority to exploit.310 The employee-shareholder, therefore,
should transfer to the loan-out any assets (including intangibles) that
may be essential to the entity's income-producing activity. The right
to exploit the employee's services is one such asset; hence the impor-
tance of a valid employment contract. However, there are many other
assets a loan-out might exploit. A performer, for example, should
transfer her right of publicity, because it will typically have to be
licensed to any third party that contracts for her services. A writer
would have to transfer the copyright in any completed works that
might be sold or licensed to third parties.311 Such transfers could take
the form of capital contributions, loans, sales, leases, or licenses. In
the case of any transfer other than a capital contribution, any pay-
ments the shareholder receives from the loan-out in exchange for such
assets must reflect arm's length bargaining. To the extent those
payments represent deductible interest, rents, or royalties, of course,
the deductions will help to zero out the loan-out's income.
There may be situations where evidence of the loan-out's
agency status is equivocal. In such cases, well-settled doctrines in-
cluding, but not limited to, assignment of income, sham incorporation,
and Section 482 should suffice to determine the true nature of the
transaction. Thus, when a shareholder-employee treats the
corporation simply as a source of personal funds, the corporation may
be disregarded as a sham, or the withdrawn funds may be regarded as
constructive dividends (subject to double taxation if the corporation
has not elected S status). In addition, when a shareholder-employee
signs one third party contract as an officer (that is, agent) of the loan-
out and another as an individual, but directs the third party in each
case to make all payments to the corporation, the assignment of
income doctrine applies, and income earned under the contract the
shareholder executed as an individual should be taxable to the
310. National Carbide, 336 U.S. at 437.
311. Copyright in works created while the writer was employed by the loan-out should vest
in the corporation ab initio under the work-made-for-hire rules of copyright law. See note 198.
However, it is possible that the copyright law might not respect every employment relationship
that is respected for tax purposes. Thus, in order to ensure that the loan-out is the owner of the
asset, the writer should execute a separate contract transferring any interest she might be
deemed to have in those copyrights to the loan-out. Otherwise, income from use or disposition
of the asset might be deemed to accrue directly to the writer. See Fox, 37 Bd. Tax App. at 272-
73, 278 (by transferring copyrights in completed works to the loan-out, taxpayer gave loan-out
the right to any earnings arising therefrom).
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individual (who may then be deemed to have made a capital
contribution or loan to the corporation), while income earned under
the contract the shareholder executed as a representative of the loan-
out should be taxable to the corporation. As these examples
illustrate, in any case where the loan-out's agency status is unclear,
the particular facts and circumstances should lend themselves to
analysis under existing doctrines consistent with Moline Properties.
As long as there exists a valid employment contract between the loan-
out and its employee-owner, there should be no role for worker
reclassification in the agency analysis.
If the government persists in defending the position it staked
out in Sargent, it will run squarely into the Bollinger line of authority.
Based on the facts presented in the Sargent opinions, the hockey
players' loan-outs should have been treated as principals under
Bollinger.312 The logical consequence of the government's position on
loan-outs is that Bollinger would foreclose the taxpayers in Sargent
from treating their corporations as agents, and Sargent would fore-
close them from treating their corporations as principals. Bollinger
expressed concern that taxpayers might whipsaw the government if
agency status were not clearly defined. If the Service has its way, it
will be the taxpayer who is whipsawed.3 13
V. CONCLUSION
Worker reclassification arguments such as those advanced by
the government in Sargent are an inappropriate response to the use of
loan-out corporations by service providers seeking the economic and
tax benefits of incorporation. In ruling for the government in Sargent,
the Tax Court attempted to apply the common law test of employee
status to a task for which it was not designed-identifying the
312. Pflug is a more difficult case, only because the opinion does not contain sufficient facts
for an adequate agency analysis. It is quite possible, however, that on a more complete factual
record the loan-out in that case would qualify as a principal under Bollinger.
313. In effect, the government would be able to choose when to treat a loan-out as an agent,
but the taxpayer would have no choice. In its discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in
Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. at 476, which used a "control" analysis to disallow losses incurred on
a sale of property to the taxpayer's controlled corporation, the Ninth Circuit in Laughton ob-
served:
It is arguable that the Higgins decision means that no matter what the particular
'tax event' may be, if it be more profitable to the tax collector to disregard the interven-
ing corporate entity this must be done. However, it seems to us that if this were the in-
tent of the court it would have said so and not spread its consideration of the cases over
many pages of the opinion. ..
Laughton, 113 F.2d at 104.
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employer of a worker who is already conceded to be an employee. The
Court applied this test without considering whether the public policy
underlying the distinction had any relevance to the issue in the case.
In doing so, the Tax Court endorsed the Treasury's "back-door" effort
to disregard a properly formed corporation.
Respecting the separate taxpayer status of closely-held service
corporations regardless of the nature of the services provided, and the
number of parties receiving those services, would erase the inequity of
the current dichotomy, which treats "traditional" professional
practices as appropriate for incorporation. It would also simplify the
worker classification problem by offering taxpayers a safe harbor
guaranteeing them independent contractor status if they conduct
their business in corporate form. This approach would provide
certainty for taxpayers and would reduce the cost of conducting the
audits and litigation engendered by worker reclassification.
The agency analysis proposed in this Article offers both the
government and taxpayers a clearer roadmap than the em-
ployee/independent contractor analysis, and eliminates the conflict
between the latter approach and the principles of Moline Properties.
Moreover, the assignment of income doctrine, the sham incorporation
doctrine, and Section 482 remain available to police any fraudulent
transactions, as well as any transactions in which the corporation is a
mere assignee or collector of funds derived from transactions in which
it played no role at all. Historically, these doctrines have successfully
identified the true earner of income in a wide variety of factual con-
texts. Where, as in Sargent, these doctrines have indicated that a
loan-out is the true earner, the government's leap to the em-
ployee/independent contractor analysis represents an ill-conceived
departure from settled principles of tax law.
A return to these sounder principles, of course, will require the
government to respect the status of loan-outs that would be disre-
garded under the position articulated in the Sargent nonacquiescence.
The government's major concern about abandoning the misclassifica-
tion attack on loan-outs will no doubt be loss of revenues. However,
losses due to noncompliance by independent contractors can and
should be addressed by improving enforcement. For example, payors
can be required to report payments made to incorporated independent
contractors rather than only payments made to sole proprietors as
under current law. In addition, any losses caused by the use of fiscal
years by loan-outs can be mitigated if Congress expands the definition
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of a PSC for purposes of Section 441 so that more corporations (not
necessarily limited to loan-outs) will be forced onto calendar years.
Other lost revenues may arise from larger contributions to
retirement plans, deduction of expenses at the corporate level rather
than the individual level, and the use of tax-favored fringe benefit
plans by employee-shareholders. However, these losses result directly
from Congress's decision to treat corporate taxpayers (and, in some
cases, sole proprietors) more favorably than employees. As long as
this disparity exists, it is only rational for workers to operate in the
corporate form if at all possible. It is well-settled that "[a]ny one may
so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is
not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury.' '314
Current law makes it relatively easy for workers in capital intensive
businesses, and those in the traditional service professions who serve
the public at large, to minimize their taxes by maximizing the benefits
of incorporation. Any policy that denies comparable benefits to work-
ers who render services exclusively to one or a few recipients bears a
heavy burden of justification.315
Congress has the power, of course, to end the benefits of loan-
outs by enacting legislation comparable to the grantor trust rules,3 16
which tax the grantor on income from property held in a trust if the
grantor retains the power to reclaim title to that property. A similar
rule could be designed for controlled corporations, whereby a corpora-
tion would be disregarded for some or all federal tax purposes if a
single shareholder had a designated degree of control (for example,
beneficial ownership of more than some specified percentage of the
stock). Alternatively, the same effect would follow if a rule were
adopted which required a corporation to have more than one owner in
order to satisfy the tax definition of a corporation.317 Either approach,
314. Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), afld 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
315. For example, Congress's rationales for subjecting unreimbursed employee expenses to
the 2% floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions suggest that the same treatment should be
applied to sole proprietors and traditional professional corporations; in addition, several of those
rationales could apply to corporations in general. See note 11.
316. I.R.C. § 676 (1994); but see Vnuk v. Commissioner, 621 F.2d 1318, 1320-21 (8th Cir.
1980) (applying grantor trust rules to impose tax on individual despite claim he was employee of
the trust he created, but distinguishing several loan-out cases because those corporations had
the legal right to direct workers' activities).
317. The Code itself does not define "corporation." Section 301.7701-2 of the Treasury
Regulations sets forth the familiar definition. Although it requires the entity to have
"associates," the regulation has not been interpreted as barring single-shareholder corporations.
If Congress were to adopt a multiple-owner rule, provision would have to be made to prevent
formalistic evasion of the rule-for example, by issuing a single share of stock to a second
person. In addition, provision could be made for temporary and inadvertent loss of the second
shareholder (for example, where one of only two shareholders dies and the second shareholder
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of course, would eradicate the separate tax status of any corporation
controlled by one individual or entity because it would apply regard-
less of the nature of the corporation's business activities. Thus, the
rule would eliminate the separate taxpayer status of all wholly owned
subsidiaries as well as one-person professional corporations formed by
individual lawyers, physicians, and accountants, and individuals
engaged in businesses traditionally viewed as independent-for
example, plumbers, retailers, manufacturers, and consultants. If
Congress were to apply such a rule only to traditionally nonself-em-
ployed workers-athletes, entertainers, nurses, truck drivers, and
clerical workers, for example-the affected taxpayers would surely
demand a justification for the distinction. Thus, any policy that
would be advanced by disregarding loan-outs should be evaluated
publicly in the appropriate policy-making forum. Until Congress
takes action, it is overreaching for the Treasury itself to create such a
distinction by a "back-door" method such as worker reclassification.
At the policy level, advocates of disregarding loan-outs while
respecting other controlled corporations should bear a heavy burden
of justification. That burden was not satisfied in the enactment of
Section 269A, a hasty measure that ultimately proved ineffective. Its
failure reflects the lack of deliberation and debate which accompanied
its enactment. If Congress revisits the question of closely held service
corporations, it should do so in a more considered and careful manner.
If there is any inequity or irrationality in the tax benefits cur-
rently enjoyed by loan-outs, it is not in the fact that taxpayers may
achieve tax savings through the mere formalism of incorporating.
Rather, it is in the fact that such formalism is necessary to achieve
those tax savings. To restore rationality to the taxation of personal
services, the answer is not to disregard a properly formed corporation
but instead to change the tax laws that make this formalism neces-
sary. The amount of business, medical, insurance, and retirement
plan deductions available to a worker should not turn on how many
different parties receive the worker's services in a given period of
time. Although that is the effect of current law, it is not a rational tax
policy. Until individual employees receive tax benefits comparable to
those of independent contractors and corporations, courts and the
government should respect the formalism of incorporating a service
business and "lending" the employee to a third party as a rational
response to these discriminatory features of the tax system.
inherits the decedents shares). It is unlikely that Congress would enact such a multiple-owner
test.
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